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Observers of British politics have begun to expect the unexpected in British 
elections. The general elections of 2015 and 2017 were among the most volatile 
in British electoral history. The outcome of the 2015 General Election delivered 
the highest share of votes on record for parties other than the traditional big 
three (Labour, the Conservatives, and the Liberal Democrats). Only two years 
later, the 2017 General Election delivered the highest combined Labour and 
Conservative two-party share since 1970. Underlying these results, the electorate 
has become increasingly volatile at the individual level, as more and more people 
switch their party support between general elections.
Why have British politics and the British party system become destabilized? 
How can we explain the extraordinary election outcomes in Britain in 2015 and 
2017 and the turbulent period of British politics in which we find ourselves? These 
are the questions we answer in this book.
Our explanation shows how long-term, gradual changes in voter volatility and 
the impact of electoral shocks have combined to radically transform the political 
landscape. We show that increased voter volatility is driven, in part, by a weaken-
ing of voters’ partisan attachments—a process known as partisan dealignment—
together with the growth of smaller parties (or ‘party system fragmentation’). 
Party identities act as a stabilizing force. When voters interpret the political world 
through the lens of partisanship, they are less likely to be swayed and rocked by 
the political winds. The British party system now has less of this kind of ballast. 
Partisan dealignment means that, compared to previous decades, fewer people 
have strong identity-based attachments to political parties and are more likely to 
switch parties than voters in the past.
On its own, partisan dealignment does not explain the results of recent elections. 
Voters might be more likely to switch parties than in the past, but that does not 
tell us which voters are switching to which parties, and why. To properly under-
stand political change, we need to consider the electoral shocks that have acted as 
catalysts for large-scale vote-switching in particular directions in the election out-
comes we set out to explain. We focus on five electoral shocks, each of which had 
a major impact on either the 2015 or 2017 elections, or on both. These are: (i) the 
substantial rise in immigration after 2004, particularly immigration from Eastern 
Europe; (ii) the Global Financial Crisis prior to 2010; (iii) the coalition govern-
ment of the Conservatives and the Liberal Democrats between 2010 and 2015; 
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(iv) the Scottish independence referendum in 2014; and (v) the European 
Union (EU) referendum in 2016. Each of these electoral shocks leads us to revise 
our understanding of recent British elections and how different variables have 
shaped vote choices over time, and why.
Electoral shocks are having a remarkable impact on election outcomes now 
because they are happening within an electorate less constrained by strong party 
loyalties. This need not be the inevitable state of play in the future if new political 
divides—such as those around Brexit—anchor voters to political parties, or if 
 levels of partisanship increase in the future. However, our analysis of trends in 
partisan dealignment suggests that the decline may be unrelenting, as older 
cohorts with strong identities are leaving the electorate and being replaced with 
newer cohorts with much weaker partisan attachments. Electoral shocks look set 
to continue to play a major role in British elections, and individual-level volatility 
is likely to remain high. These factors are also present in a large number of other 
countries, as well as in Britain. Our arguments and analysis are not just relevant 
to British electoral politics, although the specifics in British election outcomes are 
driven by the electoral shocks and the choices on offer in British politics.
Electoral shocks are not defined by their consequences. A major electoral 
shock could occur within a political system and its effects be absorbed by existing 
political divisions. Whether a shock disrupts politics depends on the way in 
which shocks are politicized and how parties compete over the fallout. 
Electoral shocks offer politicians opportunities to which they may—or may not—
strategically respond, and respond in different ways. Shocks create political and 
strategic uncertainty, and allow, therefore, for unanticipated consequences and 
opportunities.
Each of the electoral shocks in this book shares the same features in common. 
We define them by the following characteristics:
Electoral shocks are an abrupt change to the status quo. They are not necessarily 
exogenous to the party system, but they are more than simply the outcomes of normal 
everyday politics. They represent a significant and often unanticipated change.
Electoral shocks are manifest over prolonged time periods and are highly salient: 
they have the potential to be noticed and recognized even by people who do not have 
much interest in politics, and by people who might otherwise select into information 
that fits their partisan beliefs and preconceptions. Electoral shocks are, therefore, 
very difficult for voters and politicians to ignore.
Electoral shocks are politically relevant and they have the potential to change how 
parties are perceived and therefore to reshape the party system.
Electoral shocks vary in the degree to which they are short-term and longer-term. 
A shock, as we define it and think about it, differs from how the term has often 
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been used in quantitative political science and economics. That is to say, we do 
not define a shock as a temporary and short-lived event that creates a sharp spike in 
a time-series which then quickly returns to its former equilibrium. We are interested 
in shocks that change a system—the British political system. Understanding the 
longer-term evolution and complex outcomes of electoral shocks is one of the 
contributions we offer in this book. None of the shocks we identify have had only 
short-lived consequences, and many are likely to last well into the future, and 
some have already had impacts spanning more than one election. This reflects the 
significance of electoral shocks, the varied ways in which voters and parties 
respond, and the way they are given attention in politics and in the media. Shocks 
may therefore alter the equilibrium.
Electoral shocks vary in their form. For example, they may be political 
events, campaigns, referendums, institutional changes, or the consequences of 
particular policies. The way in which a shock affects electoral politics varies too. 
The effect of the Global Financial Crisis was not just a high-profile shock to the 
economy and to Labour’s reputation for economic competence; it was also the 
beginning of a long-term policy shift towards austerity and continued political 
competition around the level of national debt, political responsibility and blame. 
The EU referendum and Scottish independence referendum differed in their 
outcomes—the former leading to the outcome of Brexit, the latter to a vote 
for  the status quo. However, both led to the electoral expression of identities 
made salient by the referendums and the realignment of voters to parties on 
these divisions. The example of Scotland illustrates how shocks are not neces-
sarily independent in their effects. In 2017 the Scottish independence referen-
dum and the EU referendum combined to influence the outcome of the General 
Election in Scotland.
Electoral shocks provide an overarching explanation that departs in a signifi-
cant way from a focus on a single causal assumption, a fixed set of variables, a 
specific type of statistical model, or one particular electoral outcome. This is not a 
book about one particular party’s rise and fall, a single election outcome removed 
from its wider context, or an argument for the supremacy of one set of bottom-up 
or top-down processes, distant or proximate in the causal chain of electoral 
choice. That would, we believe, be a mistake, given the broader and longer-term 
changes to the British party system that need to be explained and understood. 
Instead, building on the foundations of the existing literature, we are seeking to 
understand why the party system has been exhibiting considerable volatility and 
instability, offering an explanation that can cover both the pre- and post-EU 
referendum periods, that can account for the divergent fortunes of political parties 
across the political spectrum, and that can be applied into the future as well as 
into the past. An explanation of electoral shocks—combined with our empirical 
analysis of how, and why, electoral shocks are shaping political behaviour—offers 
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an approach to understanding broad system-level change, and it applies across 
time, elections, and also across countries.
We offer a multitude of different insights into the routes to party choice in 
the two previous general elections within the broader context of volatility. We 
do not provide an exhaustive list of how electoral shocks may potentially shape 
electoral behaviour. We do not, after all, have a complete list of historic or 
future shocks on which to base our analysis. However, five broad important 
themes run throughout:
1  The broader electoral context has become significantly more volatile
There have been a number of long-term, gradual, social and political changes 
that have fundamentally changed the electoral context, making elections 
more volatile. The first key driver of volatility is partisan dealignment—the 
weakening of voters’ attachments to political parties. As we explain in a 
detailed chapter on partisan dealignment and volatility, partisan dealign-
ment is itself a more general phenomenon of generational change. The sec-
ond key driver is party system fragmentation (the rise of smaller parties) 
which has contributed to greater electoral volatility because of the tendency 
of voters of smaller parties to switch from one election to the next. However, 
we cannot properly understand the increase in volatility in British elections 
without appreciating the role of shocks.
2  Electoral shocks can alter party images, reputations, and perceived 
positions on issues
The 2010–15 Conservative–Liberal Democrat coalition substantially reshaped 
voters’ perceptions of the Liberal Democrats. Our analysis shows that the 
decision to enter coalition government with the Conservatives was a repu-
tational turning point for the Liberal Democrats that was to continue through 
the 2015 and 2017 general elections. The impact of coalition helps explain 
not only the Liberal Democrat collapse in 2015 but also why the Liberal 
Democrats failed to make significant inroads in the General Election of 
2017 off the back of the EU referendum result in 2016.
The EU referendum changed the image of the Conservatives. Having 
been divided during the campaign, but ostensibly pro-Remain in terms 
of Conservative leadership, the Conservative response to the referendum 
was to embrace the result of Brexit, such that voters began to perceive the 
Conservative Party as much more opposed to EU integration than they 
had done before the referendum. This meant that they were seen as the 
party of Brexit, allowing them to increase support among Leave voters 
in 2017.
When the Global Financial Crisis hit Britain, the effect on Labour’s com-
petence on the economy did not just influence vote choice in the immediate 
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general election that followed in 2010. It also influenced vote choice in 2015. 
One way in which economic crises have long-term effects on electoral 
behaviour is via their lasting effects on party competence. The Global 
Financial Crisis also provided an opportunity for parties to compete and 
win votes subsequently around austerity, competence, and responsibility and 
blame for the level of national debt.
3  Electoral shocks can shape the relevant dimensions of political choice
European immigration—and its politicization—contributed to the rise in 
elect or al significance of immigration, an increase in its correlation with 
attitudes towards the European Union, and in the overall importance of 
the cultural dimension in British politics. We chart how non-left—right 
issues became increasingly salient to the British public alongside the rise 
in immigration and the increase in media attention to immigration. This 
new set of issues has become increasingly related to electoral choice. This 
change preceded the 2016 EU referendum, but was then significantly 
accentuated in 2017 as large numbers of voters chose between parties on 
the basis of this newly salient dimension. The EU referendum caused a 
substantial increase in the electoral significance of liberal–authoritarian 
values alongside immigration attitudes and attitudes about Europe, deep-
ening demographic divides based on age and education, but softening 
those based on income. In a different way, Scottish nationalism became 
more important to Scottish general election vote choice in response to the 
Scottish independence referendum in 2014, shaping the 2015 and 2017 
election outcomes.
4  Partisan dealignment conditions the effects of electoral shocks
Since electoral shocks are not defined by their consequences, we can under-
stand their importance by the context in which they happen, as well as the 
ways in which political actors respond and compete around them. There are 
some contexts under which electoral shocks should have weaker effects, 
such as in periods of strong partisan alignment, and others in which their 
effects will be magnified, such as periods of weak partisan alignment. 
One reason that shocks are having such destabilizing consequences in con-
temporary British politics is the context of weakening partisan attachments. 
Partisan dealignment has weakened the ties between voters and parties 
and led to increasing between-election switching in the British electorate 
(individual-level volatility). The impact of electoral shocks is  therefore 
amplified by volatility, as unattached voters are more easily moved by 
the force of a shock.
5 The effects of electoral shocks are contingent
In all of our chapters and explanations about the effects of electoral shocks 
there is a story about the central role of politics: the ways in which parties 
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compete around shocks and offer voters a choice, and the degree to which 
the media contributes to the salience and politicization of new issues, 
identities, and party performance. This means that electoral shocks are not 
independent changes that always have the same potential to switch vote 
choices, or will do so in predictable or linear ways. Political actors may 
magnify the effects of a shock by competing around them, or they may not. 
Our story is therefore also about political supply: how the number of parties—
and their policies, leaders, competence, and viability—offer voters a basis to 
choose based on a particular political issue. The effects of elect or al shocks 
are contingent on the political response and competition around them.
1.1 Outline
The remainder of this book sets out to explain and demonstrate in detail how 
British politics has become more volatile, unpredictable, and turbulent.
Chapter 2 describes the key electoral outcomes we wish to explain and elab -
orates the changing patterns of volatility over consecutive elections, at both the 
aggregate and individual levels.
Chapter 3 sets out our concepts and expectations about electoral shocks in 
greater detail, how they work and the ways in which their effects are contingent 
on political competition and politicization.
Chapter 4 provides an explanation of how the wider context of voter volatility 
has come about over time. It demonstrates the role of partisan dealignment and 
the rise in voting for ‘other’ parties to account for the rise in individual-level vola-
tility in British elections.
The remaining five empirical chapters each focus on one of the electoral shocks 
listed above: the rise in European immigration (Chapter 5), the Global Financial 
Crisis (Chapter 6), the Conservative and Liberal Democrat coalition (Chapter 7), 
the Scottish independence referendum (Chapter  8), and the referendum on 
Britain’s membership of the European Union (Chapter 9). Each chapter demon-
strates how a particular electoral shock shaped political attitudes and vote choices 
in the 2015 and 2017 elections. The order of our chapters is broadly chronological, 
focusing on the effects of each shock as they occurred over time, each chapter 
examining the effects upon the relevant general election(s). Our book is, then, 
organized around our explanations, rather than on vote choices for different par-
ties, or separately on the elections of 2015 and 2017.
Our final chapter considers the implications of our broad explanation and 
analysis for the future of British politics. We cannot predict what will happen in 
future general elections, but we can identify the factors that will matter: the 
degree to which electoral shocks may further destabilize the party system, and 
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the degree to which partisan—or perhaps Brexit loyalties—provide a context for 
greater stability or destabilization of the British party system into the future.
1.2 Conclusion
This book offers a novel perspective on the wider context of the British electorate, 
focusing as it does on the trend towards greater electoral volatility over time. It 
demonstrates how shocks have contributed to the level of electoral volatility, and 
also which parties have benefited from the ensuing volatility. As such this book 
follows in the tradition of British Election Study (BES) books. We provide a com-
prehensive account of specific election outcomes—in our case the elections of 
2015 and 2017—and also a more general explanatory model for understanding 
electoral change.
Existing explanations of electoral behaviour in Britain have typically focused 
on explaining the outcome of one particular election or one party, the adoption of 
one particular variable-based explanation to assess against rival explanations, and 
pitting variables and explanations against each other to assess the primary 
im port ance of one explanation overall. Each of these approaches can give us valu-
able insights into different aspects of electoral behaviour, and each provides a 
foundation for an understanding and critique of the broad understanding of 
elect or al behaviour. They have been a feature of research that is applied to periods 
of stability or ‘normal’ political competition. However, these kinds of analytic 
approaches are less well-equipped to explain wider features of the system and 
sharp changes in outcomes and electoral behaviour that span multiple vote-
switching between different political parties over time. Our focus on electoral 
shocks offers an overarching explanation for the volatility in evidence in British 
elections, alongside the long-term trends that have led us to this point. It offers a 
way to understand the rise and fall of the UK Independence Party (UKIP), Labour’s 
disappointing 2015 performance and its later unexpected gains, the unexpected 
Conservative majority in 2015, the collapse in support for the Liberal Democrats, the 
dramatic gains of the Scottish National Party (SNP) in 2015, and the importance 
of the continuing period of tumultuous politics that has followed the General 
Election in 2017. It provides a new way of understanding electoral choice in Britain, 
and also beyond, and a greater understanding of the outcomes of recent elections.
As befitting a book from the BES team, we draw heavily on BES data, including 
not only data collected as part of the 2015–17 BES but data collected by previous 
BES teams going back to 1964. This long-running series of cross-sectional surveys 
provides invaluable evidence for measuring and analysing the long-term trends 
we refer to. For much of our analysis we rely on BES panel data, including 
data from our own thirteen-wave 2014–17 panel study, and also from inter-election 
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panels collected by previous BES teams (again going back to 1964). This reliance 
on panel data reflects the dynamic nature of electoral choice and the importance 
of electoral volatility in our story. At each election most voters do not arrive with 
a completely blank slate—they come with the baggage of a lifetime of political 
socialization and previous electoral choices. This book is about what drives voters 
to switch their electoral allegiances and more fundamentally about understanding 
profound electoral change in British politics; a topic that has central importance 
to an understanding of voters, elections, and the future of British political life.
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2
Volatility and Electoral Shocks
The period of British politics spanning the general elections of 2010 and 2017 was 
tumultuous, to say the least, and has been followed by an equally extraordinary 
period in British politics. The seven-year stretch between 2010 and 2017 saw five 
years of coalition government, three referendums, a general election in which 
minor parties achieved their highest ever vote share, and another that delivered 
the highest two-party vote share since 1970. In the space of two years, in 2015 and 
2017, we witnessed first the heralding of the fragmentation of the British party 
system, and then the apparent rebirth of the two-party system. Figure 2.1 
illustrates the dramatic change that took place between these two elections 
in terms of the total share of vote for the two largest parties. What seemed like 
an inexorable decline in the vote share of the two largest parties since 1945 
was followed by a dramatic reversal in 2017. Likewise there was an abrupt 
halt to the decades-long trend towards a more fragmented party system, as 
shown in Figure 2.2. Having reached a high-point in 2015, the 
effective number of electoral parties (Laakso and Taagepera, 1979) 
dropped to levels not seen since the 1970s. Despite this pronounced 
shift, thanks to the nature of British electoral geography there was little 
corresponding change to the effect ive number of parliamentary parties.
In this chapter we introduce the common factor that helps us make sense of 
these seemingly contradictory outcomes of very high party system fragmentation 
in 2015, and a very high two-party share in 2017. This common factor is the high 
level of electoral volatility—by which we mean the degree of change between 
elections, either in terms of the votes received by political parties or by the amount of 
switching by individual voters. We also reflect in this chapter on the key political 
developments that help us understand why some parties rather than others were 
the beneficiaries of this volatility between elections. In the next chapter we examine 
why individual-level volatility has increased. Subsequent chapters show how 
electoral shocks, acting in this volatile context, have provided the catalyst for 
rapid political change.
2.1 Aggregate-level volatility
When measured at the aggregate level, volatility is ‘the net change within the 
elect or al party system resulting from individual vote transfers’ (Ascher and 
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Figure 2.1 Two-party share of the UK vote 1964–2017
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Tarrow 1975, 480). In other words, the system-level volatility is the aggregation of 
individual decisions.
Here we measure aggregate-level volatility by how much the national vote 
shares of parties have changed between two elections (Pedersen 1979).1 Figure 2.3 
shows over-time variation in aggregate volatility for British elections from 1835 to 
2017. Taking this very long view of British elections allows us to place the 2015 
and 2017 elections into context to see just how unusual they were. From the 
Liberal revival of 1974, the 1983 election which followed the Social Democratic 
Party (SDP) split, to Labour’s landslides of 1945 and 1997, the twentieth century 
has seen many volatile elections. However, there have only been two UK general 
elections that were more volatile than 2015 and 2017, and both took place in very 
exceptional circumstances.
The first exceptionally volatile election, the 1918 General Election, followed 
the expansion of the franchise, giving women over the age of thirty the vote for 
the first time, and giving the vote to all men over the age of twenty-one. It 
came at the end of the First World War; a period of remarkable social and pol-
itical change. The 1918 election, delayed because of the war, gave the coalition led 
by Lloyd George a landslide victory whilst the nascent Labour Party more than 
tripled its vote. The Liberals, who had not sided with Lloyd George, lost more than 
1 Aggregate volatility is measured using the Pedersen index, which is the sum of differences 
between each party’s aggregate vote shares in the two elections, divided by two. It would have a max-
imum value of 100 if every previous party received zero votes in the second election and a minimum 
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70 per cent of their vote and the Irish Parliamentary Party was almost wiped 
out by Sinn Fein.
The second exceptionally volatile election, in 1931, followed the Great Depression 
and a budget crisis which precipitated the collapse and resignation of the Labour 
government. A National Government was formed at the request of King George 
V and, following the removal of the Pound from the Gold Standard, won the 
 election—primarily with Conservative support—in a landslide. The Labour Party 
split into two factions and the Liberals into three. Against these two elections of 
1918 and 1931, the 2015 and 2017 general elections stand out as the next two most 
volatile elections at the aggregate level: more volatile than the landslide elections 
of 1945, 1979, and 1997; and more volatile than the February 1974 election that 
failed to deliver a majority government.
Aggregate-level volatility is an important indicator of the dramatic changes 
that took place in 2015 and 2017. However, the aggregate picture does not tell the 
whole story. Aggregate volatility only captures the top level changes in vote shares, 
meaning that it is possible for an election to appear stable, even if a large numbers 
of voters switch parties beneath the surface, providing those vote flows cancel out. 
To give a simple example, if voters were split fifty–fifty between two parties at one 
election and everyone swapped parties at the next election, we would want to clas-
sify this as extremely volatile voting behaviour. However, the aggregate volatility 
would be zero, implying a very stable election. High aggregate volatility indicates 
many voters switching parties, but low aggregate volatility does not necessarily 
mean the reverse. A complete picture of this period of British politics requires 
attention to both aggregate-level switching and the switching that takes place 
beneath the surface among individuals.
2.2 Individual-level volatility
We measure individual-level volatility by examining the same voters in pairs 
of  elections using the British Election Study panel surveys2 and reported vote 
choices at the time of each election.3 Our measure of individual volatility is the 
2 We also make use of British Household Panel Survey/Understanding Society (BHPS) data 
for available elections. The exact levels of switching differ slightly between sources, with the BHPS 
estimates consistently lower. There are a number of possible reasons for the gap. The BHPS tends to 
interview respondents considerably longer after the election than the BES. This may tend to lead 
respondents to forget behaviour that is out of line with their long-term partisan preferences (and 
therefore underestimate volatility). Alternatively, the BES may tend to retain more politically engaged 
respondents who may react to events more. Finally, the BHPS is a long-running survey, so the samples 
may skew older (we use unweighted estimates) and, as we will show in Chapter 3, older voters tend to 
switch at lower rates. Most importantly, however, both sources closely agree about the over-time trend 
in volatility.
3 The data are derived from the British Election Study (and BHPS/Understanding Society) inter-
election panels where the same group of voters are interviewed in two successive elections right after 
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proportion of voters who switch to a different party in the second election of each 
pair. Figure 2.4 plots this measure for every election since the 1960s, when the 
British Election Studies began with Butler and Stokes’ (1969b) panel study of the 
1964 and 1966 general elections.
While 12.5 per cent of Butler and Stokes’ respondents (who voted in both 1964 
and 1966) switched parties, this has ultimately turned out to be the lowest ever 
recorded level of switching. Individual volatility tells a different story of recent 
British electoral history to the spikey pattern of aggregate-level volatility we dis-
played in Figure 2.3. Rather than the pattern of peaks and troughs of volatility 
shown by the aggregate measure, the individual data shows the British voter 
becoming fairly steadily more volatile over time. The elections of 1966 and 2001 
may look similar in terms of aggregate volatility, but Figure 2.4 shows that under 
the surface, voters were twice as likely to switch parties in 2001 as they were in 
1966. Moreover, the ‘landslide’ election of 1997 does not look so different to the 
two elections either side of it. What really differentiates 1997 from 1992 and 2001 
is not the number of voters switching parties, but the fact that much of the vote-
switching was in one direction.
Using the measure of individual volatility, the 2015 election stands out as a 
clear high point: more than four in ten of those people who voted in both the 2010 
each election, meaning we do not need to rely on respondents’ recall of their previous vote choices, 
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Figure 2.4 Individual-level voter volatility in Eleven pairs of elections between 1964 
and 2017 in the British Election Study
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and 2015 elections switched which party they voted for between the two elections. 
The 2017 election was slightly more stable, but only relative to the election of 2015. 
The level of switching between 2015 and 2017 still marks the second highest level 
of individual volatility in our data.
In order to understand this level of volatility in the 2015 and 2017 general elec-
tions, we revisit the political events of the period between 2010 and 2017 that con-
tributed to these record levels of volatility and the resulting election outcomes.
2.3 Politics 2010–15
The 2010 General Election took place in the shadow of the Global Financial Crisis 
and the subsequent recession; events which had critically undermined Labour’s 
reputation for sound economic management (Green  2010). The Conservatives 
also won over long-time Labour voters on the issue of immigration, which had 
risen in salience among the public (Evans and Chzhen 2013). Despite this, there 
were relatively low levels of aggregate volatility in 2010 (see Figure 2.3), with the 
Conservative Party failing to secure sufficient seats to form a government on its 
own. However, as Figure 2.4 shows, 2010 was a historically volatile election at 
the individual level, with large numbers of voters moving beneath an appar-
ently tranquil surface. In 2010 these vote flows largely cancelled each other out, 
with voters moving in one direction being matched by others going in the 
opposite direction.
The degree of individual-level volatility in 2010 was a harbinger of the large 
changes to British politics that lay ahead. To give one example, the Liberal 
Democrat’s vote share barely shifted between 2005 and 2010 (it increased by one 
percentage point). However, when we look at the individual-level BES panel data, 
we find that the Liberal Democrats lost 35 per cent of their 2005 voters between 
2005 and 2010. It was only because they also recruited large numbers of voters 
in  that period that their overall share was so stable. In fact, as we will see in 
Chapter 4, this is a fairly consistent pattern for the Liberal Democrats, who typ ic-
al ly lose large proportions of their voters between elections and have to gain new 
voters to compensate.
The 2010 General Election also saw the continuation of a decade-long rise in 
voting for smaller parties. This was mainly reflected in the success of the Liberal 
Democrats, but was also evident in the rapidly increasing vote share of UKIP, the 
Greens (who also won their first seat), Plaid Cymru, and the SNP. UKIP achieved 
3.1 per cent of the vote, which was their highest national vote share to that point. 
The 2010 General Election delivered the Liberal Democrats’ highest ever vote 
share (23 per cent) and fifty-seven MPs, slightly short of the sixty-two Liberal 
Democrat MPs elected in 2005 (on 22.1 per cent share). By 2010, the combined 
Labour and Conservative share was just 65.1 per cent, whereas the Labour and 
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Conservative parties had consistently received a combined vote share of around 
80 per cent in the 1960s (see Figure 2.1).
As a result of the narrow Conservative victory in 2010 and the Liberal 
Democrats’ strong performance, British voters experienced Britain’s first peace-
time coalition government since 1922. After a short period of negotiation, the 
Liberal Democrats formed a coalition with the Conservatives, to the consterna-
tion of many of their voters, as we discuss in Chapter 7. The results did not in 
fact quite rule out a Labour-led coalition, but it would have required involving 
at least three parties to achieve a majority of even one seat.4 Moreover, the 
Liberal Democrats were reluctant to be seen to be propping up an unpopular 
Labour government.
The hung Parliament and coalition government that ensued was only one of a 
series of shocks that contributed to an upturn in the fortunes of smaller parties in 
2015. Eleven years previously, the establishment of the Scottish Parliament and 
Welsh Assembly had resulted in a substantial change in the UK’s constitutional 
arrangements. Over the ensuing decade, the devolved governments gained 
further powers, increasing the importance of the devolved legislatures and the 
pol it ical significance of Scottish and Welsh elections. While the majoritarian 
Westminster system had just dealt a coalition at the 2010 General Election, a year 
later, in the 2011 Scottish Parliamentary elections, the mixed-member propor-
tional system delivered a single-party majority government. The SNP won a 
landslide victory on a platform that included a promise to call a referendum on 
Scottish independence. The independence referendum that the SNP had prom-
ised was held in Scotland on 18 September 2014. Had the ‘Yes’ independence cam-
paign won, the vote would have led to the break-up of the United Kingdom. The 
result was a 55 per cent vote in favour of the status quo, with a reported 85 per cent 
of registered voters turning out to vote.5 Turnout for the Scottish independence 
referendum was the highest recorded turnout for an election or referendum in 
the UK since the introduction of universal suffrage, considerably higher than the 
63.8 per cent turnout in Scotland in the 2010 General Election. This very high 
turnout is indicative of the importance Scottish voters on both sides had placed 
on this outcome. The referendum divided Scottish public opinion in visceral and 
4 Assuming Sinn Fein abstained, 323 seats were required for a majority in Parliament. Labour + 
Liberal Democrats + DUP = 323 seats. Alternatively (given the DUP’s poor ideological fit for Labour 
and the Liberal Democrats), they could reach 324 seats with Labour + Liberal Democrats + SNP + 
Plaid Cymru. Various other arrangements were possible, but all involved reaching a tiny majority with 
an increasingly large number of parties. Politicians and observers generally considered these arrange-
ments unlikely to be workable, given the large number of interests that would need to be reconciled 
and the small working majority that would result (Murray 2010; BBC News 2010).
5 Figure for turnout as a percentage of registered voters are always underestimates in the UK, as 
they do not account for duplicate entries which inflate the denominator (Mellon et al. 2018b). The 
actual turnout in the Scottish referendum was therefore almost certainly considerably higher as a 
percentage of registered voters.
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highly significant ways. These divisions would shortly reshape Scottish electoral 
politics, as we discuss in Chapter 8.
Parties other than the two largest in Westminster were also gaining support 
on specific issues including the environment, immigration, and Europe. Having 
previously found success in the 2004 and 2009 European Parliament Elections, 
where they had won around 16 per cent of the vote on both occasions, UKIP 
began to enjoy further electoral success with their opposition to immigration and 
the EU. First, they made significant inroads in the 2013 English and Welsh Local 
Elections, winning 147 local councillors (up from eight). Then, spectacularly, 
UKIP won 26.6 per cent share of the vote in the European Parliament election in 
June 2014, a higher vote share than either Labour or the Conservatives. UKIP also 
gained representation in the Westminster Parliament when the Conservative MP, 
Douglas Carswell, defected to UKIP from the Conservatives in 2014.
2.4 The 2015 General Election
The 2015 General Election campaign took place in the context of a recovering 
economy after years of sluggish performance and austerity policies under the 
Conservative-led coalition. The polls suggested that the most likely outcome was 
another hung Parliament with Labour as the largest party, but the SNP was in the 
ascendance in Scotland in the aftermath of the independence referendum in 2014, 
and also saw a rapid rise in the polls in Scotland throughout the campaign. The 
combination of these factors led the Conservatives to focus on two messages: 
Labour could still not be trusted on the economy, and if Ed Miliband became 
prime minister, any Labour coalition would be influenced by the SNP. The 
Conservatives promised ‘competence with the Conservatives or chaos with Labour’. 
This framing was largely successful in setting the campaign agenda. Labour 
appeared unsure whether to apologize for, or defend, its former record in office, 
struggling to identify an effective counter-message. As we will show in Chapter 6, 
economic competence played a key role in the 2015 General Election. However, our 
analysis suggests little evidence that the threat of the SNP won the Conservatives 
votes (Jane Green and Prosser 2016).
The expectation that there would be a hung Parliament with Labour ahead was 
confounded, with observers and parties misled by inaccurate polls that substan-
tially understated the Conservatives’ lead (Mellon and Prosser 2017; Sturgis et al. 
2018). In the end, the Conservatives increased their vote share by a tiny 0.8 percent-
age points but gained twenty-four MPs, and could therefore govern with an unantici-
pated Conservative majority (see Table 2.1). One implication of this surprise 
victory was that the Conservatives had to deliver on their election pledge to hold 
a referendum on Britain’s membership of the European Union.
As shown in our earlier plot of aggregate volatility in Figure 2.3, the 2015 
General Election was the third most volatile election since 1835. At the individual 
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level, volatility was immense by relative standards, with 43 per cent of BES panel 
respondents reporting a different vote choice in 2015 to the one they reported in 
2010. As Figure  2.4 showed, this level of switching was the highest seen across 
any pair of elections since the BES began in 1964. Unlike 2010, when individual 
switching mostly cancelled out, in 2015 the net effect of individual-level switching 
was large-scale changes in vote shares. In particular, there was a much larger 
increase in voting for minor parties, leading many commentators to announce 
the fragmentation of British politics. Table 2.1 displays the substantial increase in 
vote shares for UKIP, the SNP, and the Greens.
Were it not for the collapse in support of the Liberal Democrats in 2015, the 
combined vote share for the two largest parties might have been far lower. As it 
was, the vote share for the two largest parties increased very marginally, as shown 
earlier in Figure 2.1, whilst the vote choices split much more broadly across the 
smaller political parties, leading to a much more fragmented party system.
The flow of the vote between the 2010 and 2015 elections is illustrated in 
Figure 2.5. The size of each bar at either end of the ribbons representing the vote 
flow shows the total share of the vote each party received at the election (ordered 
from most votes at the top, to least at the bottom). The size of each ribbon repre-
sents the proportion of all 2010 and 2015 voters who voted for each pair of parties 
in 2010 and 2015. One of the most dramatic ways in which the large-scale 
switching manifested in 2015 was the collapse of the Liberal Democrat vote, as 
discussed. The Liberal Democrat vote share, which was 23.6 per cent in 2010, 
plummeted to 8.1 per cent in 2015, with the party losing a total of forty-nine of its 
fifty-seven MPs. The Liberal Democrats retained only 25 per cent of their 2010 
supporters, compared to the equivalent figure of 65 per cent retained voters in 
2010.6 While the opinion polls had been very poor for the Liberal Democrats 
since entering the coalition in 2010, many MPs believed that a personal vote 
6 While the Liberal Democrats performed historically badly at recruiting new voters in 2015, they 
did gain a small percentage of new recruits (~2 per cent of voters).
Table 2.1 Results of the 2015 General Election. Figures shown are 
calculated for Great Britain (i.e. excluding Northern Ireland)
 % votes Change  
in % votes
Total seats Change 
in seats
Conservative 37.7 0.8 330 24
Labour 31.2 1.5 232 –26
UKIP 12.9 9.7 1 1
Liberal Democrat 8.1 –15.5 8 –49
SNP 4.9 3.2 56 50
Green 3.8 2.9 1 0
Plaid Cymru 0.6 0 3 0
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would be enough for them to hold on to their seats. The modest incumbency 
advantage they actually enjoyed did not save many of them (Curtice, Fisher, and 
Ford 2016). The Liberal Democrats’ greatest losses in 2015 were to Labour, but they 
also leaked a large number of voters to the Conservatives, the Greens, and even 
UKIP. While the Conservatives gained fewer Liberal Democrat deserters than 
Labour, those they did gain were disproportionately in marginal seats which they 
were consequently more likely to narrowly win.
Figure 2.5 also shows substantial flows of voters moving from the Conservatives 
to UKIP. In 2015, UKIP’s vote share quadrupled to 12.9 per cent, representing 
almost 4 million votes. UKIP won votes most notably from the Conservatives, but 
also from Labour, the Liberal Democrats, and the British National Party (BNP). 
Importantly, many of the Conservative to UKIP switchers had previously defected 
to the Conservatives from Labour in 2010 (Evans and Mellon 2016b). UKIP also 
captured nearly two-thirds (63 per cent) of the BNP’s 2010 voters (the BNP fell 
from half a million votes to fewer than two thousand between 2010 and 2015). 
While the electoral system deprived UKIP of equivalent representation in terms 
of parliamentary seats (retaining only the one MP who had previously defected 
from the Conservatives), they won their highest ever national share of the vote 
in 2015.
The Green Party won 3.8 per cent of the vote, increasing its national vote share 
from 1 per cent in 2010 and achieving the highest ever popular vote share for the 






















Figure 2.5 Vote flows between 2010 and 2015
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The 2015 General Election was also remarkable for the result in Scotland 
(see Chapter 8). As shown in Table 2.1, the SNP almost trebled its GB vote share 
from 1.7 per cent in 2010 to 4.9 per cent. This equated to a huge increase of 
30 percentage points in Scotland and a vote share of 50 per cent of Scottish voters; 
the highest share of the vote for any party in Scotland since 1931 when the 
Conservatives won 54.3 per cent of the vote. The SNP deprived Labour of forty of 
its former Scottish seats in 2015, the Liberal Democrats of all but one of theirs, 
and overturned more than fifty years of Labour dominance in general elections 
north of the border. It was Labour’s lowest Scottish vote share since 1918.
Not only was the 2015 General Election volatile in electoral terms, it also had 
dramatic political consequences. For Labour, the election triggered a leadership 
election under new rules proposed by Ed Miliband, giving members and sup-
porters a greater say. The outcome was the election of Jeremy Corbyn as Labour 
leader, a backbench MP for thirty-two years, one of the party’s most rebellious 
MPs, a noted campaigner for nuclear disarmament, and a leader labelled the most 
left-wing since Michael Foot (Pickard and Parker  2017). The surprise outcome 
gave further rise to the conclusion that the mainstream political establishment 
was under challenge. Labour now had a leader that two-thirds of its MPs did not 
support and voters saw the party as increasingly divided.7 The other hugely 
significant outcome was that the Conservatives, now forming a majority govern-
ment against former expectations, committed to deliver on their manifesto pledge 
to hold the referendum on Britain’s membership of the European Union.
2.5 The 2016 EU referendum
The Conservative EU referendum manifesto pledge was part of the Conservatives’ 
attempts to stem the flow of votes to UKIP and manage decades of bitter internal 
Conservative parliamentary divisions over the question of Europe. However, rather 
than paper over the cracks in the Conservative Party, the EU referendum height-
ened them; first in the campaign and then, of course, in the resulting period of 
Brexit negotiations. High-profile Tories such as Boris Johnson and Michael Gove 
led the Leave campaign in 2016, while David Cameron and George Osborne 
campaigned for the Remain side.
The internal divisions were not limited to the Conservative Party. Despite 
strong support for Remain among Labour MPs and Labour voters, Jeremy Corbyn 
ran a low-key referendum campaign that many commentators believed reflected 
his long-standing scepticism about the EU. Labour’s ambiguity on Brexit also 
7 Twenty-seven per cent of BES panel respondents said that the Labour Party was ‘very divided’ or 
‘fairly divided’ in the pre-election wave in April 2015, but 45 per cent said the same by April 2016 
(denominator includes don’t knows).
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served the strategic purpose of helping to avoid Labour losses in heartland seats, 
many of which went on to strongly vote for Leave. These splits left the Remain 
campaign in the odd situation of having one of its most prominent figures on 
paper offering only lukewarm support for EU membership.
The British public had never been strongly supportive of EU membership, even 
though 67.2 per cent of Britons in 1975 voted in the last EU referendum to stay in 
the European Community (Evans and Menon 2017). Nor had they developed a 
strong sense of European identity (Curtice 2016). The campaign therefore centred 
on practical questions of the costs and benefits of EU membership. On the Leave 
side this focused on the issues of immigration from the EU, and sovereignty; 
‘taking back control’. The Remain side focused on the economic benefits of EU 
membership and the costs of leaving the EU. These issues were also reflected in 
the reasons BES panel respondents gave for their vote at the time (Prosser, Mellon, 
and Green 2016).
The referendum took place on 23 June 2016 with the dramatic—and for many, 
surprise—result that Britain voted 51.9 per cent to 48.1 per cent to leave the EU. 
The vote was an endorsement of the most significant constitutional, economic, 
policy, and political change of direction in decades. It was another sign of the 
rejection of the status quo and of mainstream politics and politicians, especially 
as the vast majority of the political establishment had campaigned for Remain. 
The referendum also exposed deep attitudinal and geographic divisions that were 
emerging in the UK (Jennings and Stoker 2017).
Other than UKIP, none of the parties’ 2015 voters overwhelmingly supported 
one side or the other in the referendum. The Conservatives’ 2015 voters leaned 
60 per cent towards Leave, while Labour’s leaned 62 per cent towards Remain. 
The SNP faced a similar breakdown to Labour, with 67 per cent of their 2015 
sup porters backing Remain. The Liberal Democrats’ 2015 voters were the most 
Remain leaning, but even among these, 27 per cent voted Leave. The EU referen-
dum cut across the existing political divides in a way that would have substantial 
consequences for electoral politics (see Chapter 9).
The outcome of the referendum had immediate ramifications for the political 
parties. David Cameron resigned the morning after. Following a relatively short 
leadership contest, Theresa May was elected Conservative leader. Many Labour 
MPs felt let down by Jeremy Corbyn’s weak support for the Remain campaign 
and triggered a new leadership election, with two-thirds of the Labour Shadow 
Cabinet resigning. This attempt to replace Corbyn ultimately backfired. In the 
ensuing leadership election, Corbyn expanded his majority among the Labour 
membership. Corbyn’s second leadership win quelled the brewing civil war 
within the parliamentary Labour Party, at least temporarily. UKIP, meanwhile, 
was in internal disarray. Nigel Farage resigned immediately after the referen-
dum, declaring that he had achieved his political goal. He was succeeded for 
eighteen days by Diane James (who then resigned) and subsequently by Paul 
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Nuttall. A series of internal disputes led to funders withdrawing, a fist fight 
between two UKIP MEPs, and UKIP’s only MP leaving the party to sit as an 
independent MP.
The immediate aftermath of the EU referendum was a turbulent period in 
Britain’s political history, during which the government needed to conduct cru-
cial and complex negotiations for Britain’s exit from the EU, and pass important 
legislation and key parliamentary votes. While the 2015 General Election had 
delivered a majority Conservative government, the result was a slender working 
majority of only seventeen MPs. After the EU referendum, however, the tide 
looked like to be turning in the Conservative’s favour. A week before the election 
was called, one poll gave the Conservatives a twenty-one point lead over Labour 
(YouGov 2017). On 18 April 2017, with Labour and UKIP both internally divided 
and crashing in the polls, and the Conservative Party with a large lead, Theresa 
May called a snap general election.
2.6 The 2017 General Election
The 2017 General Election was almost universally expected to increase the 
Conservatives’ majority, perhaps with a landslide. However, instead of increasing 
the Conservative majority, the result was a huge blow to May’s leadership. The 
Conservatives increased their share of the vote, but they lost thirteen seats and 
with them, their parliamentary majority. A subsequent ‘confidence and supply’ 
deal was forged with the Northern Irish Democratic Unionist Party (DUP). At a 
time when the Irish border would be paramount in Brexit negotiations, the 
Conservatives relied on the votes of the Leave-supporting DUP.
The election had been billed as the Brexit election, but the campaign failed to 
focus very much on Brexit as an issue (Prosser 2018). Instead, the public debate 
focused on controversial Conservative manifesto promises on social care and fox-
hunting, Theresa May’s controversial policy U-turn on social care, and two 
 terrorist attacks that took place during the campaign. Theresa May appeared as an 
ineffective campaigner as she repeated her campaign slogans with lacklustre 
performances and avoided taking part in a televized head-to-head debate with 
Jeremy Corbyn. By contrast, Jeremy Corbyn enjoyed a highly successful cam-
paign and the two leaders’ ratings had converged by election day. The campaign 
confounded expectations that short periods of campaign activity are rarely 
decisive for the outcome of the election. The 2017 General Election campaign was 
a highly influential campaign in which the main beneficiary of vote-switching 
was Labour (Mellon et al. 2018a). Once again, the outcome of the vote confounded 
the expectations of many observers. Corbyn, who many had written off as 
incapable of improving Labour’s electoral fortunes, in fact led the party to an 
increase in their vote share of 9.8 percentage points (see Table 2.2), reaching 
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a  level for Labour not seen since 2001. Labour enjoyed success in parts of the 
country that had not voted Labour in such numbers since Blair’s historic victory 
in 1997. The Conservatives increased their vote by 5.8 percentage points to 
43.4 per cent. Together, the two largest parties scooped up almost 85 per cent 
of the vote, but the large increase in Labour support cost the Conservatives their 
majority, turning the expected easy election victory into something that was 
widely perceived to be a disaster for Theresa May. Its consequences would 
overshadow the subsequent Brexit negotiations and weaken Theresa May’s authority 
among her MPs in Parliament.
At the aggregate level, 2017 was nearly as volatile as 2015, making it the fourth 
most volatile election in British history (Figure 2.3). Nowhere was this aggregate 
volatility clearer than in the dramatic change in the two-party share of the vote 
(see Figure  2.1). The steady and significant decline of the two-party vote over 
many consecutive elections, which had culminated in the largest share for parties 
other than Labour, the Conservatives, and Liberal Democrats in 2015, was dra-
matically reversed only two years later. Because both major parties gained sub-
stantial numbers of votes at the same time, neither reaped a huge electoral reward 
in terms of seats.
The rapid change in the aggregate vote shares between 2015 and 2017 was 
reflected in large vote flows at the individual level. In total, 33 per cent of BES 
respondents reported a different vote choice in 2017 to the one they reported in 
2015. This individual-level switching was lower than in 2015, but still some-
what higher than 2010, making it the second highest on record. Although the 
period between 2015 and 2017 was dramatic, including as it did the EU referen-
dum and Britain’s vote to leave the EU as a result, it was still only a two-year 
period in which we would normally expect overall switching to be lower than 
in a longer five-year election cycle when voters have more time to be persuaded 
to switch votes between parties. Given this, we can see 2017 as a highly volatile 
election, not least because of the dramatic change at the aggregate level. 
Table 2.2 Results of the 2017 General Election. Figures shown 
are calculated for Great Britain (i.e. excluding Northern Ireland)
 % votes Change  
in % votes
Total seats Change 
in seats
Conservative 43.4 5.8 317 –13
Labour 41 9.8 262 30
Liberal Democrat 7.6 –0.5 12 4
SNP 3.1 –1.7 35 –21
UKIP 1.9 11 0 –1
Green 1.7 –2.2 1 0
Plaid Cymru 0.5 –0.1 4 1
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Furthermore, the cumulative effects of individual-level volatility meant that of 
those that voted in 2010, 2015, and 2017, only 51 per cent voted for the same 
party in all three elections.
Figure 2.6 shows the flow of votes between the parties in the two-year period 
between 2015 and 2017.
In addition to the aggregate-level and individual-level amounts of volatility, 
the 2017 General Election also witnessed the highest levels of an unusual form 
of vola til ity in British politics: switching between Labour and the Conservatives. 
The usual view of British voters sees them as ‘bounded partisans’ who switch 
within party groups, but consistently reject one of the major parties (Zuckerman, 
Dasovic, and Fitzgerald 2007). In 2017, as Figure 2.7 shows, a more substantial 
proportion of Labour and Conservative voters switched to the other major party 
than in any previous election we can compare. This direct swapping between the 
major parties contributed to some surprising changes in the geographic distribu-
tion of the Labour and Conservative vote, resulting—for example—in Labour 
taking the highly educated Conservative strongholds of Canterbury and Battersea, 
and the Conservatives wresting working-class constituencies such as Mansfield 
and Middlesbrough South from Labour.
While Labour and the Conservatives gained large numbers of voters, including 
from each other, the Liberal Democrats failed to improve on their disappointing 
2015 performance. As might now be apparent, this apparent aggregate stability 
hid substantial individual-level volatility: 51 per cent of 2015 Liberal Democrat 




















Figure 2.6 Vote flows between 2015 and 2017
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the difference by recruiting substantial numbers of 2015 Labour and Conservative 
voters. This individual-level volatility was also reflected in seats. While the Liberal 
Democrats ended the election with twelve seats—four more than in 2015—they 
won eight new seats in comparison to 2015 but also lost five (including the 
Richmond Park constituency they had won in a by-election the previous year).
Labour and the Conservatives also gained votes from the smaller parties. Most 
dramatically, UKIP’s support fell from their 12.9 per cent high in 2015 to only 
1.9 per cent in 2017. The earlier 2017 local elections had wiped out all of UKIP’s local 
councillors, and the 2017 General Election, in which they fielded less than 400 
candidates, largely eliminated their electoral base. The Conservatives were the 
major beneficiaries of this collapse, securing 56 per cent of all 2015 UKIP voters, 
according to our BES panel data. The Conservatives also gained votes from Leave-
voting 2015 Liberal Democrat, Labour, and SNP supporters. Labour’s success 
came from sweeping up huge proportions of 2015 Green and Liberal Democrat 
voters, as well as a modest portion of UKIP voters (Mellon et al. 2018a).
Labour to Conservative switching was especially strong in Scotland, where the 
Conservatives campaigned as the party of leaving the EU and keeping Scotland 
part of the UK. Their appeal to Unionist voters helped them gain 22 per cent 
of  2015 Scottish Labour voters along with 25 per cent of 2015 Scottish Liberal 
Democrats. Their appeal to Leave voters, meanwhile, meant that they even 
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Figure 2.7 Combined switching from Labour to the Conservatives and from the 
Conservatives to Labour between one election and the next as a percentage of Labour 
and Conservative voters at the previous election
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from 50 per cent in 2015 to 36.9 per cent in 2017, the largest direct beneficiary 
being Labour, although these gains were mostly cancelled out by Labour’s other 
losses. The net result of these shifts was a twenty-one seat loss for the SNP, with 
corresponding gains for Labour, the Liberal Democrats and, most notably, the 
Conservatives, who gained 28.6 per cent of all Scottish votes and twelve seats 
(see Chapter 8).
2.7 Conclusions
The General Elections of 2015 and 2017 marked a historically high level of vola til-
ity, both at the aggregate level and also at the level of the individual voter. In this 
chapter we described how this increased volatility is part of a long-term trend in 
British politics, but one which accelerated markedly after 2010. At the aggregate 
level, 2015 and 2017 were the two most volatile elections since 1931. At the indi-
vidual level, they were the two most volatile elections for which we have data to 
measure. Unlike with aggregate volatility, which has changed erratically over 
time, we showed that individual-level volatility has been steadily and significantly 
increasing since 1964. The changes seen at the 2015 and 2017 elections were not 
the sudden, out-of-the-blue shifts that the aggregate results might suggest. They 
were the culmination of a fifty-year increase in vote-switching in British elections. 
The 2015 and 2017 elections were important—not only because of how much 
switching there was—but also the directions of that switching. Unlike many elec-
tions when vote flows favouring one party are compensated by counter-flows 
favouring another, voters in 2015 and 2017 moved systematically, first away from, 
and then towards the two major parties. The 2017 election saw record numbers of 
voters moving between the two largest parties.
The 2017 General Election is the endpoint of our analysis in this particular book, 
but it was only the beginning of another turbulent period of British  politics. The 
period between 2010 and 2017 was extraordinary in many ways, as we highlighted 
in this chapter. The last few years have not just felt like a more tumultuous period 
in British politics than usual; this really has been an exceptionally volatile 
period in British political history.
Judged by our metrics, the elections of 2015 and 2017 are historically volatile. 
Both elections were remarkable in different ways, and each raises important ques-
tions about the instability in the British party system. They represent an in tri-
guing puzzle: what can both account for dramatic gains for minor parties and 
nationalists in one election, and also the collapse of Britain’s third party, but also 
account for the highest two-party vote share in almost forty years? What were the 
common factors and themes that led voters to reject the mainstream parties in 
2015, only to subsequently be willing to vote for them again in large numbers only 
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two years later? In short, we need to address the following question: what explains 
this instability in the British party system and in the British electorate? To answer 
that we need to pay attention to both the long-term trends that produced vola til-
ity in the system, and the electoral shocks that were able to have such a large 
impact in that volatile environment.
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British politics has become less predictable and the party system less stable. More 
voters are switching their vote choices than ever before. This switching has led 
to dramatic changes in election outcomes and dramatic changes in political party 
support over very short time periods. What can account for this instability in 
British politics, and what does this instability tell us about the outcomes of the 
two most recent British general elections?
Our explanation focuses on the long-term and short-term antecedents of elect-
or al choice.
We start with a foundation of the gradual and long-term changes that have 
made voters more likely to switch their support to different parties: the changing 
long-term context of volatility. Chapter 4 deals with these changes in greater 
detail and explains why they have come about. Here we explain why the gradual 
destabilization of the party system means that shocks can result in extraordinary 
political consequences; from the largest vote share for parties other than Labour, 
the Conservatives, and Liberal Democrats in 2015, to the largest two-party vote 
share since 1970 in 2017. However, there are still features of the system that pro-
vide stability, not least the advantages enjoyed by the major parties in retaining 
voters and the majoritarian electoral system.
The remainder of this chapter focuses on the mechanisms and consequences of 
electoral shocks in the context of increasing electoral volatility. We set out the 
reasons for focusing on the impacts of shocks, a definition of electoral shocks, 
and the mechanisms through which shocks affect voting behaviour. Our approach 
to the study of electoral shocks recognizes that the potential impacts of shocks 
are multifaceted and can have far-reaching, system-wide effects. Shocks do not 
have inevitable consequences, and are not defined by their consequences. They 
create political opportunities, and their consequences depend on how politicians 
react to them and compete around them, and how they are politicized in the wider 
media environment. The chapter also explains why the gradual destabilization 
of the party system means that electoral shocks are having increasingly dra-
matic consequences.
This account of electoral change departs from a focus on single explanatory 
factors or votes for a particular political party. It rejects a false choice between 
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bottom-up demand-based explanations and top-down political supply-oriented 
explanations. Political outcomes are more complex than this. Understanding the 
changing nature of the party system calls for an explanation that is broad and 
multifaceted. We need to understand how the structures and incentives that 
underpinned the stable party system have become weaker over time, what the 
consequences of that weakening are, how they account for instability in British 
politics, and what the prospects are for a return to greater stability in the future. 
This chapter sets out an explanation that considers relatively short-term but com-
plex factors—electoral shocks—and situates them and their effects in the context 
of long-term gradual political change. We explain how these long-term and short-
term factors interact: the impact of electoral shocks can be accentuated when 
party attachments are weak.
3.1 The long-term trend in volatility
In Chapter 2 we showed how sharp and trendless fluctuations in aggregate level 
volatility have been accompanied by a long-term and gradual increase in individ-
ual level volatility over the last five decades. The long-term trend reflects an elect-
or ate that is more fluid and potentially more responsive to the choices provided 
by political elites and parties.
The gradual rise in individual-level volatility can be explained by the com bin-
ation of two other long-term trends, the evidence for which is set out in Chapter 4.
The first long-term trend is the gradual and sustained reduction in the strength 
and number of people identifying with political parties over time—a process 
widely referred to as ‘partisan dealignment’ (Särlvik and Crewe  1983; Dalton 
2000). As people have become less attached to political parties—both in terms 
of the number of party identifiers in the electorate and the weakening strength 
of the attachment of those who still identify with a party—the ballast in the 
party system has been steadily eroded. Partisan attachments have the effect 
of stabilizing the party system. Conversely, partisan dealignment has the effect of 
destabilizing the party system. A system with strong social identities built around 
parties tends to reproduce itself for several reasons. First, in an electorate with 
strong party attachments, a higher proportion of voters have a default vote choice 
that they are likely to revert to at each election. In other words, voting can have a 
habitual element (Plutzer  2002), with voters demonstrating a ‘homing instinct’ 
towards a foundational party over consecutive elections (Butler and Stokes 
1969b). Second, party identifiers tend to socialize their children into their own 
partisanship (Zuckerman, Dasovic, and Fitzgerald  2007), so that successive 
generations have some of the distribution of partisan leanings to their parents. 
This gives the system stability over the long term, such that there is ‘memory’ in 
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partisanship, inherited over time. Third, partisan identification acts as a perceptual 
filter, which means that voters interpret political information through the prism 
of their pre-existing political commitments (Lodge and Taber 2013), making the 
system less vulnerable to disturbances, such as negative performance or policy 
change. Partisans are more likely to reject information that conflicts with their 
prior beliefs, by rejecting the message or the source (Zaller  1991; Zaller  1992), 
and attribute responsibility for problematic outcomes to other pol it ical actors or 
institutions (Tilley and Hobolt 2011). Indeed, some scholars see this filter as the 
primary way in which partisanship affects vote choice (Bartels  2002). Weaker 
party identifiers and those with no party identity, on the other hand, are more 
likely to consider other party choices because they are open to information 
from other parties. As partisan dealignment means there are now more people 
in Britain with weak attachments to political parties, or no attachment to 
political parties at all, this partisan dealignment creates the conditions for the 
system to become unstable because more people are available to switch 
between parties.
The second long-term factor is the increase in the proportion of votes won by 
parties other than Conservative or Labour between 1950 and 2015, which we refer 
to as fragmentation.
As the electorate has become increasingly ‘dealigned’, minor parties have seized 
opportunities to gain votes from a more fluid and available electorate. As we 
showed in Chapter 2, the share of the vote won by the two major parties declined 
steadily from the 1960s to 2015. However, 2017 saw a sharp increase in the two-
party share of the vote and a drop in fragmentation. The fragmentation of votes in 
British elections has directly affected volatility because, compared to the major 
parties, smaller parties struggle to retain voters from one election to the next. We 
demonstrate the extent to which this is the case in Chapter 4. The fact that major 
parties are more likely to retain their voters successfully between elections is the 
reflection of a number of important and continued stabilizing features of British 
politics which create inertia and help maintain the party system over time, albeit 
with some major disturbances. Increasing returns to electoral success stem from 
the institutionalized advantages enjoyed by established larger parties including 
high start-up costs for new parties, funding disparities, differential media coverage, 
and advantages bestowed by the electoral system (Pierson  2000). Success leads 
to  success, especially in the British majoritarian electoral system, as larger vote 
shares are rewarded with a disproportionate number of seats. This in turn pro-
vides a strong disincentive to ‘waste’ votes by supporting smaller, less viable alter-
natives (Duverger 1954). Major parties also have a significantly greater likelihood 
of being able to form a government, creating further incentives for voters to sup-
port them at the expense of minor parties (Green, Fieldhouse, and Prosser 2015). 
Additionally, major parties enjoy informal advantages of an established support 
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base. By virtue of having more supporters and partisans, major parties benefit 
from habitual voting and the passing down of partisan preferences from generation 
to generation through political socialization, as discussed above. Similarly, this 
greater support base provides advantages in terms of interpersonal influence 
(Huckfeldt and Sprague 1995), mobilization (Rosenstone and Hansen 1993,) and 
normative pressures (Fieldhouse and Cutts 2016). Smaller parties have to over-
come all of these built-in advantages that favour their larger rivals in order to 
attract voters and retain them in subsequent elections. Even those  voters who are 
convinced that a smaller party is viable in one election are likely to grow disillu-
sioned when success does not materialize, and then switch back to a more viable 
option in subsequent elections.
Taken together, these factors make it difficult for minor parties to attract and 
retain voters, and therefore to sustain their support from one election to the next. 
Because of the structural disadvantages facing minor parties, increased votes for 
minor parties in one election tends to lead to an increased level of volatility in 
subsequent elections, as smaller party voters are more likely to switch parties. In 
Chapter 4 we show that this effect is substantial, accounting for a large portion of 
the increase in individual-level volatility since 1964.
Partisan dealignment and fragmentation change the system in more ways 
than just the total amount of switching between elections. A dealigned electorate 
is one that has greater potential to respond to stimuli and political disturbances—
the storms and headwinds of politics—because there are fewer stabilizing 
 factors for these stimuli to overcome. The system has less inertia. Similarly, 
because minor party voters already have a high probability of switching between 
elections, a larger number of minor party voters means a larger pool of voters 
who are more vulnerable to the effect of shocks and other stimuli. This might be 
seen as normatively desirable, creating a closer connection between political 
actors and the mechanisms of electoral accountability. However, a more tumul-
tuous and unpredictable electoral environment may have its own risks, particu-
larly where parties miscalculate the likely outcomes of their policy offerings 
and where voters find it harder to anticipate the likely outcomes of collective 
voting decisions.
Our analysis in Chapter  4 suggests that volatility cannot be completely 
explained by partisan dealignment and fragmentation, however. This raises the 
question of how else we might explain the increase in vote-switching and the dra-
matic changes in British elections over a short period of time. An increase in the 
willingness of voters to switch parties is not sufficient to explain dramatic changes 
in support for particular parties at particular elections. To understand these out-
comes, we need an explanation that can account for the choices that the more 
volatile electorate makes in a particular election. Furthermore, we need to explain 
how the long-term destabilization of the electorate provides the context for such 
shorter-term dynamics to have greater effects.
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3.2 Electoral shocks
In economics, international relations, and public policy studies, systems undergo 
sharp changes in outcomes in response to shocks. In the absence of shocks, systems 
are expected to function in a relatively stable and incremental way. Economists 
state that system shocks ‘interrupt and disrupt the process of economic growth 
and development’ (Martin 2012, 3), leading to long-lasting societal implications 
and changes in public policy (Rodrik  1999). In international relations, system-
level shocks can be necessary prerequisites for changes to otherwise intransigent 
tensions. ‘A political shock is a dramatic change in the international system or its 
subsystems that fundamentally alters the processes, relationships, and expectations 
that drive nation-state interactions’ (Goertz and Diehl 1995, 31). In public pol-
icy, major policy change comes in bursts in response to pressure accumulating, 
external events, or shocks, known as a process of ‘punctuated equilibrium’ 
(Baumgartner and Jones  1993). Shocks change policy paradigms and can have 
permanent, wide-reaching consequences (Hall 1993). These ideas can be very use-
fully introduced to the study of party systems and elections.
In electoral politics, we propose that electoral shocks are the disturbances that 
have the ability to lead to substantial and dramatic increases in vote-switching, 
and therefore to changes in the party system. They may alter the political system 
in the short-term, and potentially the long-term—cutting through ‘normal’ pol it-
ical ebbs and flows, loyalties, and levels of public inattention to politics. They are 
not, however, defined by their consequences.
Electoral shocks are unavoidable, high-salience changes or events that can 
prompt large sections of the population to update their political evaluations 
and party preferences. This is in contrast to more stable, ‘normal’, or uneventful 
 periods in politics in which voters have fewer reasons to update their partisan-
ship and when new information can be more readily rationalized into pre-existing 
beliefs. Shocks cannot be as easily avoided via partisan selection mechanisms of 
information and social networks, or through partisan rationalization. This is 
consistent with work showing that major economic shocks alter the relationship 
between partisanship and economics. In stable economic periods, economic 
evaluations are more likely to be endogenous to party preferences, driven by party 
attachments and voting behaviour. In times of exogenous economic shocks, how-
ever, partisanship is more likely to be updated in response to economic changes 
(Chzhen, Evans, and Pickup 2014).
A definition of electoral shocks
A electoral shock has the potential to be recognized even by people who might 
otherwise rationalize, ignore, or attribute responsibility to someone else (Green and 
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Jennings  2017). Electoral shocks are not the minor everyday routine political 
 happenings such as misdemeanours, resignations, speeches, or announcements. 
A major event or discontinuity must be highly salient and relevant to party choice 
and competition to have the power to cut through traditional loyalties, inatten-
tion to politics, and cause dramatic political change. Shocks can cause people to 
re-evaluate their political preferences in a way that everyday politics should not. 
This means that shocks can lead to substantial volatility, shifting people out of 
their habitual voting behaviour.
Electoral shocks might not always have major consequences in terms of abrupt 
system-wide electoral change. They could occur within a very stable system that 
is resistant to the effects of external shocks, they could reinforce rather than cut 
across stable patterns of electoral choice, and their effects might be dampened by 
the failure of political actors to capitalize on them. If the concept of electoral shocks 
is to be theoretically and analytically useful, they must not be defined by their 
consequences. However, electoral shocks are necessary conditions for abrupt 
system-wide changes to occur alongside the broader context of a system less 
constrained by party loyalties.
In terms of their defining characteristics, electoral shocks: 1) represent a sharp 
change to the status quo outside the normal course of politics; 2) are highly salient 
and noticeable over prolonged time periods, and 3) are relevant to party politics.
We now elaborate on these properties in greater detail.
1. Electoral shocks are an abrupt change to the status quo. They are not necessarily 
exogenous to the party system, but they are more than simply the outcomes of nor-
mal everyday politics. They represent a significant and often unanticipated change.
Electoral shocks are extraordinary political events or changes, representing a 
departure from the status quo. Many such events might be described as ‘exoge-
nous’, originating outside of the political system. In reality, however, most events 
are not entirely exogenous. For example, wars, economic recessions, and major 
political crises usually have origins inside the political system, reflecting the 
coming together of a complex array of decisions made by political actors. 
However these events frequently transpire because of external factors or contin-
gencies that could not be foreseen. They are therefore not the inevitable outcome 
of the usual, more predictable pattern of policymaking and politics. Such events 
may be considered electoral shocks. In contrast, where events or decisions are 
within the normal gamut of party politics we should not consider it a shock. This 
also helps explain why we define shocks as abrupt changes to the status quo. 
Because their origins are at least partly exogenous it is possible to determine 
when they occurred: there is a discrete point in time at which a shock takes place, 
and whilst the effects of an electoral shock are likely to be prolonged, they will 
also be immediate.
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2. Electoral shocks are manifest over prolonged time periods and are highly salient: 
they have the potential to be noticed and recognized even by people who do not have 
much interest in politics, and by people who might otherwise select into information 
that fits their partisan beliefs and preconceptions. Electoral shocks are very difficult 
for voters and politicians to ignore.
Most political ups and downs are little recognized by the public. As hard as it may 
be to believe for people who are fascinated by politics, most people do not know 
the outcomes of major political negotiations, who is in the cabinet, and many do 
not understand the major policy shifts of political parties, what parties stand for, 
or what parties are focusing on in their election campaigns. Some people may 
be able to recognize party leaders in only a superficial and cursory way, relying on 
rumours and the occasional story to form an impression. However, there are 
other moments in politics and in public life that are inescapable. They permeate 
public discourse and reach beyond the Westminster bubble. Such moments have 
the potential to shape public opinion, even fundamentally so. For something to 
effect a major change in the public, it has to be recognizable and more than a ‘blip’ 
in the public’s consciousness. As a result of being both substantial and persistent, 
shocks reach large numbers of people and they have the potential to create sig-
nificant shifts in electoral behaviour. That is to say, they register in public opinion. 
They are also impossible for parties to ignore. Under normal conditions, political 
actors can frequently choose which issues to emphasize and which to ignore, usu-
ally opting to draw attention the issues that they ‘own’ (Petrocik 1996). However, 
electoral shocks are sufficiently salient that political actors are forced to engage 
with them even if they are electorally disadvantageous (Mader and Schoen 2018). 
Electoral shocks are highly salient and noticeable, and have the potential to 
change partisan attachments, party support, and to cut through public discourse 
in a way that regular events do not.
3. Electoral shocks are politically relevant and have the potential to change how 
parties are perceived and therefore to (re)shape the party system.
Something could happen in a country that is hugely significant, and also extremely 
salient, but it might not be political or relevant to party choice. However, for a 
shock to be relevant to a party system, it has to be party political in nature, or 
potentially party political in nature, enabling political parties to compete around 
it and for vote choices to be swayed on the basis of it. Electoral shocks must, then, 
be changes that have the potential to impact on the party system because they 
affect how voters evaluate or feel about different parties.
To see the need for these three requirements, consider the following events that 
lack each one of the three criteria, and which we would not therefore classify as 
electoral shocks.
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We could have a situation where there was an event or change that represented a 
sharp change from the status quo and was political, but failed to become salient. The 
establishment of the UK Supreme Court might be such an example. This was an 
important and abrupt constitutional change that almost entirely failed to register 
with the general public and had no apparent party political impact. It became 
temporarily salient in the media in 2017 when the Supreme Court ruled that an Act 
of Parliament was required to authorize withdrawal from the European Union, but 
in 2017 it did not remain noticeably salient over a sustained period or cut through 
public inattention to politics. In this period the Supreme Court did not penetrate the 
public consciousness and consequently its establishment was not an electoral shock.
We could also have a situation where a political event or change was highly 
salient but does not represent a sharp change in the status quo. Such events reflect 
the normal in-and-outs of regular party politics and do not fundamentally alter 
how parties are perceived in terms of what they stand for and how competent 
they are. For example, Theresa May’s ill-considered 2017 manifesto commitment 
concerning the funding of social care which was labelled a ‘dementia tax’ falls 
into this category. It could also apply to popular policies such as new commit-
ments to increasing NHS funding, to changes in party leaders, and to election 
campaigns. In each, the event or development is political and salient but does not 
represent a sharp change to the status quo. There are other examples that might 
be more borderline in terms of definition. While the choice of party leaders reflect 
changes within a political party, and often bring shifts in party policy, they can 
usually be considered a direct consequence of everyday party politics. The rise and 
fall of Margaret Thatcher were highly salient and politically relevant, and marked 
a clear change in policy direction. However, it is arguable whether Thatcher brought 
about—as opposed to reflected—fundamental changes in the nature of British 
politics. Similarly, the election of Jeremey Corbyn to Labour’s leadership in 2015 
had substantial effect on electoral politics in Britain. While the unusual circum-
stances of his election1 mean that this might plausibly be con sidered a shock, the 
circumstances which enabled his victory originated from within the Labour Party. 
His election to the leadership should therefore be con sidered part and parcel of 
normal party politics and of the regular shifts in policy and political representa-
tion that entails. A change in leader or policy might have very large effects on 
electoral outcomes, but these are better understood through existing frames of 
analysis such as spatial and valence politics. This highlights that the abrupt change 
criteria does not merely mean that an event or decision changes something, but 
that the change is atypical and does not arise from the normal course of politics.
1 Corbyn was elected leader in 2015 by a large majority of the membership vote. However, he had 
struggled to muster up the thirty-five nominations he required from the Parliamentary Party follow-
ing Ed Miliband’s resignation. Contemporary reports suggest he managed to secure sufficient nom in-
ations with the support of some who wished to ensure a contest that represented the full spectrum of 
voices in the party but did not expect him to win.
OUP CORRECTED PROOF – FINAL, 18/11/19, SPi
Turbulent British Politics: An Explanation 35
A third example would be a situation where an event was highly salient and 
represented a sharp change in the status quo but does not link to party politics. 
A clear-cut example of such an event would be if England (eventually!) won the 
World Cup. Such an event would be unavoidably salient and, at least in terms of 
national self-image, might be a large change from the status quo. But no party’s 
fortunes are highly linked to the England team’s performance, so it would not be 
an electoral shock.2 A more borderline example would be the death of a monarch. 
This would again be hugely salient and represent a large change in the status quo 
for the national experience. However, while there is an obvious political element 
to the monarchy, the current party system and state of public opinion provides no 
immediate way for the death of the monarch to translate into electoral conse-
quences. The death of a monarch is a political event but not a party political event.
In reality, of course, the three components of shocks are usually overlapping. 
Furthermore, the archetypal shock clearly and unambiguously fulfils all three 
criteria, but shocks can vary in their size and significance. Change becomes sali-
ent because it is so significant; the larger and more consequential the change, the 
more it becomes worthy of media attention and public attention. Public salience 
provides an imperative for political parties to compete on something that matters 
to large groups of voters, with the potential to become party political. Shocks may 
arise because of political decisions—or at least be painted as the responsibility of 
politicians—being, therefore, inherently party political in nature. However, events 
should not be considered shocks unless they exhibit all three characteristics; each 
are necessary conditions but none are sufficient on their own.
Our definition of shocks requires a higher threshold of change than has been 
used in the existing political science literature. Researchers of presidential and 
prime ministerial approval have used the term ‘shock’ to denote a wide range of 
events that leads to an interruption to a time-series, with simple and direct sub-
sequent effects at the ballot box (Mueller  1970, e.g.; Kernell  1978; Ostrom and 
Simon  1985; Nadeau et al.  1999). In the US, Kernell (1978) demonstrated the 
effects of the Korean War, the Vietnam War, the economy, Watergate, and inter-
national ‘rally’ events on presidential approval. In the UK, the Falklands War, the 
poll tax, the Exchange Rate Mechanism (ERM) currency crisis, Major’s reselec-
tion as Conservative prime minister, the Iraq War, have all been defined as 
shocks (Clarke and Lebo 2003; Green and Jennings 2017; Green and Jennings 
2012). It is certainly true that some shocks in the existing literature would 
qualify as electoral shocks under our definition, for example, major economic crises 
and recessions, and the Watergate crisis.
2 Some studies have claimed spillover competence effects of seemingly unrelated issues such as 
shark attacks and sporting outcomes (Achen and Bartels  2016; Healy, Malhotra, and Mo  2010). 
However, these results have not been replicated in subsequent studies (Fowler and Hall 2018; Fowler 
and Montagnes 2015) and are not likely to be major drivers of electoral outcomes.
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It is important to reiterate that shocks are not defined by their electoral 
 outcomes. Even if a shock moves voters, it may not affect aggregate outcomes 
depending on what other flows happen in that election, which could counteract 
the aggregate level outcome of shocks. A shock may be responded to successfully 
by the parties in the system, political entrepreneurs may fail to mobilize eff ect-
ive ly in response to the shock, or voters may be too attached to their current 
parties to be moved by the shock. We expand on the contingent nature of shocks 
in section 3.6 of this chapter. But first, we illustrate the concept of electoral shocks 
with the five examples of the electoral shocks which shaped the outcomes and 
voting behaviour in the 2015 and 2017 British general elections. We discussed, 
above, the properties of shocks, and some cases that we would not categorize as 
shocks. Here we summarize five shocks in recent British politics that do possess 
the properties of electoral shocks.
3.3 Five electoral shocks in recent British politics
The following examples illustrate considerable variation in their nature but each 
meets our definition. We will demonstrate in later chapters (5, 6, 7, 8, and 9) how 
each of the following shocks has fundamentally reshaped the outcomes of the 
recent 2015 and 2017 British General Elections, the ways in which they have done 
so, and also how the underlying trends in destabilization have combined with 
these electoral shocks to create dramatic outcomes.
1. The EU immigration shock
The first shock we consider is the rapid rise and sustained level of immigration to 
the UK, particularly following the 2004 accession of ten new EU member states 
whose citizens suddenly enjoyed freedom of movement to the UK. EU migra-
tion reflected a sharp change from the status quo because it very substantially 
increased the flow of migration into Britain, representing a step-change in immi-
gration policy. It also disrupted the traditional pattern of thermostatic policy-
making and public opinion that had previously characterized UK immigration 
policy (Jennings 2009). When public concerns about immigration had been high 
in the past, governments tended to tighten immigration rules to bring numbers 
down. Despite Conservative promises to do so again, however, freedom of move-
ment within the EU prevented any meaningful steps to reduce migration while 
remaining in the EU. In essence, the UK government was unable to control EU 
immigration or manage its speed, which became politicized in public and political 
debate. This electoral shock was highly salient due to the corresponding rise in 
media coverage of immigration, and in turn immigration routinely topped the list 
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of most important issues stated by the public. Immigration from the EU was party 
political in nature due to: 1) the existing party competition over immigration and 
the willingness of the Conservative Party to use the issue against the Labour 
government; 2) the linkage of immigration to the long politicized issue of EU 
membership which had spawned two new challenger parties in the 1990s (UKIP, 
and formerly the Referendum Party) and; 3) the political campaigning of a charis-
matic radical right leader, Nigel Farage, who was well placed to capitalize on the 
EU immigration issue at the head of the already ascending party of UKIP.
2. The Global Financial Crisis
The second shock that reshaped British politics was the 2007–8 Global Financial 
Crisis, and the subsequent Great Recession. An economic crisis inevitably involves 
a change in the status quo as it directly affects the lived experience of the popula-
tion in significant and far-reaching ways. It also led to a sharp, long-lasting, 
and important shift in policy—austerity—which was justified on the grounds of 
reducing the level of national debt and the government’s budget deficit. The Global 
Financial Crisis and Great Recession were hugely salient, both through media 
coverage at the time, the strong sense of outrage over the failure of banks, the 
unaccountability of financial institutions that were ‘too big to fail’, and their direct 
effects on the economic well-being of British citizens. These concerns were also 
salient politically, providing the backdrop and justifications for political competi-
tion, blame attribution, and policy shifts. An economic crisis is inevitably linked 
to party politics because the economy is one of the most important ways that an 
incumbent government is judged, and also because of the ways in which all par-
ties responded. The crisis was clearly an electoral shock in the 2010 election, but 
its impact persisted through to 2015, as we demonstrate in Chapter 6.
3. The Conservative and Liberal Democrat coalition
The third shock that shaped British politics was the Conservative and Liberal 
Democrat coalition formed in the wake of the 2010 election that delivered a hung 
Parliament. The coalition represented a sharp departure from the type of gov-
ernment most British voters had ever experienced, and a major disruption in the 
image of the Liberal Democrats, and hence to the nature of party choices available 
to voters. The Liberal Democrats had primarily been seen as an anti-Conservative, 
centre-left party, with the majority of its supporters falling attitudinally closer to 
Labour than the Conservatives (Russell and Fieldhouse 2005). Most people who 
expected a coalition would have expected the Liberal Democrats to govern more 
naturally with the Labour Party. In the space of one week, the Liberal Democrats 
OUP CORRECTED PROOF – FINAL, 18/11/19, SPi
38 Electoral Shocks
abandoned this position, enabling a government led by a party that the majority 
of its supporters strongly opposed. The coalition also fulfils the salience and party 
political elements of the shock definition. A coalition government was not hugely 
unexpected in 2010. A coalition formed of the Conservatives and the Liberal 
Democrats, however, was a surprise. It was a huge news story, announced 
with  great fanfare and sustained for five years of media attention. By virtue of 
being unusual and a different type of government to what people were accus-
tomed to, it was certainly noticeable to the general public, and Nick Clegg, the 
Liberal Democrat leader, was a high-profile deputy prime minister. In short, if 
you knew one thing about the Liberal Democrats during this time period, it was 
likely to be that they had entered into a coalition with the Conservatives.
4. The Scottish Independence Referendum
The fourth shock that shaped British politics happened in Scotland. Since the 
advent of devolution in 1999, the SNP had been making inroads with Scottish 
voters in their campaign for Scottish independence. This culminated in a referen-
dum on independence in September 2014. On the face of it, the outcome of the 
referendum was not a major change: the pro-independence ‘Yes’ side achieved 
45 per cent of the vote, lost the referendum, and Scotland remained part of the UK. 
However, the referendum itself was a major departure from normal Scottish 
pol it ics. It united the two major parties, Labour and the Conservatives, behind a 
common cause (the Union); it placed a high-stakes electoral choice into a binary 
decision, and in so doing demonstrated and deepened an existing schism in the 
Scottish electorate. It was unquestionably salient and unavoidable in Scotland, as 
well as throughout the UK (to a lesser extent). It permeated political and cultural 
life in Scotland for a prolonged and intense period, and it culminated in an excep-
tionally high level of participation, with an 84.6 per cent turnout. Finally, the 
independence referendum was clearly a party political issue given that the parties 
all took positions on independence on one side or the other, making it easy for 
voters to link their positions on independence to party politics.
5. The Brexit referendum and outcome
The final shock should come as no surprise: the 2016 EU referendum and the vote 
for Brexit. As with the Scottish independence referendum, the EU referendum 
exposed and accentuated visceral divides. The EU referendum was clearly a party 
political event: the referendum was called by the Conservatives to head off 
in tern al dissent and compete against UKIP, although the referendum campaign 
did not fall along party lines. The vast majority of Conservative, Labour, and 
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Liberal Democrat leadership opposed Brexit (although Labour’s leader, Jeremy 
Corbyn, was naturally more Eurosceptic), as did the bulk of their MPs. Similarly, 
most of the smaller parties—the SNP, Plaid Cymru, and the Greens—lined up on 
the pro-Remain side. Only UKIP was united as a party behind the Leave cam-
paign. There were, however, significant divisions within the two main parties: the 
official Leave campaign was headed by prominent Conservatives MPs, including 
Boris Johnson, and a small number of vocal Labour MPs launched a ‘Labour 
Leave’ campaign.
The referendum campaign was divisive and highly salient, but so was the 
aftermath of the referendum. The Conservatives, with a new leader who had 
supported Remain (Theresa May), almost universally threw themselves whole-
heartedly behind Brexit (with some notable but more peripheral exceptions). 
Labour maintained a position of studied ambiguity, adopting a softer, more 
critical version of Brexit, following a brief period of infighting between Corbyn 
and the Parliamentary Labour Party which was resolved in Corbyn’s favour. The 
Liberal Democrats, the SNP, and the Greens continued their op pos ition to 
Brexit. Suddenly, finding itself without a clear purpose, UKIP was engulfed in 
internal conflict. Since the outcome of the referendum, the trials and tribula-
tions of the government’s negotiations with the EU dominated the news cycle. 
The EU referendum and its aftermath are inescapable, enduring, and very high 
in salience. Brexit is perhaps the most vivid and stark example there is of an 
elect or al shock.
Each of these examples is of special interest to us because of their proximity to 
the election outcomes in 2015 and 2017. However, this does not mean that earlier 
shocks did not have any impact on previous elections, or that shocks have not 
always been important drivers of volatility and election outcomes. What is par-
ticularly important now, as we discuss presently, is that shocks are taking place 
within an electorate that also exhibits a greater propensity for volatility and 
sensitivity to shocks. That combination of underlying volatility and shocks is 
necessary to understand the outcomes of recent elections, the increasing level of 
switching and system volatility, and the vulnerability of the British party system 
to future disruption.
3.4 How electoral shocks work
We identify three mechanisms through which shocks drive electoral behaviour. 
This is not to say that the way in which shocks shape electoral behaviour can be 
easily divided into separate categories. They typically work through a com bin-
ation of multiple interacting mechanisms. However, these categories help us the-
or ize more clearly about the combinations of ways in which shocks can shape 
election outcomes.
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Salience
Parties and voters have policy positions, or potential positions, on a wide range 
of  issues, but only a few of these are crucial in any particular electoral choice. 
However, a shock can change which of these issues a voter attaches weight to 
and how clearly they perceive the positions of the parties on the issue. The ‘non-
ignorability’ of shocks makes them cut through other concerns and attachments, 
changing voters’ views of what is important in politics. Any major high-profile 
disruption to politics has the potential to alter the relative importance of issues 
(or issue dimensions) to electoral choice.
The effects of salience on the factors that voters prioritize in their vote choice 
are well established on a wide range of issues. When issues become more salient 
voters tend to become better informed about those issues and about the parties’ 
positions on them (RePass 1971). As a result, those issues are given greater weight 
in a voter’s calculus (Green and Hobolt  2008). Voters have a wide variety of 
views on issues that make it hard for any party to simultaneously satisfy their 
preferences on all fronts. Parties therefore find it advantageous to downplay cer-
tain issues or maintain constructive ambiguity over what their position is (Somer-
Topcu 2015). When an issue is highly salient, however, this ambiguity is harder to 
maintain: voters will make greater efforts to obtain information about the issues 
they see as most important. The media will also make greater efforts to pin down 
a party’s position on a salient issue and communicate this to voters, while oppos-
ing parties may take the opportunity to convey negative information about their 
competitor’s position on the issue. Ambiguity is a harder strategy to follow when 
an issue is highly salient, although as we discuss in Chapter 9, this is arguably the 
strategy adopted by Labour in 2017 with respect to Brexit. Consequently, when an 
issue is salient, parties are more likely to adopt the priorities of the electorate 
(Budge and Farlie 1983) and manage policy positions and campaigns accordingly.
Several of our shocks work through salience to an important degree. The 
sustained high levels of media coverage about immigration acted as a salience 
shock which increased the weight of immigration attitudes in the vote calculus. 
The shock had further reverberations, of course, when the Conservative Party 
responded to the rise of UKIP by promising to call a referendum on EU member-
ship if they won the 2015 election (which they then did). The Scottish independ-
ence referendum was a salience shock insofar as it increased the weight that 
voters placed on their views on Scottish independence in their vote choice in 2015 
and, to a lesser extent, in 2017. However, as noted above, salience shocks also 
affect the clarity of positions taken by parties: by making the position of parties 
clearer on the issue of independence, where some—most notably Labour—might 
have preferred to have maintained ambiguity to avoid splitting their base over the 
issue. As with the Scottish independence referendum, the EU referendum repre-
sented a salience boost to the issue of EU membership and the result of a vote to 
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leave the EU guaranteed that this salience would remain high and hugely pol it ic al ly 
significant for years to come.
Party image
Shocks may fundamentally alter the image of a political party regarding who and 
what it represents, altering the effective choices available in the party system. We 
discussed above how voters may seek and gain greater clarity on party positions 
when shocks make issues and evaluations more salient. Shocks can also reshape 
the way a party is perceived with respect to what it stands for and which groups’ 
interests it represents. This can happen via a number of different routes, each of 
which causes a sudden and fundamental change to a party’s image and its pur-
pose to voters. First, by revealing or emphasizing a new or previously obscured 
position on an issue, a shock may alter what a party is perceived to stands for with 
respect to issues and ideology. Second, and relatedly, any such change may lead to 
a change in who a party represents with respect to the social and demographic 
interest groups it favours. A party image shock can therefore involve a shift in 
either the social identity of a party or the political identity (or both). For example, 
Green et al. (2002) described how the enfranchisement of black Americans 
through the Voter Rights Act of 1965 led to their incorporation into the Democrat 
Party, bringing about a change in the social imagery of both the Republicans and 
the Democrats that ultimately led to realignment (Carmines and Stimson 1989). 
Third, a shock may shift the position of voters on issues independently of (or prior 
to) any change in the position of political parties, changing the issue distance 
between different groups of voters and the political parties. A major event, such 
as the Fukushima nuclear plan disaster, can lead to a change in public opinion on 
that issue which may in turn lead to a change in the position of political parties 
(Meyer and Schoen 2017).3 The extent to which parties respond stra tegic al ly to 
such a shift will determine the extent to which such an event affects party support 
(Mader and Schoen 2018).
In the case of Britain, we can draw on two examples detailed later in this 
book. First, the choice of a Conservative-led coalition shifted the image of the 
Liberal Democrats as a vehicle for preventing Conservative rule, and linked 
the Liberal Democrats to a Conservative-defined agenda. The coalition therefore 
acted as a party image shock to the Liberal Democrats. It was specifically the coali-
tion with the Conservatives that made the change so dramatic: a coalition with 
3 Attitudes of the electorate tend to move quite slowly, whereas parties can change positions quite 
abruptly, especially in face of a shock. The analyses of shocks presented in this book suggest that 
shocks are more likely to affect how attitudes and values are aligned with party choice rather than by 
instigating a change in attitudes.
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Labour would not have been as sharp a break with the status quo because it would 
not have changed the way that the Liberal Democrats were widely perceived. The 
co ali tion therefore changed many voters’ perceptions of what the party repre-
sented. Second, the Scottish independence referendum changed the image of the 
Labour Party in Scotland. As noted above, while Labour had previously been 
widely regarded as a primarily working-class, left-wing party, the independence 
campaign highlighted their identity as a party of the Union, alongside the 
Conservatives. Many voters, especially those who favoured independence, began 
to redefine Labour in these terms, leading—as we show in Chapter 8—to mass 
switching to the SNP.
Competence
Electoral shocks can affect parties’ reputations for sound judgement and manage-
ment. Green and Jennings (2017) outline three consequences of ‘competence 
shocks’ for public opinion and electoral choice: competence shocks contribute to 
the loss of long-standing party reputations on issues, or their ‘issue ownership’ 
(Petrocik 1996), parties can suffer a deterioration in their perception of compe-
tence overall, and competence can become more electorally relevant. Competence 
shocks cut through otherwise stable party reputations on issues, causing the 
public to evaluate the ability of parties to handle and deliver on different issues, 
including their traditional issues. This is consistent with the ways in which the 
immigration shock worked (as described in Chapter 5) and the Global Financial 
Crisis (Chapter 6). The rise in immigration acted as a competence shock against 
the Labour government—and then the Conservative government—when both 
were unable to fulfil their promise to reduce net migration to the ‘tens of thou-
sands’ once they took office. The outcome of the EU referendum had a supple-
mental effect of removing a lever for Conservative competence on immigration 
because freedom of movement within the EU meant that they previously had 
very limited policy tools to reduce EU immigration. The Global Financial Crisis 
took place under the Labour government and was widely seen as an indictment of 
Gordon Brown’s economic management and Labour’s economic policy more 
generally, particularly—and interestingly—after the 2010 General Election. The 
damage to Labour’s reputation persisted under Ed Miliband, placed Labour in a 
strategic bind over economic policy in 2015, and created competition over 
blame for the deficit that went on to damage Labour’s performance in the 2015 
General Election.
Shocks provide a change in the relevance of different criteria by which voters 
might make their decisions. Simply, competence shocks make competence more 
salient to political choice, differentiating parties, making competence a more urgent 
criterion for voters, and by providing political opportunities to compete around 
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handling and competence. Concerns around immigration—and the hand ling of 
immigration—became more salient to electoral choice following the immigration 
shock, providing UKIP, and latterly the Conservatives, with votes following the 
Brexit referendum. The effects of Labour’s competence on the economy were also 
enhanced as the parties competed around this problem—and the necessity of 
different policy responses—throughout the period between 2010 and 2015.
3.5 Shocks as political opportunities
The impacts of electoral shocks depend not only on how they affect voters but 
also on the responses of political actors. In other words, they are a function of 
political supply and demand. This means that the outcomes of shocks are not 
determined solely by the shock, but also by the different ways in which political 
actors respond to them. Shocks can also have an effect by constraining the policy 
options open to a party. For instance, a terrorist attack might force a party to 
change foreign policy in a way it may have preferred to avoid, or a currency crisis 
might require a government to interfere with financial flows in a way that angers 
key supporters.
Shocks provide an imperative for parties to compete around newly salient 
issues. Not only are shocks impossible for voters to ignore, they are also im pos-
sible for parties to ignore. However, shocks do not simply create a burden that 
parties must bear: they also create new opportunities for strategic actors to alter 
their electoral fortunes. Consider the way in which the EU referendum affected 
the outcome of the 2017 General Election because the Conservatives—despite 
choosing the Remain-supporting Theresa May as their next leader—pursued a 
policy of hard Brexit, promising to leave the single market, and thereby avoiding 
the commitment to the principle of freedom of movement. This response, com-
bined with the Conservatives’ increased perceived competence on immigration, 
changed the pattern of party choice in 2017, leading many 2015 UKIP voters to 
defect to the Conservatives.
Shocks affect party strategies and electoral behaviour in ways that are not 
anticipated, and they also create unpredictability and uncertainty among politi-
cians about how to respond, leaving them struggling to understand why the rules 
of politics have shifted beneath them. In policymaking, a shock or a crisis creates 
a sense of urgency and unusually rapid responses, less reliance on experts and 
more on ideology, but also a high degree of uncertainty (see Fischer, 2015). Such 
events are often highly technical and complex, meaning the ramifications cannot 
always be understood, increasing the potential for mistakes (Grossman  2015). 
Shocks are, by definition, unusual, differentiating them from the normal events of 
politics for which there are precedents, providing political actors invaluable 
ex peri ence of how to best handle them. While shocks provide new strategic 
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challenges to politicians, the increased demand to do something means a range of 
actions are deemed to be politically necessary. By way of example, Labour and the 
Conservative pledges to cut net migration can be viewed as actions that were 
politically necessary, but which backfired given their inability to meet them. 
Ed Miliband’s policy difficulties around austerity were a response to a successful 
effort to blame Labour for the financial crisis, and especially the level of national 
debt, and the demand to respond in some way for Labour’s previous period of 
government. Consider again the EU referendum and the Brexit outcome. It might 
have appeared, on the face of it, that all the Conservatives needed to do in 2016 
was immediately get behind the Brexit project and win over the majority of UKIP 
voters to increase the party’s majority under Theresa May. Yet under the surface, 
the churn in the electorate, Labour’s strong performance, combined with the sali-
ence of Europe following the EU referendum, meant that a fundamental change 
happened in 2017 that was not widely foreseen. The outcome was, in part, a prod-
uct of the Brexit effect (a rise in votes for the two major parties) but it also dem-
onstrated the unanticipated consequences that come with shocks (the loss of the 
Conservative Party’s majority).
If a new issue or dimension becomes salient as a result of a shock, and if parties 
provide new choices to voters when competing on that dimension, realignment of 
electoral choice on that issue or dimension could be the result. For this to come 
about, the impact of the shock must be sufficiently long-lasting and strong enough 
to overcome the inertial forces we described above. Electoral volatility means that 
any durable pattern of electoral choice may be unlikely. Without an electoral shock 
and without differentiated responses from political actors, elections may still 
produce patterns of support which deviate from normal alignments as a result of 
regular political competition (Evans and Norris 1999). However, it is also unlikely 
that an electoral realignment will occur in the absence of an electoral shock.
3.6 Shocks within a volatile system
Earlier in this chapter we highlighted the combination of two destabilizing elect-
or al forces in British politics: the long-term and gradual increase in underlying 
volatility caused by party-dealignment and party system fragmentation, and the 
impact of electoral shocks which create additional election specific peaks in 
switching. Although the elections of 2015 and 2017 were almost certainly unusual 
in terms of the large number of electoral shocks that preceded them, it is not at all 
clear that shocks have become more frequent over time more generally. Even if 
shocks themselves are not more likely to occur now than in the past, there are a 
number of reasons to expect that the potential impact of shocks on election out-
comes has grown over time as a result of the weakening of partisan attachments 
and party system fragmentation.
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First, shocks determine which parties gain and which parties lose from 
 vote-switching. Therefore, insofar as shocks favour some parties over others, as the 
underlying level of volatility increases, the parties profiting from a shock stand to 
gain more at the expense of the losing parties. Even if the overall level of volatility 
was unaffected by a shock, the impact might be expected to be greater when the 
baseline level of volatility (the amount of voter switching we would expect on the 
basis of long-term trends in partisanship and fragmentation) is higher. In other 
words, because shocks influence the direction of vote-switching, higher levels of 
volatility can produce larger electoral swings. Second, as the underlying level 
of volatility increases, the additional churn created by electoral shocks becomes 
more likely to lead to marked shifts in electoral outcomes in terms of seats, since 
parties have a smaller base of voters on which they can rely. In contrast, when the 
baseline level of volatility is low, any additional vote-switching caused by shocks 
is less likely to bring about dramatic political change. Third, because unattached 
voters and smaller party voters have a greater propensity to switch, under most 
electoral conditions shocks might be expected to affect voters who do not iden-
tify with a party—or identify only weakly—more than those that have a strong 
attachment.4 In other words, party identification may provide some insulation 
from electoral shocks. This is consistent with the theories of partisan identifica-
tion which argue that party identifiers are less likely to be swayed by new infor-
mation or more likely to interpret that information in a way favourable to their 
own party (Lodge and Taber 2013). An example of the insulating effect of party 
identification is illustrated in Chapter 9. EU referendum vote had a stronger 
effect on 2017 vote choice among those identifying strongly with a major party 
compared to weak or non-identifiers. As suggested above, this insulating effect 
of  party identification may not always hold because some shocks can cut 
through the stabilizing effect of party identification leading voters to update 
their relevant attitudes, evaluations, and even partisanship (Green, Palmquist, 
and Schickler 2002). For example, whilst the collapse of Liberal Democrat support 
was greater among non-identifiers and weak identifiers, the desertion rate of 
strong identifiers relative to weak/non-identifiers was similar to that seen in pre-
vious elections, but with both strong and weak identifiers defecting at a higher 
overall level (Chapter 7).
It is important to note that the argument that unattached voters and smaller 
party voters have a greater propensity to switch does not mean they switch 
randomly, or willy-nilly. It is only because of some other stimuli that cause 
them to change their party choice. In normal times this might be driven by 
changes in voters or parties, such as voter preferences, party offers, or party 
competence. When a political shock occurs, volatile voters are most likely to react. 
4 The direction of this effect is complex and depends on the baseline level of volatility, the size of 
the shock, and the strength of the effect of party identification on vote choice.
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Certainly, there is sufficient academic evidence to conclude that a dealigned 
 electorate will be more likely to respond to political stimuli, and therefore more 
likely to exhibit responsiveness and switching in response to shocks. As noted 
 earlier, weaker identifiers are less likely to rationalize information, and less likely to 
exhibit bias in the way they deal with evaluating politics and party policy positions. 
As a result, weaker attachments to political parties have been found to increase 
the impact of economic voting when electorates exhibit. Strong partisans are less 
affected by the ups and downs of economic performance, whereas weak party 
identifiers are much more so (Kayser and Wlezien 2011) and weaker partisans are 
more influenced by both issue positions and issue competence (Weßels et al. 2014). 
As a result, unattached voters have a broader choice set of political parties that 
they are willing to consider voting for. Moreover, people who have switched 
parties previously have already demonstrated a greater willingness to consider 
different and diverse political messages, policy positions, leaders, and priorities. 
This shortens the cognitive leap required to vote for a rival party.
We described above how increasing returns to electoral success (or positive 
feedback effects) mean that established parties enjoy institutionalized advan-
tages. Hence, party systems are normally expected to persist, according to the 
freezing hypothesis of Lipset and Rokkan (Lipset and Rokkan 1967). As Pierson 
(2000, 258) explained,
Key historical junctures produced major political cleavages. These political divisions 
became organized into political parties. Once they have surmounted initial start-up 
costs and fuelled processes of adaptive expectations, these parties are reproduced 
through time, which generates ‘frozen’ party systems.
These institutionalized advantages, not least the majoritarian electoral system, 
still have a powerful effect on bringing the party system back towards equilib-
rium. This is apparent through the fact that major parties still retain substantially 
higher proportions of their voters between elections compared to minor parties. 
Nevertheless, partisan dealignment and fragmentation have weakened the ability 
of the system to remain in a stable equilibrium in the face of electoral shocks. 
Electoral volatility in tandem with electoral shocks counters the forces that sta bil-
ize the party system. Depending on the balance of forces, rapid change may occur 
as a result of shocks, because of the underlying vulnerability of the wider system.
3.7 The future of volatility and electoral shocks
It might be tempting to think that volatility could increase inexorably if the frag-
menting and dealignment processes that lead to volatility are path dependent, 
and if shocks inevitably lead to further dealignment and fragmentation. However, 
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this is not what is in fact happening, as we will demonstrate in the remainder of 
this book. Certainly, an obvious outcome of fragmentation and dealignment 
is the weakening of the in-built advantages of major parties, and further partisan 
dealignment could be seen as an inevitable consequence of new cohorts entering 
the electorate without the partisan identification of their parents. Importantly, 
however, shocks can lead to disruptions to these processes, as well as the ac cel er-
ation of existing processes. In other words, shocks have the capacity to reduce 
fragmentation and increase partisan attachments, as well as the reverse.
Consider the outcome of the 2017 General Election, which delivered the largest 
two-party vote since 1970 and an abrupt pause, stop, or reversal (we cannot yet 
know which) in the fragmentation that had taken place up to 2015. The 2017 
General Election was still a very volatile election. The total level of switching was 
very high between 2015 and 2017, though not as high as between 2010 and 2015. 
However, the amount of switching between the Conservatives and Labour between 
2015 and 2017 was the highest on record. The defragmentation of the party system 
between 2015 and 2017 was just as much the result of volatility as was the frag-
mentation of 2015.
There are good reasons to think that volatility might now drop somewhat 
in  a future election, since mainstream parties are more likely to retain their 
 voters—even if those voters are previous minor party voters—and if more people 
identify with parties. There was a small hint of such an increase in identification 
in 2017, but nothing of sufficient magnitude or strength to suggest a major 
 stabilization of support. The period after 2017 was so fraught with political dif-
ficulties on all sides that it is also easy to see the trend in partisan dealignment 
continuing, and while fragmentation has reversed, the electorate still has far 
lower levels of partisanship than in earlier decades. This means that the impacts 
of future shocks could be particularly substantial. What we also know, of course, 
is that a future shock or multiple shocks could happen. Indeed, Brexit is very 
likely to continue to reshape the British party system, whatever its outcome. It is 
shaping up to be a very substantial electoral shock. We consider a number of 
different ways in which the future of British politics might become more stable 
or unstable in the concluding chapter of this book, considering the possibility 
of different political identities around Brexit and early evidence for volatility 
looking ahead.
For now, it is important to note that our explanation of volatility and shocks 
does not imply that the British party system is on a one-way journey to greater 
fragmentation. Volatility does not inevitably lead to fragmentation and the pro-
cesses that have led to volatility are not necessarily irreversible. However, a desta-
bil ized party system and more volatile electorate brings with it considerable 
uncertainty about the future of British elections and politics. It will be particularly 
responsive—and therefore less predictable—in its response to future shocks. 
Those shocks seem an inevitable part of the future of British politics.
OUP CORRECTED PROOF – FINAL, 18/11/19, SPi
48 Electoral Shocks
3.8 Conclusions
Election outcomes cannot be understood without an appreciation of the long-term 
context in which they take place, and without understanding the major events that 
precede them. Voters do not decide how to vote in a vacuum of major events and 
changes that alter the political and electoral calculus. The volatility of the 2015 
and 2017 elections did not come completely out of the blue: these tumultuous 
elections followed a steady increase in vote-switching in British elections that has, 
until now, been unexplained. In this chapter we explained this volatility by the 
long-term processes of partisan dealignment and the increasing votes for ‘other’ 
parties up to 2015 (fragmentation), both of which we go on to describe in detail 
in Chapter 4.
Once we account for the long-term trend in volatility and the destabilization of 
the British party system that results from it, it was not preordained that the vote 
flows would look anything like the way they did in the elections in 2015 and 
2017, or that they would be the size they were. We need an explanation that can 
account for sharp and sudden changes in electoral volatility and outcomes. In 
this chapter we set out our explanation combining long-term volatility in the 
British electorate with the importance and mechanisms of electoral shocks; the 
major, salient political changes to the status quo that may cause substantial shifts 
in electoral choice.
Shocks work via mechanisms of salience, changes to party images, and percep-
tions of competence. They provide political opportunities and create an impera-
tive for parties and political actors to respond, meaning that the effects of shocks 
may be absorbed, or may also create major and long-lasting changes in the elect-
or ate, and to elections. They may even lead to ‘critical elections’, where the basis of 
electoral choice alters such that realignment takes place between parties and 
 voters. However, our theory of electoral shocks departs from critical election theory 
(Key  1955; Burnham  1970). Most importantly we do not dichotomize elections 
into those which are critical and those which are not, nor do we assume that 
shocks only occur as a precursor to such critical elections. Electoral shocks have 
the potential to sharply change the patterns of support for political parties at any 
election, the magnitude of the effect being determined by the nature of the shock, 
the response of political parties, and the underlying volatility in the electorate.
As such, an explanation based on electoral shocks incorporates explanations 
based on the competence of political leaders, the functioning of the economy, 
party and voter positions on issues, the salience of particular issues, and the rep-
resentation of social groups. A theory of electoral shocks does not make other 
theories of electoral behaviour redundant: it provides the context to understand 
why and when they matter. Our explanation of electoral behaviour is, then, very 
different to one that applies one theory or model to all elections. Not all elections 
are the same and not all elections can be explained by the same sets of factors.
OUP CORRECTED PROOF – FINAL, 18/11/19, SPi
Turbulent British Politics: An Explanation 49
Electoral shocks have the potential to cause dramatic electoral outcomes under 
some conditions more than others. We argue that the increasing underlying vola-
tility in the party system in Britain has enabled shocks to become particularly 
important in the elections that we are studying. The ballast that once maintained 
a more stable party system has weakened, making the system more vulnerable to 
the impacts of electoral shocks. Volatility and shocks could lead to the fragmenta-
tion of the party system, and they could lead to the defragmentation of the party 
system. They help to explain the seemingly unpredictable and tumultuous nature 
of recent British politics and elections.
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4
The Rise of the Volatile Voter
Politicians and journalists have long obsessed over identifying the pivotal voters 
in elections; the ‘swing voters’ who might actually change which party they vote 
for. Each party, it is said, must win the swing vote in an election to have a chance 
of winning a majority. Swing voters have been thought of as a narrow segment of 
the electorate, those who might be won over by different parties given particular 
circumstances. Election strategists form profiles of the kinds of people they believe 
to be swing voters, such as ‘Essex Man’, ‘Worcester woman’, or ‘Mondeo Man’. 
They are often thought to be the small but moveable part of an otherwise loyal 
electorate; a small island of active switchers among an ocean of habitual supporters 
who parties can count on election after election.
When Butler and Stokes looked at panel data of vote choice in the 1960s, they 
observed that only around 13 per cent of those who voted in both elections 
switched their vote choices between elections (Butler and Stokes 1969). They 
concluded that differential turnout and cohort replacement were the major drivers 
of electoral change. Slightly over a decade later, Särlvik and Crewe (1983) saw 
sufficient change (21 per cent of voters switched) that they considered there to 
have been a ‘decade of dealignment’. However, even the switching seen there 
seems modest when compared to the levels seen in 2015 (43 per cent) and 2017 
(33 per cent). Across the four elections from 2005 to 2017, around 60 per cent of 
voters switched parties at least once.1 Far from being the minority of the electorate, 
swing voters—defined as people who switch their support to different parties 
between elections—now comprise the majority of the modern British electorate.
In Chapter 3 we argued that the growth in the number of these ‘volatile voters’ 
has increased the potential for electoral shocks to have a significant impact. That 
is to say, the more voters are prepared to move to another party, the more un stable 
the party system becomes. In this chapter we focus on the long-term changes that 
have helped to generate this more volatile electorate. We identify several potential 
influences on levels of vote-switching between elections. Some of these cannot 
account for the long-term increase in volatility because they do not follow the 
same trend over time. One—the increasing ideological similarity between the 
1 We calculate this in two ways. First, by taking British Election Study Internet Panel (BESIP) 
panellists who took all four post-election surveys and voted each time. This gives a stable voters 
figure of 39 per cent but is based on a sample of just 562 voters. The alternate approach supplements 
the panel data with vote recall data obtained as soon after the election as possible. This gives a 
much larger sample of 19,189 voters and a stable voter figure of 45 per cent.
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main parties—does help to account for increasing volatility, but only to a modest 
extent. There are, however, two processes that can account for the substantial 
increases in volatility over the long term: partisan dealignment and party system 
fragmentation.
High levels of partisanship—or party identification—are expected to create a 
stable basis for vote choice and therefore limit voter volatility (Campbell et al. 
1960; Butler and Stokes 1969). Consistent with this idea, we show that long-term 
partisan dealignment—the weakening of the attachments between voters and 
political parties—has a very strong impact on the level of electoral volatility. 
Additionally, and for a variety of reasons (which include institutional advantages 
and the electoral system), the larger parties tend to retain a greater share of their 
supporters from one election to the next. This means that the increased frag-
mentation of the party system in recent years has resulted in more voters switch-
ing their vote choices between elections. The success of smaller parties at one 
election tends to lead to lower overall levels of vote retention at the next election, 
increasing the amount of switching between elections as the votes for minor par-
ties have increased over time, until, that is, the 2017 General Election.
Partisan dealignment and party system fragmentation only go so far in explaining 
increases in voter volatility. There remain unexplained increases in volatility in 
recent elections that cannot be understood without also taking specific events—
electoral shocks—into account. In subsequent chapters we therefore focus on 
the electoral shocks that have led to an increasingly volatile electorate changing 
its electoral choices to an even greater extent, contributing to further volatility 
and dramatically shaping the outcomes of the 2015 and 2017 General Elections.
4.1 Partisan dealignment
The British two-party party system was relatively stable in the post-war era, with 
high levels of partisan identification associated with processes of political so cial-
iza tion and the strong class-based links of the two main parties. This stable sys-
tem existed with strong party loyalties leading to stable patterns of vote choice. 
However, one of the best documented trends in British politics has been the decline 
in the number of people identifying with a political party, and the decline in the 
proportion of identifiers who have a strong attachment (Särlvik and Crewe 1983; 
Crewe, Särlvik, and Alt 1977; Dalton 1984).
In the BES, party attachment is measured using questions that ask respondents 
to say which party they feel closest to, followed up with a question about how 
strong those feeling of attachment are. Table  4.1 shows the question wordings 
used in the BES and British Social Attitudes (BSA) surveys. Note that the partisan 
strength wording changed slightly between the earliest waves of the BES and 
later surveys. The two series complement each other. The BES surveys provide a 
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time-series covering each election back to 1964. The BSA surveys only started in 
1983, but are conducted every year, allowing us to analyse change in the elector-
ate’s partisan attachments between elections. The BSA questions consistently 
receive lower levels of respondents reporting a partisan attachment than the BES 
questions, likely due to the filter question which invites respondents to state a lack 
of identity.
Figure 4.1 shows the trend in this strength of attachment among party iden ti fiers 
since 1964, as well as the percentage with no party identification, using BES data.2
2 The party identification strength question wording was changed following the first three BES 
post-election panels in 1964, 1966, and 1970 and the second set of panels covering 1970 and 1974. This 
gives us an approximate picture of how much difference the wording makes. Using the original wording, 
1970 has strong party identification of 47 per cent, compared with 44 per cent in 1966 and 30 per cent 
in 1974. Using the revised wording, the 1970 strong party identification figure is 42 per cent. This 
means that the old wording somewhat overstates the 1970–74 drop in party identification, although 
Table 4.1 Party identification question wordings in the British Election Study and 
British Social Attitudes surveys
BES (1964–70) BES (1970–present) BSA (1983–present)
[Q1] Generally speaking, 
do you usually think of 
yourself as Conservative, 
Labour, Liberal, or what?
[Q1] Generally speaking, 







[Q1] Generally speaking, 
do you think of yourself 




[Q2 if no at Q1] Well, do 
you generally feel a little 




[Q2 if ‘none’ at Q1] Do you 
generally think of yourself 
as a little closer to one of 




[Q2 if no at Q1] Do you 
think of yourself as a little 
closer to one political party 
than to the others?
 • Yes
 • No
[Q3 if yes at Q2] Which 
party is that?
[Q3 if yes at Q2] Which 
party is that?
DO NOT PROMPT
[Q3 if yes at Q1 or Q2] 
Which one?
DO NOT PROMPT
[Q4 if party given at Q1 or 
Q3] Well how strongly 
[party] do you feel: very 
strong, fairly strong, or not 
very strongly:
 • Very strongly
 • Fairly strongly
 • Not very strongly
[Q4 if party given at Q1 
or Q3] Would you call 
yourself very strong 
[party], fairly strong, 
or not very strong?
 • Very strong
 • Fairly strong
 • Not very strong
[Q4 if party given at Q3] 
Would you call yourself very 
strong [party], fairly strong, 
or not very strong?
 • Very strong [party]
 • Fairly strong
 • Not very strong
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As can be seen in Figure 4.1, the combined size of the ‘not very strong’ and 
‘none’ categories has increased steadily over the fifty years of British Election 
Studies. This long-term fall in party identity has mainly resulted from falls in levels 
of identification with the two major parties.3 The proportion of the electorate 
reporting a very strong party identification has also plunged from 45 per cent in 
1964 to only 10 per cent in 2005, with a particularly noticeable drop in strong 
identification in the 1970s.4 On this measure, partisan identity had reached its 
nadir by the 2005 election and remained at a similar level since, with the two 
most recent general elections, 2015 and 2017, witnessing a small increase in parti-
san identification.
It is clear, then, that the linkage between the major parties and the elector-
ate  has weakened in Britain, as it has in many other advanced democracies 
(Dalton 1984; Dalton 2012b; Scarrow 2004; Clarke and Stewart 1998). If voters do 
both wordings agree that the drop was large (17 percentage point versus 12 percentage points). We 
further conducted a survey experiment randomizing the two formulations and found lower levels 
(8 percentage points) of strong party identification using the post-1966 wording.
3 Other parties have increased their levels of identification substantially in recent elections as their 
vote share has increased, but this accounts for a tiny share of all respondents.
4 The extent of this sharp drop needs to be treated with caution. The strength of party identity was 
only asked of Labour and Conservative identifiers in the two 1974 elections, which will have had the 
effect of reducing the number of strong identifiers slightly. Miller, Tagg, and Britto (1986) find a less 
pronounced drop between 1970 and 1974 in their analysis of surveys conducted by the Conservative 
Party. In their study, very strong identifiers fell from 42 per cent in 1966 to 37 per cent in 1970, to 
33 per cent in February 1974.
No party ID
Not very strong party ID
Fairly strong party ID




















1970 1974 1979 1983 1987 1992 1997 2001 2005 2010
2015
2017
Figure 4.1 Declining levels of party identification and strength of identification
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not identify with a political party, and if they lack a strong sense of attachment, it 
is much easier to switch support to another party or not to vote at all (Huddy 2013). 
It is not surprising, therefore, that partisan dealignment and vote-switching are 
closely connected phenomena (Blais et al.  2001; Dassonneville, Hooghe, and 
Vanhoutte 2012; Farrell, McAllister, and Broughton 1994; Johnston 1987; Dalton, 
McAllister, and Wattenberg 2000; Rattinger and Wiegand 2014).
The relationship between party identification and vote-switching can be under-
stood through the ways in which party identification stabilizes a voter’s loyalty to 
a political party. As we discussed in Chapter 3, partisanship can be viewed as a 
form of social identity that provides a lens through which voters evaluate pol it ics—a 
‘perceptual screen’ (Bartels 2002; Campbell et al.  1960; Huddy 2001; Butler and 
Stokes  1969).5 Because the psychological motivations to maintain one’s existing 
identity are very strong (Lodge and Taber 2013), partisans form judgements about 
political parties (and leaders, the economy, policy positions, etc.) in line with 
their prior attachments. Partisans are also less likely to seek out information that 
challenges their existing viewpoints, less likely to be exposed to contrary views in 
family and social networks, and less likely to accept information that is contrary 
to their existing preferences (Lodge and Taber 2013; Zaller  1992). Therefore, an 
electorate comprising fewer people holding strong partisan iden tities should lead 
to greater responsiveness to political events and competition. Not only are people 
less positively biased towards a preferred party, they are also less negatively biased 
against another. The result is a greater willingness to switch parties (Rattinger and 
Wiegand 2014).
Figure 4.2 demonstrates the level of vote-switching for respondents of differ-
ent strengths of partisanship for each of twelve pairs of consecutive elections 
(labelled according to the second of each pair) starting with 1964–66 and ending 
with 2015–17. It replicates Figure 2.4 in Chapter 2, but for each level of partisan 
identification.
Figure 4.2 reveals three key relationships. First, across all of these pairs of elec-
tions, the more someone identifies with a political party, the less likely they are to 
switch their vote choice between elections. Second, the relationship between 
party identification strength and vote-switching—if we focus on the gap between 
the level of switching for each group—has remained broadly consistent over the 
past fifty years.6 Third, and importantly, switching is higher in recent elections 
5 This view is not unchallenged even among scholars who agree that party identity is best charac-
terized as a form of social identity. Green, Palmquist, and Schickler (2002) argue that apparent evidence 
for perceptual screens is better characterized as evidence for partisans holding genuinely different 
values in how they evaluate political events and strong priors about their preferences. Follow-up stud-
ies have tended to confirm the perceptual filter model (Bartels  2002; Druckman, Peterson, and 
Slothus 2013; Gaines et al. 2007; Lodge and Taber 2013), especially for low salience issues (Carsey and 
Layman 2006).
6 Vote-switching between 2015 and 2017 was similar for strongly and fairly strong identifiers. This 
may be statistical variation or may reflect the cross-cutting importance of the EU in 2017 (see Chapter 9).
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within each category of party identification strength. The first two observations, 
in conjunction with the increase in non-identifiers and weak identifiers we reported 
earlier, suggest that partisan dealignment may account for at least part of the long-
term rise in volatility. The third observation, however, suggests that increased 
volatility in recent elections cannot be explained by declining partisanship alone: 
partisan dealignment had, to a large degree, bottomed out by 2005, yet volatility 
continued to increase and did so even within the different levels of identification, 
at least until the most recent election in the data series in 2017.
How dealignment works: The role of generational replacement
The key process behind these changes is the replacement of older generations with 
strong party ties by younger generations with weak or no party ties. Party identi-
fication has been described as a long-term attribute of voters that is socialized at an 
early stage of development (Campbell et al. 1960; Butler and Stokes 1969). If the 
party identification of parents becomes weaker, so will that of their children, as 
parents cease to provide partisan cues (Martin and Mellon 2018; Dinas 2013). 
To put it another way, we would expect the children of the 1960s to be exposed 
to  much more partisan socialization than the children of later decades, simply 
because the electorate in the 1960s had higher levels of party identification. There 
is, then, likely to be a ‘ratchet effect’ in partisan dealignment, with each gen er-
ation being less likely to be socialized into partisanship than the one before.
No party ID
Not very strong party ID
Very strong party ID
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Figure 4.2 Relationship between party identity strength at election 1 and the probability 
that a voter switches parties at election 2 across different elections (labelled by 
second election)
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To examine this process, we need to separate cohort replacement from 
within-cohort change.7 For this we need data that are measured more often than 
once per election cycle. The British Social Attitudes Survey data provides a useful 
source, as it is conducted yearly, although the data only go back as far as 1983 
rather than all the way to 1964. Using BSA data, Figure 4.3 shows that each new 
political gen er ation (since those entering the electorate prior to 1964) has entered 
with lower levels of party identity than the political generation before. Most of 
these gen er ations have maintained relatively stable levels of party identity once 
they have entered the electorate. The only exception to this stability is the most 
recent political generation: those who entered the electorate under the Conservative 
government since 2010 (we do not show them on the chart as they have only a 
handful of observed years). This newer generation displays unstable levels of par-
tisanship that at times are higher than the preceding generation. This may be 
because these voters have been newly enthused by politics in the 2014–16 era, or it 
may simply be an artefact of the small sample size of voters in this age range.
The significance of generational replacement becomes clear when we decom-
pose the change in party identity into within-cohort change and cohort replacement. 
In other words, we consider: what portion of change can be attributed to the 
7 By generational replacement we mean the change attributed to the differences in levels of partisan 
identification between cohorts leaving the electorate (dying off) and those entering as they come of 
age. Within-cohort change captures the extent to which the level of partisan identification of those in 
the electorate changes over time. We define a political generation according to the government in 
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Figure 4.3 Percentage of respondents with any party identification over time for 
different cohorts (defined by the party in power when the voter reached voting age)
OUP CORRECTED PROOF – FINAL, 18/11/19, SPi
The Rise of The Volatile Voter 57
differences between the average person entering and exiting the electorate, versus 
changes in the attitudes of people already in the electorate?8 Figure 4.4 shows the 
trends in levels of party identity in the BSA, decomposed in this way. The total 
line (left-hand-side figure) shows the overall difference in party identification in 
the BSA compared to 1983, the first year the survey was conducted. The trend 
starts at zero, so the y-axis refers to the cumulative change that has taken place. 
Party identification declined by around 20 percentage points since 1983 up to 
2009 followed by a partial recovery. By 2017, the total fall in party identification 
was only 9 percentage points compared with the first BSA survey in 1983.
The right hand panel of Figure 4.4 shows the percentage point change that can 
be attributed to within-cohort change and cohort replacement, respectively. The 
figure tells us that the increase in non-identification since 1983 has come almost 
entirely from cohort replacement—that is resulting from the difference between 
cohorts entering and leaving the electorate. Overall, the difference in partisanship 
8 For detail of the equations we use to define within- versus between-cohort variation see the 
appendix to Chapter  4. Because we define the age cohorts narrowly (in single birth years) and we 
observe nearly all years sequentially in the BSA, this algebraic decomposition need only assume that 
there is no within-cohort change for the newest age cohort between the time when they entered the 
electorate and were interviewed. This approach is similar to that proposed by Firebaugh (1997; 1990). 
Firebaugh’s approach has been criticized for not distinguishing age and period effects (Glenn 2005; 
Rodgers 1990) in its measure of cohort replacement. However, as Firebaugh (1997; 1990) argues, this 
critique conflates cohort replacement effects with cohort effects. Although our analysis is not an age-
period-cohort (APC) analysis, APC models specified in line with Grasso et al. (2017) find large cohort 






































Figure 4.4 Total change in non-PID in BSA and decomposed into within-cohort 
change component and cohort-replacement component
OUP CORRECTED PROOF – FINAL, 18/11/19, SPi
58 Electoral Shocks
between incoming and outgoing cohorts has contributed 15.8 percentage points 
towards dealignment since 1983.
From 2014 to 2017, the long-term decline in party identification driven by 
cohort replacement was somewhat offset by increasing levels of party identifica-
tion within existing generations, but has so far been insufficient to reverse the 
overall trend. Within-cohort change shows large but not trending fluctuations 
year-to-year. In particular, we see large increases in rates of party identification in 
election years. This fits with the findings of Michelitch and Utych (2018) who 
found that, across eighty-six countries, levels of partisanship vary by 12 percent-
age points across the electoral cycle. Interestingly, the last four years of the avail-
able BSA data (2014–17) all show higher levels of party identity. This likely reflects 
the series of high-profile political events (2014 Scottish referendum, 2015 General 
Election, 2016 EU referendum, and 2017 General Election that took place in this 
time period). Nonetheless, given the higher partisanship of older cohorts, either 
existing cohorts will need to become much more partisan, or new cohorts enter-
ing the electorate will need to attain the far higher partisanship levels of their 
grandparents to maintain current levels of partisanship.
Why has partisan identification declined?
There is still the question of how this generational cascade of weakened political 
socialization was initiated. Previous researchers have suggested a number of pos-
sible causes, including the decline of class divisions in British party politics, the 
ideological convergence of parties, and the rise of a more informed and educated 
electorate. None of these provide convincing explanations of dealignment.
It has been claimed that class voting has declined since at least the 1970s 
(Crewe, Särlvik, and Alt 1977; Clark and Lipset 1991; Franklin and Mughan 1978), 
although this was disputed for many years on the basis that the claim conflated 
the absolute size of class-aligned voting with the relative propensity of classes to 
vote for Labour or the Conservatives (Heath, Jowell, and Curtice 1985; Evans 
1999b). The evidence of class dealignment became much clearer after the rise of 
New Labour in the 1990s. Under Tony Blair’s leadership, Labour shifted to the centre 
(Bara and Budge  2001) and focused less on appealing to the working class 
(Fairclough 2000; Evans and Tilley 2017, ch. 6). This was accompanied by a dra-
matic decline in MPs from working-class backgrounds (Heath 2015) and a similar 
fall in the extent to which Labour was perceived as a party that represents the 
working class. These changes were in turn accompanied by a large decline in 
differences between the working and middle classes in voting for Labour versus 
the Conservatives (Evans and Tilley 2017; Heath 2015). However, it is difficult to 
explain the decline in partisanship as a result of a decline in levels of class voting. 
A substantial amount of partisan dealignment preceded the onset of the most 
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pronounced period of class dealignment, from 1997 onwards. Also, the partisan 
dealignment among the working class during the New Labour years does not 
explain a great deal of the more general downward trend in partisan identification.
Similarly, ideological convergence between the Conservative and Labour par-
ties appears unlikely to explain the long-term decline of partisanship. Political 
polarization in Britain did not uniformly decline over the time period we are 
examining. In the late 1960s and 1970, Labour and the Conservatives appeared 
to  be close together, in both their manifesto content and in the perceptions of 
 voters.9 Polarization then peaked in the 1980s before returning to levels similar to 
those in the 1960s. While the 2017 election saw a modest increase in the propor-
tion of voters perceiving ‘a great difference between the parties’, the level has not 
returned to anywhere near that seen in the 1980s.10 It is highly improbable that a 
curvilinear trend can explain a more or less linear decline.
Another influential explanation for the decline in voters’ attachments to parties 
is the growth of a more educated, informed, and critical electorate. The theory of 
cognitive mobilization predicts that partisan cues should be more important for 
less educated citizens. Higher levels of education will therefore reduce partisanship 
because highly informed voters do not require the heuristic or shortcut of party 
labels (Dalton 1984). The average level of tertiary education has substantially grown 
among BES respondents since 1964, increasing from around 10 per cent to more 
than 35 per cent of the population in 2017, a trend which is certainly consistent 
with this idea. However, the evidence for cognitive mobilization as a cause of par-
tisan dealignment is limited. Dassonneville et al. (2012) find that the aggregate 
patterns of education and partisan dealignment in Germany align closely, but 
the individual level relationship is absent or even reversed. Similarly, Berglund 
et al. (2005) find that the relationship between education and partisanship is 
not stable over time, and the relationship disappears in some cases once age is 
 controlled for.
These factors do not explain a large portion of the over-time decline in party 
identity. This can be seen when we model the decline in party identity over the 
eleven elections between 1964 and 2017 using (pooled) post-election BES cross-
sectional surveys. We estimate the impact of convergence (perceived difference 
between the major parties), cognitive mobilization (educational attainment), and 
9 Across this period, the perceptions of BES respondents on the differences between Labour and 
the Conservatives closely track left–right positioning measured by the Comparative Manifestos 
Project (Volkens et al. 2015).
10 We should note, however, that despite the similarity in policy programmes in the 1960s, the two 
parties were seen as being very different in terms of whose interests they represented. The Labour 
Party was seen to clearly represent the working class and the Conservatives the middle class—the 
backbone of political competition at the time. After 1997, when the Labour Party abandoned its 
distinctive role in representing the working class, the electorate saw it as no longer representing the 
interests of the working class per se (Evans and Tilley 2017). The role of convergence with respect to 
social group representation—as opposed to ideology—in the decline of partisanship remains worthy 
of further investigation.
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socialization (parental party identification) on whether a respondent has no party 
identification. We also control for other variables that, according to the literature, 
may be linked to party identification, including age, sex, marital status, class, 
religiosity, union membership, and region. A fixed-effect for each year is used 
to measure the trend in dealignment before and after adding the explanatory 
vari ables.11 Our model shows that having no party identity is strongly predicted 
by perceiving Labour and the Conservatives to be similar, by lacking a religion, 
and by having a parent who lacked a party identity when the respondent was 
growing up. However, these factors explain relatively little of the over-time trend 
in partisan dealignment. The effect of education on non-identification is minimal 
at the individual level and explains none of the over-time trend in dealignment.
Figure 4.5 shows the increase in non-identification, compared with 1964, for 
each year before and after we account for differences in the explanatory variables. 
The solid line can be interpreted as the raw (unadjusted) increase in the propor-
tions with no party identification compared to 1964. The dashed line is the 
remaining difference in each election year after differences in our explanatory 
variables are taken into account. Figure 4.5 shows that even after all of the poten-
tial influences described above are included, we can explain relatively little of 
the decline in party identity. In the 1980s, when parties were perceived as more 
11 See Table A4.1 in the appendix for details of the model. The unexplained difference could be a 
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Figure 4.5 Percentage point decline in respondents with any party identity, compared 
with the level in 1964
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polarized, voters were actually more dealigned than would be expected given the 
perceived levels of difference between the parties.
While our cohort analysis demonstrates that partisan dealignment has been 
driven primarily by generational replacement, the reason for this generational 
change is unclear. Even with the benefits of fifty years of BES data, and drawing on 
variables that represent the most plausible explanations of the decline in partisan 
dealignment, we cannot account for that trend. That is to say, we know that new 
cohorts are becoming less attached to political parties, but this is not explained 
empirically by party convergence, by cognitive mobilization, or by parental 
socialization. The cause of partisan dealignment, which is making the electorate 
more volatile and vulnerable to electoral shocks, is not something we can explain. 
We can, however, highlight its important consequences. Partisan dealignment is 
connected with volatility and also with a further source of increasing volatility, 
party system fragmentation, to which we now turn.
4.2 Fragmentation
In Chapter  2 we described how, alongside increased voter volatility, there has 
been a decline in the two-party vote share. The corollary of this has been a sharp 
rise in the share of smaller parties, and an increase in the effective number of 
electoral parties, calculated using Laakso and Taagepera’s (1979) formulation. The 
two-party share of the vote has declined since the heyday of the two-party system 
in the 1950s and 1960s, with the lowest two-party shares recorded in 2010 and 
2015. This was followed by a sharp reversal in 2017 and a drop in the effective 
number of electoral parties (see Figure 2.2).
Fragmentation is important for volatility because smaller parties do not typ ic-
al ly retain voters to the extent that large parties do. A share of the vote for smaller 
parties in one election should increase the expected numbers of switchers in the 
following election. There are a number of reasons why we expect minor parties to 
struggle to hold onto their voters. They often campaign on a narrower set of issues 
than major parties, which means a voter may defect when they no longer see 
one of those issues as salient; their voters tend to have weaker partisan identifica-
tion; and they often have fewer resources (campaign funding, quality candidates, 
media coverage, campaigners). While minor parties have been improving on 
these over time, they still have far less access to resources than major parties in 
the British system. Most importantly, in a majoritarian system such as that in the 
UK, there is the danger that minor party votes will be perceived as a wasted vote if 
the party fails to be competitive locally. There is also a subtle mathematical effect 
that makes it easier for major parties to retain voters. If we imagine an over-
simplified model of voting where voters choose randomly, the larger parties would 
retain a higher proportion of their voters simply by chance. The Conservatives 
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received 42.4 per cent of the vote in 2017, which means that they would only need 
to be twice as good at attracting their own previous voters as they are at attracting 
voters in general in order to reach 80 per cent retention. The Liberal Democrats, 
by contrast, received 7.4 per cent of the vote and would therefore need to be 
nearly eleven times better at attracting their own previous voters than voters in 
general, in order to maintain the same levels of retention.12 To put it another way, 
the baseline likelihood that a voter does something common (voting Labour) two 
elections in a row is relatively high, compared to the probability that a voter does 
something rare (voting Green) two elections in a row. Insofar as any voters tend 
to make a new decision at each election (rather than sticking with their old vote 
choice by default and then deciding whether to defect), this will increase the 
observed retention rates for major parties and reduce the observed retention rates 
for minor parties.
What is the evidence that minor party voting contributes to electoral volatility? 
Figure 4.6 shows that the defection rate of Liberal Democrats and other minor party 
voters has been consistently higher than that of the major parties. Across our twelve 
election pairs, the Liberal Democrats lose an average of 44 per cent of their voters 
from the previous election, and ‘other’ parties have lost 50 per cent of their previous 
voters. Conservatives and Labour, by contrast, lose an average of 18 per cent and 
17 per cent respectively (although this has increased somewhat over time).
12 This follows the same logic as a pool effect in intermarriage rates. Blau, Blum, and Schwartz’s 
(1982) study showed that much stronger preferences for in-group marriage are needed to maintain 
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Figure 4.6 Proportion of a party’s voters lost in the following election
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Although minor parties are relatively more likely to rely on new recruits who 
have already shown a proclivity for switching, minor party volatility is not entirely 
driven by this. Looking across three sets of three elections, minor party voters 
who had voted for the same minor party in the two previous elections were still 
more likely to switch parties than major party voters who were voting for the 
major party for the first time.13 Defection rates are even higher for new minor 
party voters, of whom at least three-quarters defected at the next election. This 
means that a strong minor party performance at the previous election greatly 
increases the expected level of volatility at the subsequent election. However, 
minor party voting is not independent of party identity, which is the other main 
driver of volatility. That is, minor party voters, on average, have considerably 
lower levels of party identity.
Sources of fragmentation
Fragmentation is linked to electoral volatility, but then we also need to ask the 
question of why has the party system become more fragmented?
The most obvious (tautological) answer is that major parties have failed to 
maintain their appeal to supporters. There are a number of reasons this may have 
occurred. First, political parties have long competed around economic issues 
since the emergence of the class cleavage following the industrial revolution 
(Lipset and Rokkan 1967). In Britain, party politics was organized around eco-
nomic issues of left and right for many years (Heath, Jowell, and Curtice  1985; 
Evans, Heath, and Lalljee 1996). However, by the late 1990s and early 2000s, non-
economic issues such as crime, immigration, and the environment have become 
more salient. The rise of a second ideological dimension was originally thought to 
be linked to increases in the prominence of ‘post-material’ values (Inglehart 1981), 
which focused on the increased importance of issues such as the environment. 
However, much of the rise in non-economic issues in Britain is the result of the 
increased salience of issues at the conservative end of the spectrum, such as crime 
and immigration (Green and Hobolt  2008). As we argued in Chapter  3, new 
issues can become salient not just though value change but as a result of a shock: 
we demonstrate this in Chapter  5 with respect to the increased importance of 
immigration and Europe.
Whatever the root cause, the rise of new issues is challenging for the major 
parties because it leads many voters to feel cross-pressured: that is, some voters 
will prefer one party on economic issues but another party on social or cultural 
issues. This trade-off is exacerbated by the fact that all British parties and their 
13 The three sets of triplets of elections with connected panel data we examine are February 
1974–October 1974–1979; 2005–2010–2015; and 2010–2015–2017.
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candidates show a strong correlation between their liberal–authoritarian and 
 economic left–right views (r = 0.70) while there is no such correlation for voters 
(r = 0.04).14 It is not just the major parties which fail to offer left–authoritarian 
or  right–liberal choices to voters. Even UKIP, the Liberal Democrats, the SNP, 
and the Green party all offer either left-liberal or right-authoritarian positions. 
The difference with these smaller parties is that they downplay their economic 
message while emphasizing the second-dimension issues that are their focus. For 
example, immediately after the 2015 election, 46 per cent of BESIP respondents 
were unable to place UKIP on the economic redistribution scale, but only 25 per 
cent were unable to answer about UKIP’s position on the EU integration scale. 
The rise of new issues has therefore opened up opportunities for new parties to 
compete around non-economic issues including the environment (the Greens), 
immigration and Europe (UKIP), and national self-determination (SNP and 
Plaid Cymru).
A second crucial factor in the failure of major parties to maintain their support 
is the decline of party identification that we discussed above. As we have already 
demonstrated, party identifiers are more likely to stay loyal in terms of their vote 
choices. British voters had strong attachments to Labour and the Conservatives 
in the 1960s and voted for them in high numbers. Consequently, the decline in 
partisanship has tended to hurt the major parties more than the smaller parties—
simply because they started from a position of relative strength. As we saw in 
Figure 4.2, higher partisanship tends to reduce vote-switching at the subsequent 
election. In the 1960s, this protected the votes of Labour and the Conservatives, 
but subsequent dealignment weakened this protection. However, unlike some 
of the relationships we demonstrate in this chapter, the relationship between 
partisan dealignment and fragmentation is a contingent one. As Butler and Stokes 
(1969) observed, strong inherited partisanship tends to maintain existing elect-
or al alignments. In the 1960s, strong partisanship protected the high vote shares 
of Labour and the Conservatives, but dealignment removed that protection. 
However, if smaller parties started with a base of strong partisans, dealignment 
could just as easily have led to the consolidation of the party system. 
A third influence on fragmentation is likely to be the range of parties on offer 
to voters and how viable they are. The average number of parties standing in 
constituencies has been increasing, but it is not clear that the simple number of 
options is the most relevant measure. The mere presence of small parties does not 
meaningfully increase electoral choices if voters are not interested in them, do 
not know anything about them, or do not perceive them as having any chance 
of success. Electoral viability is likely to be crucial. To gain representation in a 
14 Correlations based on data from the British Candidate Survey 1992–2015 and BESIP 2014–2017. 
Left–right and liberal–authoritarian positions of candidates and voters measured using graded 
response item response theory (IRT) models to generate latent variables for each dimension.
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first-part-the-post system like Britain’s, new and smaller parties must overcome 
the fear of elect ors wasting their votes on parties which have little apparent chance 
of winning seats in Parliament (Duverger  1954; Franklin, Niemi, and Whitten 
1994). In other words, small parties suffer because their supporters strategically 
vote for larger parties (Ferland 2014). One way that small parties can overcome 
this is by demonstrating viability by performing well in second-order elections. 
The Liberal Democrats in Britain have used local elections to demonstrate their 
electoral viability in particular areas (Russell and Fieldhouse 2005). Similarly, 
more permissive electoral rules at European Parliament elections lower the cost 
of electoral coordination, enabling smaller parties to overcome some perceived 
problems of viability (Prosser 2016b). European Parliament elections have been 
described as serving as ‘midwives’ to the birth of new parties in Europe, which 
subsequently start to play a significant role in first-order elections (Curtice 1989; 
Ysmal and Cayrol  1996). Examples of this include the French Front National 
who caused a major surprise when they won 11 per cent of the vote at the 1984 
European Parliament election and then went on to win 9.6 per cent of the vote 
and their first seats in the National Assembly in 1986 (Ysmal and Cayrol 1996); 
and the German Greens (Muller-Rommel 1993) who gained representation in 
the European Parliament of 1983 (with 5.6 per cent of the vote) and on that basis, 
one year later, were able to enter the German federal parliament with 8.2 per cent 
of the vote.
The increasing number of second-order elections in Britain—in particular for 
devolved institutions and European Parliament—have provided additional 
opportunities for small parties to establish an electoral foothold, leading to 
increased small party vote share and fragmentation. The most dramatic example 
is undoubtedly UKIP’s success in 2015 following their first-placed finish in the 
UK’s European Parliament elections, but SNP and Plaid Cymru success was also 
built on strong performances in devolved elections; and Green success in 2015 
was built on the back of strong European performances in 2009 and 2014.
A further important aspect of whether a party can be considered to be genu-
inely cognitively available to a voter is whether the party is regularly mentioned 
in the media (Hopmann et al.  2010). We collected mentions of ten parties15 in 
nine national newspapers16 to create an effective number of media parties meas-
ure, which is calculated in an equivalent way to the effective number of electoral 
parties measure (Laakso and Taagepera 1979), substituting shares of media men-
tions for shares of total votes cast. Figure 4.7 shows that the effective number of 
media parties has been steadily increasing over this whole time period, indicating 
15 Conservatives, Labour, Liberal Democrats, Plaid Cymru, Scottish National Party, UKIP, Green 
Party, Referendum Party, British National Party, and Respect. For details of the search terms used, 
see Table A4.3 in the appendix.
16 The Mail, Express, Telegraph, Times, Sun, Mirror, Guardian, Independent, and Star.
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that the electorate’s media diet includes significant coverage of parties other 
than Labour and the Conservatives. It is worth noting, however, that while 
minor parties are receiving more coverage in total, the media attention that 
each minor party receives is still well below that received by each of the major 
parties. An upward trend does not prove that supply has an effect at the indi-
vidual level, but the trend is at least consistent with supply having some role in 
increasing fragmentation.
4.3 Explaining volatility
We have considered how we can explain partisan dealignment and the fragmen-
tation of the party system. We now show how each of these—partisan dealignment 
and fragmentation—have contributed to the over-time increase in electoral vola-
tility in British elections.
To understand how much of the increased level of switching can be explained 
through the trends we described, we model the predictors of switching in the 
British Election Study inter-election panels over the previous five decades. We 
run a pooled logistic regression model of switching across the eleven inter-election 
panels for which we have the relevant variables, and include a dummy vari able for 
each election pair.17 As well as variables testing the impact of our two key factors, 
17 We weight each panel to contribute the equivalent of 1,000 cases, so that the larger recent panels 
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Figure 4.7 Effective number of media parties
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we include a measure of the ideological convergence of the major parties and a 
number of controls including education, sex, and marital status. To reflect the 
complex interplay between our key factors we include a number of inter actions 
between these variables which are discussed below.
First, consider dealignment. Based on the evidence above, we expect an increase 
in the number of people who do not identify with a party (or identify only weakly) 
to account for some of the increase in vote-switching. However, we would not 
expect this mechanism to work for people who have a different party identity 
from the party they voted for at the previous election. In that case, a strong party 
identity will be pushing people away from their vote choice rather than attracting 
them to it. There has consistently been around 10 per cent of the British electorate 
who vote for one party but have an attachment to a different party, so it is important 
to interact the effects of party identity with an indicator of whether the voter 
identified with the same party they voted for previously (to avoid dampening the 
effect of party identity). To assess the impact of dealignment on volatility, we 
therefore include strength of party identification, whether or not a person voted 
for the same party as their party identification, and the interaction of these.
Figure  4.8 shows the relationship between party identity strength and vote 
volatility, by consistency of party identity and vote choice in the prior election 
(controlling for other factors). Voters who have no party identity at the first election 
have an average 35 per cent chance of switching to another party by the second 
election. Among consistent voters, switching falls to just 13 per cent for those with 
a strong party identification. In contrast, cross-pressured voters, those who voted 
for a party other than the one they were attached to, are more likely to switch 
their vote choice if their party identity is stronger (although that difference is not 
significant). In other words, the impact of partisan dealignment is conditional on 
consistency of vote and party identification.
To capture the effect of fragmentation, we include a dummy variable repre-
senting whether a respondent was a major party voter (Conservative or Labour) 
in the previous election. Our model tells us that even after accounting for party 
identification and other predictors of vote-switching, a voter who voted for 
another party in the first election was 23 percentage points more likely to switch 
parties in the subsequent election, compared to a major party voter.18 The fact that 
people have increasingly voted for parties other than Conservative and Labour 
is therefore a substantial contributor to overall volatility. To illustrate this, take 
but this either hardly affects the standard errors or in some cases shrinks them. This is promising, 
given that a substantial inflation of clustered standard errors compared with unclustered can indicate 
model misspecification (King and Roberts  2015). For the full regression tables of these models see 
Table A4.2 in the appendix.
18 This figure is based on the marginal effect of voting for a minor party at election 1 on voting for a 
different party at election 2, accounting for all the other effects in our model.
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two hypothetical elections where the major and minor party retention rates are 
83 per cent and 50 per cent, respectively (the average values across all elections). 
In the first election, the major party share of the vote is 90 per cent (typical in the 
1960s) and in the second it is 65 per cent (close to the level in 2010 and 2015). 
Based on just the different two-party vote shares, we would expect the first elec-
tion to see 20 per cent of all voters switch parties and the second election to see 
29 per cent of voters switch. In other words, a large proportion of the difference in 
individual-level volatility between the 1960s and 2010s can be attributed to the 
size of the minor party vote share.
We might expect that ideological convergence has some direct effect on voter 
volatility for two reasons. First, a reduced distance between two parties reduces 
the space that a voter has to jump from one to the other, and may therefore allow 
them to choose between the parties on other grounds than ideological position, 
such as performance (Green 2007). Second, a reduced distance between the two 
major parties increases the likelihood that a voter sees neither party as adequately 
representing their preferences and therefore switches to a minor party. Both of 
these mechanisms are explanations for why major party voters would be more 
likely to switch in the presence of convergence. However, neither mechanism 
would apply to non-major party voters, so we include an interaction of conver-
gence with major party voting, so as not to obscure its effect among major party 
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Figure 4.8 Predicted probability of a voter switching parties between elections 
depending on 1) whether their party identity and vote choice at the first election were 
the same and 2) the strength of their party identity at the first election. Predicted 
probabilities derived from logistic regression model fitted to twelve election pairs
OUP CORRECTED PROOF – FINAL, 18/11/19, SPi
The Rise of The Volatile Voter 69
between the major parties, and interacted this with whether or not the respondent 
voted for Labour or the Conservatives.19 We find that while a perception of clear 
difference between the major parties reduces the likelihood of vote-switching, 
the effect is absent or even reversed for people who voted for other parties. 
A Conservative or Labour voter who perceives a great deal of difference between 
the parties is 9.9 percentage points less likely to switch parties at the next election 
than a Conservative or Labour party voter who perceived not much difference 
between the parties (Figure 4.9). However, if the voter supported another party at 
the first election, then seeing a great deal of difference between Labour and the 
Conservatives is associated with a 4.9 percentage points higher likelihood of 
switching parties at the next election.20 In other words, convergence increases 
volatility for major party voters but has no effect, or perhaps even an opposite 
effect, among smaller party voters.21 This makes sense spatially, as major party 
convergence leaves more space at the extremes for minor parties to compete. 
However, this means that as the level of support for minor parties has increased, 
19 The pooled model predicting vote-switching therefore contains the main effects of having voted 
for a minor party at time 1, perceptions of major party convergence at time 2, and the interaction of 
those two effects.
20 Note that this difference is not statistically significant.
21 It is not possible to conclusively say whether this is a causal effect or instead reverse causation 
where identifiers are strongly motivated to see differences between ‘their’ party and their rivals.
Other party at previous election
































Figure 4.9 Predicted probability that a voter switches parties between elections 
depending on whether they voted for a major party and the amount of difference they 
perceive between Labour and Conservatives (pooled model of eleven election pairs 
1964–2017)
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the total effect of convergence on vote-switching has become weaker, dampening 
the negative effect of convergence on volatility.
We have seen that, over this period, fragmentation and dealignment in com-
bin ation with party convergence affect the chance of voters switching allegiance 
between elections. But how far do these factors account for the sharp rise in vola-
tility we documented in Chapter 2? To test this, we use a pooled model predicting 
party switching across the eleven pairs of elections we model between 1964 
and 2017. This model simultaneously accounts for all the factors we have discussed: 
party system fragmentation, partisan identity, convergence, occupational class, 
education, and other demographics. We also include separate dummy variables 
for each election, so that we can estimate how much extra switching we see com-
pared with the base category of the 1964–66 election pair. We then compare this 
residual level of switching to the actual level of switching that took place. If our 
model has explained the time trend then this residual level of switching should be 
substantially lower than the observed increase in switching. Figure 4.10 shows the 
time trend in vote-switching (measured as the percentage point increase in vote-
switching compared with the 1964–66 elections) before and after modelling the 
variation.22 The dark line shows the actual increase in switching since 1964 and 
1966 and the lighter dashed line shows the residual increase in switching not 
explained by the model. We can clearly see that the variables included in the 
22 2005–2010 vote-switching is not included in these models because the difference between 
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Figure 4.10 Percentage point increase in individual-level voter volatility, compared 
with the level seen between 1964 and 1966
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model explain a substantial portion of the increase in vote-switching since 
1964–66. For instance, in 2015 the level of vote-switching was 29 percentage 
points higher than the level of switching between 1964 and 1966. However, once 
we account for how the predictors of vote-switching changed between the two 
elections, the residual increase in vote-switching falls to 17 percentage points. 
This means that we have explained around 40 per cent of the difference in vote-
switching that was observed in 1964–66 and 2010–15. Thus, the dramatic result 
seen in 2015 can be partially explained by the long-term trends that have driven 
British politics, but we also need to look to election-specific factors or shocks to 
explain the extremely high level of volatility seen in that election.
To see how much each of the separate factors explains the trend over time 
shown in Figure 4.10 we calculate the percentage reduction in the mean of the 
marginal effect of all of the election year dummy variables compared to 1964–66, 
for a series of models. Each bar in Figure  4.11 represents the reduction in the 
mean marginal effect of the election dummy variables for models which include 
each factor separately. In other words, it shows what percentage of the area under 
the solid line in Figure 4.10 that can be explained by each factor. In the full model 
(model 4), we reduce the average increase in volatility by 43 per cent.23 Figure 4.11 
show that dealignment and fragmentation are the key factors in explaining 
23 As with the dealignment models, the remaining unexplained variation could be some com-
bin ation of omitted variables and changes in the relationship between independent variables and 
vote-switching.
Model 4: Combined
Model 3: Difference between
Labour and Conservatives
Model 2: Labour/Conservative vote
Model 1: Party ID strength
–10 0 10 20 30 40 50
Percentage reduction (compared to empty model) in mean of
year marginal effects minus 1964–66 marginal effect
Figure 4.11 Percent of the increase in year marginal effects since 1964–66 explained 
by different sets of factors in the switching model
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the  increase in volatility, with convergence actually making the increase more 
anomalous.24 Despite the importance of partisan dealignment and party system 
fragmentation, however, we clearly see several elections (1974, 1997, 2017, and 
especially 2015) that have large unexplained increases in volatility. As we show 
throughout the rest of the book in 2015 and 2017, these spikes in volatility, which are 
not explained by secular trends, are largely attributable to specific electoral shocks.
4.4 Conclusion
In the last fifty years, we have seen important long-term trends that have made 
voters more likely to switch parties between elections. In this chapter we have 
shown how the twin processes of partisan dealignment and party system frag-
mentation have underpinned this increase in volatility.
Whilst we have found a strong and consistent relationship between a voter’s 
level of partisanship and the likelihood of them switching parties at the next elec-
tion, and that this accounts for a substantial proportion of the trend in volatility, 
it is less clear why partisan identification has itself declined. We offered tests of 
the most plausible explanations of partisan dealignment and found that it is 
difficult to explain the downward trend in partisan attachments. Beyond gener-
ational replacement, the causes of partisan dealignment are somewhat elusive. 
We find little support for the cognitive mobilization theory that partisanship 
has declined because more educated voters have less need for partisan cues; and 
only a weak link to class dealignment, despite the reduction in class voting. 
Moreover, we do find substantial effects of party convergence on levels of party 
identification, but this does not account for the decline in partisanship. Partisan 
dealignment remains a hugely important trend, and yet one it is not yet possible 
to explain empirically. We have, however, shown a clear pattern of generational 
replacement in partisan identification; with newer cohorts entering with lower 
levels of partisanship and remaining relatively stable over time. This is important as 
it implies that voter volatility it is likely to stay with us for some time, as younger 
cohorts of voters with lower levels of party identification move through their voting 
lives. However, there are signs that young voters entering the electorate in the last 
few years may be beginning to break the downward trend in party identification.
The other main factor driving volatility is fragmentation. We have shown that 
smaller parties (other than Labour and the Conservatives) consistently lose a 
much higher proportion of their voters between elections than the major parties. 
This means that a higher share for these minor parties increases volatility. 
24 Interacting fragmentation with convergence also reduces the proportion of the time trend 
explained by fragmentation even though the overall model fit improves.
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Fragmentation is explained by the rise of cross-cutting issues and, relatedly, the 
supply of viable choices.
Nonetheless, despite the strong relationship between fragmentation, dealign-
ment, and voter volatility, these factors do not fully explain the upward trend in 
volatility. The factors included in our model accounted for some of the rise in 
the number of ‘swing voters’, but we saw that, even adjusting for all these factors, 
there are still large unexplained election-specific spikes, most notably in 2015. 
To understand these we must return to the implications of the theory we set out in 
the third chapter of this book: voter volatility is a product not only of long-term 
secular trends but is the result of unanticipated and unexplained electoral shocks 
which act as a catalyst for vote-switching, especially among an electorate who, for 
the reasons explored in this chapter, have become less fixed in their voting habits.
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5
EU Accession Immigration  
and the Rise of UKIP
Britain’s relationship with the EU was at the root of two shocks that shaped the 
2010, 2015, and 2017 British elections. The Brexit vote itself was the major shock in 
2017, which we address in Chapter 9. This chapter examines the earlier shock of 
EU immigration, which rose dramatically following the accession of ten new EU 
member states in 2004. This shock had three key outcomes: first, the EU and 
immigration became inexorably linked as political issues; second, this fusion of 
these two issues led to the rise of UKIP by increasing the salience of immigration 
and destroying the perceived competence of first Labour, and then the Conservatives, 
on that issue; and third, the Conservative response to the UKIP threat led to the 
calling of the EU referendum.
The rise of UKIP is one of the most significant shifts in party support in 
Britain’s recent history. UKIP was founded in 1991 (as the Anti-Federalist League), 
but was initially eclipsed by its better-resourced Eurosceptic rival the Referendum 
Party. Following the collapse of the Referendum Party, UKIP’s fortunes slowly 
began to turn. In the 1999 European Parliament Elections (the first held using a 
system of proportional representation), UKIP won 6.5 per cent of the vote and 
three MEPs (including Nigel Farage), giving them an important bridgehead into 
the political arena. At the 2004 European Parliament Elections—buoyed by the 
presence of well-known celebrity candidate Robert Kilroy-Silk—UKIP nearly 
quadrupled its number of votes and pushed the Liberal Democrats into fourth 
place. In 2009 UKIP performed similarly well at the European Parliament Elections, 
finishing in second place thanks to a poor Labour performance. However, these 
triumphs failed to translate into success in other electoral arenas, with the UKIP 
vote plummeting back to earth at the general elections that followed.
The tide began to turn in 2012 as UKIP support ticked up in the polls: by 2013, 
15 per cent of the electorate said they intended to vote for the party at the next 
general election. Strong polling translated into electoral success when the party 
made significant gains at the 2013 local elections, which heralded further success 
in both the 2014 EU Parliamentary Election, in which they won 27 per cent of 
votes and the most seats, and in the 2015 General Election, in which they won 
13 per cent of the vote (but only one seat). UKIP’s influence far exceeded their 
representation at Westminster. The presence of a credible Eurosceptic challenger 
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prompted David Cameron to promise that a Conservative government would 
hold a referendum on EU membership—a promise that has profoundly affected 
British politics, as we discuss in Chapter 9.
How and why did this happen? To answer that question we need to consider the 
conditions that may have led to UKIP’s rapid rise in support. UKIP is often thought 
of as a radical right-wing ‘challenger party’. Such parties are typically linked with 
positions on liberal-authoritarian issues such as European integration and immigra-
tion that have not received representation via mainstream parties. Some challenger 
parties have achieved electoral success and in doing so have opened new dimensions 
of competition, or extended and polarized existing ones (Adams et al. 2006; Meguid 
2008; Hino 2012; Wagner 2012; van de Wardt 2014; Jensen and Spoon 2010).1
Challenger parties have long played a role in many European party-systems (see, 
for example: Kitschelt 1988; Kitschelt 1995). Historically, levels of support for challen-
ger parties have been low (less than 5 per cent of the vote on average across Europe), 
but their levels of support have more than doubled in the last decade (Hobolt and 
Tilley 2016). Many explanations of this rise have often focused on the consequences 
of the Euro crisis. For Hobolt and Tilley (2016, 971), for example: voters ‘choose 
challenger parties because they offer a rejection of, and an alternative to, the 
mainstream response to the crisis’. In some countries, however, these parties achieved 
notable earlier success in times of relative prosperity: for ex ample, the Front National 
in France during the 1990s and the Dutch Lijst Pim Fortuyn in 2002. These parties 
point to another issue being key in understanding the rise of radical right parties: 
immigration. In Britain too, as we shall see, immigration played a key role in explain-
ing the rise of UKIP, and the conditions were being put in place for immigration to 
emerge as a defining issue well before the arrival of the financial crisis.
The most influential explanations of UKIP’s popularity have emphasized its 
appeal to the ‘left-behind’ losers of globalization. For Ford and Goodwin (2014, 
270), UKIP is ‘a working-class phenomenon. Its support is heavily concentrated 
among older, blue-collar workers, with little education and few skills.’ However, 
others have found that the self-employed, traditionally the most right-wing of the 
social classes, are as solidly pro-UKIP as the working class themselves (Evans and 
Mellon  2016b). Additionally, UKIP’s success could never have been achieved 
without substantial support from within the professional and managerial middle 
classes—the contemporary working class is simply too small (Evans and Mellon 
2016b). Comparative research likewise finds that the self-employed and small 
employers such as shop owners, generally appear to provide important sources of 
radical right party support (Kitschelt 1995; Lubbers, Gijsberts, and Scheepers 2002; 
Ignazi 2003; Ivarsflaten 2005; Arzheimer and Carter 2006). More generally, this 
1 They are also referred to as ‘niche parties’ (e.g. Meguid 2008), but we will stick to the term 
challenger parties for sake of economy and clarity.
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sort of interpretation has difficulty explaining the timing of UKIP’s emergence 
from being a marginal party to one that represented one pole of arguably the 
key political issue dimension of the current era. The left-behind are not a new 
phenomenon in post-industrial societies (Evans and Tilley 2017).
In contrast to this focus on major social transformations, our thesis is that 
the  primary catalyst for the increasing importance of immigration and the EU 
in British politics, which led to the rise of UKIP, was political: the decision taken 
in 2004 to open Britain’s borders to EU accession countries. This decision set in 
train a process that raised the salience of immigration and led to the entangle-
ment of the EU and immigration issues. A key issue was the inability of the 
government—any government—to respond to rising public concern. Although 
British immigration policy had previously responded to public opinion by restrict-
ing levels of immigration (Jennings 2009), controlling EU immigration was not 
possible because free movement between member states continued to be a funda-
mental EU principle. The lack of an effective policy mechanism to respond to this 
public concern resulted in attitudes towards the EU becoming increasingly 
aligned with concern about immigration.
In this chapter we first consider how Britain’s relationship with the EU featured 
previously in electoral politics and why its impact on the dimensionality of pol it-
ical competition was muted until party decisions provided the conditions for the 
increased importance of immigration. We then examine the 2004 accession deci-
sion and how it acted as an electoral shock which helped shape the ensuing social 
and political context, leading to the emergence of UKIP, the reshaping of political 
allegiances, and, ultimately, Brexit.
5.1 Party competition and European integration
Across member states, party positions towards the EEC during the early phase 
of  European integration—which was primarily concerned with market 
 harmonization—were generally characterized by their economic left–right position. 
Parties on the right saw European integration as an opportunity to expand market 
competition, while those on the left saw it as a threat to protected national industries. 
As European integration broadened in scope, this alignment began to change, 
with party positions becoming more structured by the social and cultural dimen-
sion (often referred to as liberal–authoritarianism). Socially liberal parties began 
to see European integration as a way of fostering international cooperation, while 
for socially conservative parties, the EU was a threat to national autonomy and 
tradition (Hooghe, Marks, and Wilson 2002; Prosser 2016d).
For many years the EU was the dog that didn’t bark in British electoral politics. 
Labour itself was somewhat hostile to joining the European Economic Community 
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(EEC) before and after the 1975 referendum, but Harold Wilson, the leader of the 
party in government, successfully obtained strong support for staying in the EEC 
(Saunders 2016). Despite Enoch Powell’s infamous ‘rivers of blood’ speech in 1968 
and the social unrest in the 1970s associated with far right groups (Billig  1978; 
Fielding  1981) concern about immigration only briefly and modestly affected 
vote choice (Studlar  1978).2 In general, there was little sign of a new elect or al 
alignment along the liberal–authoritarian dimension of political competition 
(Heath et al. 1990).
Divisions within Labour over Europe had helped catalyse the SDP split in 1981 
(Crewe and King 1995) but the modernization of the party under Neil Kinnock, 
together with the European Economic Community’s (EEC) move towards ‘Social 
Europe’ under the Delors Commission, meant that Labour’s position on European 
integration began to soften. Conversely, the Conservative Party, which had led 
Britain into Europe, began to cool towards Europe as the scope of integration 
deepened. This transition was exemplified by Margaret Thatcher, who had been a 
driving force behind the adoption of the Single European Act (1986) but only two 
years later in her famous Bruges speech declared: ‘we have not successfully rolled 
back the frontiers of the state in Britain only to see them re-imposed at a European 
level.’ As Clements and Bartle (2009) note, these differences are even more appre-
ciable in 1997, 2001, and 2005. By the 2001 Election, analyses of the party mani-
festos indicated that Europe was a ‘major point of party contention’ (Bara and 
Budge 2001). The systematic evidence of the manifesto project also corresponded 
with scholarly analyses of the shifting positions of the parties (Nairn  1972; 
Denman 1995; Turner 2000; Forster 2002).
As long as Labour maintained a Eurosceptic position, mirroring that of many 
of its traditional working-class supporters, the opportunity for Europe to become 
a new cross-cutting issue had been muted. Once they abandoned that position, 
the seeds of realignment were sown. This policy reversal was given sharpest 
emphasis following the emergence of Tony Blair as party leader in 1994 and 
prime minister in 1997 and Labour’s rebranding as ‘New Labour’.3 This period 
saw the traditionally Labour-voting and Eurosceptic working class start to lose 
their allegiance to Labour (Evans  1999b). Between the landslide of 1997 and 
the sweeping Labour victory of 2001 the only noticeable defection away from 
Labour to the Conservatives was by voters who did not like Europe (Evans 2002). 
2 Analyses of the impact of responses to the question of have ‘too many immigrants have been let 
into this country’ in the 1960s and 1970s show an increase in its effect in 1970 following that speech. 
People who agreed were slightly more likely to vote Conservative and they perceived a much larger 
difference between Labour and Conservatives on immigration in 1970 than they had done in 1964 or 
1966 (Butler and Stokes 1974), but it did not last (Heath et al. 1990).
3 The same 1997 Election saw James Goldsmith’s Referendum Party attempt and fail to force the 
Conservatives to agree to a referendum on membership of the union (Heath et al. 1998).
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But they were small in number. The EU still did not have the power to reshape 
political alignments.4
5.2 The catalyst
Why did this change? Our contention is that a key shock that led to the rising 
importance and closer linkage of attitudes towards the EU and immigration was 
the Labour government’s decision to implement immediate open borders with 
the ten 2004 EU accession states rather than imposing transitional controls on 
immigration. Nearly all other existing EU members (the other exceptions were 
Ireland and Sweden) applied these controls, which concentrated the migrant 
flows towards Britain, Ireland, and Sweden (Europa.eu 2011).
How did this decision come about? While UKIP has claimed that Labour fol-
lowed an intentional policy of encouraging mass migration in order to boost the 
city of London and future ethnic minority voters (UK Independence Party 2016), 
the evidence suggests that the policy may have come from an incorrect assess-
ment of the likely number of migrants.
One key piece of evidence the Labour government relied on when deciding 
whether to impose a transition period on free movement was a now infamous 
Home Office report that concluded that ‘net immigration from the AC-10 to the 
UK after the current enlargement of the EU will be relatively small, at between 
5,000 and 13,000 immigrants per year’ (Dustmann et al. 2003). In fact, the rate of 
increase in workers born in post-2004 accession countries has been closer to 
127,000 per year (Vargas-Silva and Markaki 2015).5
The Home Office report does state that ‘If Germany imposes a transition 
period for the free movement of workers . . . we would not think that more than 
one in three immigrants who had intended to migrate to work in Germany would 
instead migrate to the UK’ (Dustmann et al. 2003, 57). However what the paper 
does not explicitly state anywhere is that this ‘small fraction’ could constitute 
more than six and a half times as many immigrants from accession countries as 
the stated forecast.6 The paper was not technically incorrect, but did a poor job of 
4 It might have done so had Gordon Brown not prevented Britain from joining the Euro, but his 
efforts in this respect diffused what could have become a basis of mobilization given the public’s 
op pos ition (Evans 2003).
5 It should be noted that these figures differ somewhat from estimates using the International 
Passenger Survey. However, all studies agree that the number of immigrants from the AC–10 countries 
to the UK exceeded the Home Office estimates by many multiples.
6 The highest forecast of annual net immigration to Germany in the paper is 209,651 (Table 6.4). The 
highest numerical forecast that the paper shows for the UK is 12,568. Therefore the multiple of additional 
immigrants can be calculated as: ((209651/3) + 12568)/12568 = 6.56. This calculation is never conducted 
or hinted at in the Home Office paper. See Nicholas Watt and Patrick Wintour, ‘How immigration came 
to haunt Labour: the inside story’, The Guardian, 24 March 2015. Available at: https://www.theguardian.
com/news/2015/mar/24/how-immigration-came-to-haunt-labour-inside-story
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communicating the importance of Germany’s choice to impose transitional 
 controls. The UK government’s decision not to impose transitional controls 
therefore appears to be a relatively non-strategic decision based on incorrect 
expectations that the effects would be minor—and was belatedly recognized as 
such by its primary proponent.7
5.3 The ‘transmission belt’ of concern
The impact of immigration from the accession countries on UK immigration 
 levels were substantial. It maintained the already high levels of immigration 
that had occurred since the late 1990s (Figure 5.1). Most significantly, however, 
it changed the composition of immigration into the UK, at times displacing 
Commonwealth immigration as the largest source of foreign immigration 
(Figure 5.2).
Voters then reacted to the increase in EU immigration. Monthly Ipsos MORI 
data on what issue voters think is the most important (Figure  5.3) show that 
7 See Laura Hughes, ‘Tony Blair admits he did not realise how many migrants would come to the 
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Figure 5.1 Total levels of immigration of non-UK citizens to the UK by year 
(thousands of immigrants)
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Figure 5.2 Total levels of immigration of non-UK citizens to the UK by year 
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Figure 5.3 Ipsos MORI trends (1974–2015) on what percentage of voters mention 
immigration as an important. (Source: Ipsos MORI: ‘What would you say is the most 
important issue facing Britain today?’ ‘What do you see as other important issues 
facing Britain today?’ Concern is averaged for each year over all surveys fielded in 
that year)
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immigration concern peaked in the mid-2000s just after accession migration 
started. Concern inevitably fell away at the height of the economic crisis of 
2008/2009 as the economy dislodged it as the most important issue facing the 
country, only to elevate rapidly in the following years.
While it is clear that public concern tracks actual levels of immigration, the 
mechanism that connects the two is not necessarily straightforward. After all, 
people cannot observe national immigration rates directly, so people must 
either learn about immigration through their own local experience or through 
the media.
There is some evidence for a weak effect of local experience. Recent research has 
looked at the question of whether anti-immigrant attitudes are related to the level of 
immigration to an area (Kawalerowicz 2016). Kawalerowicz’s  research (following 
earlier work in the United States (Newman 2013)) concludes that only 6 per cent 
of total variance in attitudes towards immigrants is attributable to differences 
across constituencies, with the remaining 94 per cent varying at the individual 
level. In line with other research (e.g. Kaufmann 2017) Kawalerowicz finds that 
immigration rates were predictive of anti-immigrant attitudes while the absolute 
level of people born overseas was not. Furthermore, Kawalerowicz finds that 
immigration rates are less predictive of anti-immigrant sentiment where there is a 
larger existing foreign-born population.8
We find that these patterns also hold for the salience of immigration (just 
4.7 per cent of variance in the salience of immigration is at the local authority 
level), with the exception that the levels of the foreign-born population are also 
predictive of anti-immigrant attitudes after controlling for individual covariates 
(see Appendix Tables A5.1 and A5.2).9 Although there is clearly some role for local 
experience, the available evidence suggests that local experiences of immigration 
account for only a small proportion of the variation in either attitudes towards 
immigration or its salience.
In general terms, there is strong evidence that the media play a key role in shap-
ing public opinion (Bartels 1993; Kellstedt 2003; King, Schneer, and White 2017). 
More specifically, studies in other European countries have found that the media 
shapes levels of concern about, and attitudes towards, immigration (Boomgaarden 
and Vliegenthart  2007; Boomgaarden and Vliegenthart  2009; Van Klingeren 
et  al.  2015; Thesen  2018). Likewise, in Britain, media reporting of immigration 
appears to feed public concern. This can be seen by comparing Figure  5.3 and 
Figure  5.4, which show how closely mass readership newspaper coverage 
8 This relationship may be better explained by a non-linear relationship between immigrant levels 
and sentiment, but the wider point stands that any specification explains only a small proportion of 
the variance in attitudes.
9 The marginal effect of moving from the lowest to highest immigration rates is around 3 percent-
age points for people in areas with the lowest levels of prior immigration, so the effect is modest even 
at its greatest extent.
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 corresponds with both immigration levels and levels of concern about immigration. 
The correlations between immigration level, newspaper coverage, and public 
concern are shown in Table 5.1. The strongest correlation is between public con-
cern and the Daily Mail’s coverage (r = 0.97), followed by public concern’s rela-
tionship with immigration levels and the Daily Express’s coverage. The relationship 
between immigration concern and coverage of immigration in the Sun and the 
Daily Mirror is considerably lower. This fits with other analyses which have found 
that the Mail  and Express have consistently higher negative portrayals of immi-
gration and immigrants (Gerard 2016). Once we model immigration concern as a 
function of coverage in the Daily Mail and immigration rates simultaneously, as 
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Figure 5.4 Levels of coverage of immigration in four tabloid newspapers
Table 5.1 Correlations of immigration importance (Ipsos MORI), coverage of 














Immigration importance 1.00      
Daily Mail 0.97 1.00     
Daily Express 0.83 0.91 1.00    
The Sun 0.43 0.68 0.66 1.00   
Daily Mirror 0.30 0.55 0.58 0.93 1.00  
Immigration levels 0.86 0.89 0.76 0.19 0.10 1.00
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levels on public concern about immigration.10 This suggests that the vast bulk of 
concern over immigration is mediated by media coverage and is not the result of 
direct observation by voters.11 While there is no direct effect of immigration rates, 
the Daily Mail’s coverage is sufficiently strongly correlated with actual immigration 
(r = 0.89) that public concern tracks the actual rate of immigration closely.12
The links between immigration, media coverage, and public concern are 
impressively close, but immigration still need not have evolved into a powerful 
political issue. As we argued in Chapter 3, the impact of shocks is conditional on 
the response of political actors. To understand why EU immigration had such an 
impact, we need to consider how parties typically deal with issue concerns via 
their policy responses. In this respect, policy is often conceptualized as following 
a thermostatic model (Wlezien 1995), where a policy output such as redistribu-
tion is reduced when it gets too far above the level that public opinion prefers, 
and that public opinion responds in turn to the effects of these policy changes. 
As a result, in the long run, policy and public opinion remain in step, although 
they are subject to over-corrections in the short term.
British immigration policy previously responded to public opinion in a fairly 
thermostatic manner, with governments strengthening asylum policy and border 
controls in response to public concern over immigration (Jennings 2009). However, 
the rapid growth of EU immigration changed this relationship, with both concern 
and levels of immigration rising over an extended period. The fact that immigra-
tion was defined as a fundamental freedom within the EU seriously limited the 
ability of any government to adopt policies that would limit it. In fact, we can 
see evidence of attempts at a response by the government in Figure 5.2, which 
shows that Commonwealth migration plummeted a few years after increased 
EU accession migration began. However, while the voters have responded to ris-
ing immigration by becoming more concerned, the usual thermo stat ic response 
of more restrictive controls was absent. As a result, immigration continued to 
be high and public concern rose yet further. This further reinforces our argument 
that EU accession migration represented a sharp change in the status quo of 
British politics. In such circumstances new political issues can become sufficiently 
salient to begin driving vote choices in what is normally a unidimensional system 
of party competition.
10 We should be careful about over-interpreting this null relationship as it is based on only twenty-
five years of data. The Daily Mail is the only newspaper that entirely eliminates the relationship 
between immigration rates and immigration concern.
11 As well as driving the salience of immigration, UKIP also benefited more directly from media 
attention. Murphy and Devine (2018) find strong evidence that media attention to UKIP drove 
increasing support for UKIP in the poll.
12 The close link between immigration and media coverage could result from a number of processes: 
deliberate attempts to influence policy; a reflection of the principal agent relationship between voters 
who dislike immigration and the media who try to find stories their readers are interested in; or the 
paper’s coverage may itself reflect the level of immigration and the supply of available stories to cover.
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5.4 The changing relationship between  
EU and immigration attitudes
Given how strongly entwined they have become in contemporary politics, one 
would be forgiven for thinking that immigration and the EU would always 
have been tightly linked issues. However, just as there have been significant shifts 
between party ideology and positions on European integration, so too have there 
been large changes among the general public (van Elsas and van der Brug 2015; 
Eichenberg and Dalton  2007). As European integration progressed, opposition 
based on economic left-wing concerns about market integration gave way to con-
cerns driven by liberal–authoritarian issues like immigration and cultural threat 
(McLaren 2002; McLaren 2006; Tillman 2013).
We can see the stark nature of this change by examining the relationship 
between immigration attitudes and European integration preferences in the 1975 
EEC referendum and at the 2015 General Election. In Figure 5.5 we compare EU 
preferences among people who think there are too many immigrants using evidence 
from the 1975 EEC referendum (Crewe, Robertson, and Sarlvik  1975) and the 
2015 BES post-election face-to-face survey.
In 2015, a respondent’s attitude towards immigration was an extremely strong 
predictor of their EU attitudes, with 51 per cent of respondents who believe 
there are too many immigrants supporting leave, compared with just 11 per cent 




































Figure 5.5 The relationship between believing there are too many immigrants and 
support for leaving the EU in 1975 and 2015
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EU referendum, by contrast, the difference was far smaller (12 percentage points) 
and in the opposite direction.
However, we can also examine the extent to which voters’ attitudes towards 
the EU and immigration are linked over time in a more granular way and using 
more contemporary data by examining the BES Continuous Monitoring Survey 
(Sanders and Whiteley 2014b). This survey is carried out every month and asks 
separately about which political issue is currently most important to respondents 
and their level of approval of the EU.13
Figure 5.6 shows the difference between the average support for the EU among 
respondents who said that immigration was the most important issue facing the 
country and respondents who said another issue was the most important. The 
results show that even in early 2004 there was a positive relationship between 
concern about immigration and disapproval of the EU. However, the relationship 
clearly strengthens substantially over time, with the gap in EU perceptions between 
people who worry about immigration and those who do not almost doub ling 
between 2004 and 2013.14
We also know anti-EU attitudes rose over this same time period. After initial 
ambivalence towards Britain’s membership of the EEC in the 1970s, public 
13 Wording: Overall, do you strongly approve, approve, disapprove, or strongly disapprove of
Britain’s membership in the European Union?



























































2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014
Figure 5.6 The growing link between responses to ‘How much do you approve of 
Britain’s membership of the EU?’ and ‘what is the most important issue facing the 
country?’
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support had increased steadily through the 1980s before it peaked in 1991, when 
57 per cent of those surveyed said Britain’s membership of the Common Market 
was ‘a good thing’ and only 14 per cent said it was a ‘bad thing’.15 From that peak 
however, support for integration steadily eroded throughout the 90s, before 
 sta bil iz ing in the mid-2000s. However, anti-EU sentiment increased at the same 
time as immigration and the EU were becoming linked issues and the Eurozone 
crisis was reaching its peak. Anti-EU sentiment ran very high during this period, 
but initially this did not translate into political opposition. In the CMS data, 
disapproval of Britain’s membership of the EU peaked in late 2011—before the 
rise of UKIP—and declined steadily thereafter. Only when the potent combination 
of the EU and immigration came together did the European issue achieve a 
political breakthrough.
5.5 The political consequences
The link between immigration and the EU provided the perfect opportunity for 
a radical right party to prosper electorally. Immigration was initially integrated 
within traditional two-party left–right competition. The Conservatives took a 
harder line on the issue, promising to reduce net migration to the tens of thou-
sands. This appeal was relatively successful in the 2005–10 election cycle when the 
Conservatives were not in government, so that by 2009–10 substantial numbers 
of voters were defecting from Labour because of the government’s handling of 
immigration (Evans and Chzhen 2013). This was particularly striking given the 
country was then also in the midst of a major financial crisis. In the 2010–15 
elect or al cycle, however, the impact of immigration and the EU moved decisively 
from favouring the Conservatives who, once in government were powerless to 
implement effective reduction of EU immigration, to favouring UKIP. This was 
aided by UKIP’s emphasis on a more typical radical right agenda, making anti-
immigrant policies a central and vocal part of its agenda along with its existing 
anti-EU agenda (Ford and Goodwin 2014). Indeed, many of the voters that the 
Conservatives won from Labour and the Liberal Democrats in 2010 by campaigning 
on immigration subsequently moved onwards to UKIP in 2015 (Evans and 
Mellon 2016b).
The reasons for this reversal are not difficult to ascertain, given that the 
Conservative-led coalition government continued to promise to reduce net 
immigration to less than 100,000, and did reduce non-EU immigration, but could do 
nothing about immigration from the EU. Consequently, EU nationals now formed, 
for the first time, the plurality of immigrants. As a result, EU immigration was 
15 https://ec.europa.eu/commfrontoffice/publicopinion/index.cfm/Chart/getChart/chartType/
lineChart//themeKy/3/groupKy/3/savFile/10000
OUP CORRECTED PROOF – FINAL, 19/11/19, SPi
Eu Accession Immigration and The Rise Of Ukip 87
even more salient and the government’s impotence became even more apparent. 
As can be seen from answers to a question in the 2015 BES survey shown in 
Figure 5.7, all parties were seen to have aspirations that outstripped their ability 
to reduce immigration, but UKIP was believed to be by far and away the party 
most likely to do so if they were in government. Given the growing importance of 
immigration to the electorate, this gives a basis for expecting substantial levels of 
immigration-related vote-switching to UKIP.
The EU, Immigration, and Vote-Switching 2010–15
To assess the importance of the EU and immigration to political choice, we model 
the 2015 vote choice of various groups of 2010 voters looking at how EU and 
immigration attitudes (as measured in 2010) predicts the flows in the merged 
2010 and 2015 BES internet panels.
In the 2010 BES pre-election panel wave, respondents were asked to describe 
their feelings about immigration16—whether they had felt a series of emotions 
about immigration. We run an IRT model on indicator variables of whether 
respondents’ felt angry, disgusted, uneasy, or afraid about immigration, and a 
16 Which, if any, of the following words describe your feelings about immigration (Please tick up to 















































Would try to reduce immigration Would achieve a reduction in immigration
Conservatives Labour UKIP Conservatives Labour UKIP
Figure 5.7 Perceptions of the parties’ desire to reduce immigration and their ability 
to do so
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binary variable measuring whether respondents said immigration was the most 
important issue.17
Because we run separate models for each 2010 party origin, we also include 
people who have a different identity to the party they voted for in the non-
identifying category on the basis that a party identification with a different 
party is unlikely to be an impediment to them switching in future (as we demon-
strated in Chapter 4). This substantially increases the proportion of non-affiliated 
voters in each year.
Figure 5.8, Figure 5.9, and Figure 5.10 show predicted probabilities from three 
separate multinomial models predicting 2015 vote choice for different groups of 
2010 voters: Conservatives, Labour, and Liberal Democrats. In each case, the 
latent immigration variable (measured in 2010) and EU approval strongly predict 
switching to UKIP in 2015. The only other variable that has a consistent impact is 
having a strong party identity, which inhibits switching. Demographics have only 
minor and inconsistent effects (see Table A5.5 in the appendix).
We can get a sense of the importance of EU/immigration concern by consider-
ing two counterfactual scenarios where respondents did not express any of the 
negative emotions about immigration or cite it as the most important issue 
(15 per cent of respondents fell into this category). In the first scenario we just 
look at the direct effect that this reduction in immigration concern would have 





























← Less concerned More concerned →
2010 Immigration concern
2010 Labour 2010 Conservatives 2010 Liberal Democrats
Figure 5.8 Predicted probabilities of switching to UKIP in 2015 for voters of different 
2010 party origins with different levels of 2010 immigration concern
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Figure 5.10 Predicted probabilities of switching to UKIP in 2015 for voters of 

































2010 Labour 2010 Conservatives 2010 Liberal Democrats
Figure 5.9 Predicted probabilities of switching to UKIP in 2015 for voters of different 
2010 party origins with different levels of EU approval in 2010
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had on the UKIP vote. In the second scenario, because immigration is so closely 
linked with the EU, we also impute (predict the values based on the model) the 
levels of EU approval that respondents would have had had they not been con-
cerned about immigration (using the regression model in Table A5.6 in the 
appendix). This model predicts levels of support for Europe on the basis of several 
factors including a respondent’s level of concern about immigration. This imput-
ation of EU approval moves the mean score from 2.81 to 3.38 (out of 5). This pre-
dicted level of anti-Europeanness is then used along with the counterfactual level 
of concern about immigration to predict the UKIP counterfactual.18
Based on this counterfactual simulation, we estimate that the levels of switching 
to UKIP would have been drastically lower in the absence of a salient immigration 
issue in 2015. Figure 5.11 shows the actual flows to UKIP for respondents in the 
2010–15 models and the estimated flows to UKIP if the immigration and the EU 
had been less salient. If immigration concern had not been widespread, fewer 
than 5 per cent of the three main parties’ supporters in 2010 would have switched 
to UKIP in 2015.19
18 Note that we only examine voters in England and Wales given the very different patterns of 
response in the Scottish party system, where UKIP never achieved prominence.
19 As we cannot rule out selection effects or reverse causation completely on the basis of this analy-




















































Figure 5.11 Levels of vote switching to UKIP among respondents in the multinomial 
models under the actual levels of concern and the counterfactual scenario of low 
immigration concern
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UKIP and Brexit: the spillover
Although UKIP performed very well in 2015 by the standards of minor parties in 
British politics, their most important impact on British politics was indirect: by 
activating the EU as a salient political issue, UKIP helped bring about the 2016 
EU referendum. The 12.9 per cent of the vote that UKIP won in 2015 substantially 
underestimates the potential of their appeal in the electorate. Not only had UKIP 
won half a million more votes at the European Parliament election the year 
before, the relative aggregate stability in the polls belies considerable volatility. 
Among respondents who took the six waves of the BES internet panel fielded 
between February 2014 and May 2015, 23 per cent voted for UKIP in at least one 
(European Parliament, local, or general) election, and a further 7 per cent said 
they intended to vote UKIP at least once. The popularity of a distinctly Eurosceptic 
challenger party posed an obvious threat to the main British parties, especially 
the Conservatives.
Although the 2016 EU referendum was unique in being an in/out referendum, 
the strategic use of holding (or at least, saying you are going to hold) referendums 
on the EU to avoid electoral competition over European integration is well estab-
lished in the EU (Oppermann 2013; Prosser 2016a). The logic of this strategy is 
that by holding a referendum on the EU, governing parties provide an electoral 
outlet for Eurosceptic voters and, in doing so, minimize the extent to which EU 
attitudes influence vote choice in general elections. In Britain, this strategy was 
first adopted by Labour under Blair (Oppermann 2008). Faced with a potential 
backlash over its preferred European policy, Blair offered (but avoided holding) 
referendums on first Britain joining the Euro, and second the ratification of the 
proposed 2004 Constitutional Treaty.
The same strategy lay behind the Conservative’s decision to hold a referendum 
on EU membership. UKIP’s surge and the continuing salience of immigration 
were key drives behind the decision to hold a referendum (Shipman 2016). It is no 
coincidence that, following a year in which UKIP’s support in the polls had jumped 
by about ten points, in January 2013 David Cameron announced that there would 
be an in/out referendum on Britain’s membership of the EU.
5.6 Conclusion and discussion
We have argued that the 2004 decision on open immigration from EU accession 
countries appears to have unintentionally unlocked potent issues in British pol it-
ics. This decision was highly salient (as we can see from public concern and media 
coverage), a large change from the status quo (because the government was 
un able to formulate a policy response), and clearly highly relevant to party pol it-
ics, as the series of election results from 2010 to 2017 have shown. In Chapter 3 
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we identified three main ways that a shock can affect electoral politics. The EU 
accession shock worked primarily through two of these mechanisms. The first 
was through increasing salience: concern about immigration, specifically EU 
immigration, can be traced to an increase in EU accession migration resulting 
directly from this decision. Our evidence is consistent with the media function-
ing as an information transmission belt to which the electorate responded. The 
second effect of the EU accession shock was through its effect on competence 
evaluations. The inability of any government to respond thermostatically to this 
growing concern—illustrated clearly by the coalition’s government’s year-on-year 
failure to reduce or even flatten off EU immigration rates—provided the opportunity 
for a challenger party, UKIP, to fill that representation gap. Thus a spiral of inter-
connected immigration fears and Euroscepticism emerged, resulting in a dramatic 
upsurge in support for UKIP, the only occupant of the anti-EU, anti-immigration 
space that was perceived to be competent on the issue and which provided repre-
sentation for more socially conservative voters.
While not denying that challenger parties need to seize the opportunities pro-
vided by mainstream party decisions, much as the literature on the role of op por-
tun ity structures (e.g. Kitschelt 1995) would predict, our analysis shifts the focus 
to the actions of the governing party in providing the catalyst for a swift and 
dramatic surge in immigration concern. Evidence that political decisions of this 
sort can act as salience shocks that elevate immigration concerns and facilitate 
the swift emergence of radical right challenger parties has also been seen recently 
in Germany, where Chancellor Merkel’s decision to welcome immigration from 
outside the EU in 2016 in response to the Syrian crisis transformed the fortunes 
of Germany’s own radical right challenger party, the AfD (Alternative für 
Deutschland). Arzheimer and Berning (2017) track the change in the AfD’s fortunes 
during this period when they reorientated themselves to become an immigration-
focused party rather than just an anti-EU party. Immigration gave their EU message 
far more mobilizing power.
As a final point, we should note that the impact of EU immigration appears to 
be unrelated to any increase in intolerance in the electorate. In other words, rising 
concern about rising levels of immigration does not indicate that xenophobia per 
se is on the rise. This should not surprise us: the electorate is now substantially 
more highly educated than in previous decades and higher education is more 
strongly associated with tolerance and social liberalism than just about any social 
attribute (Evans, Heath, and Lalljee 1996; Evans 2002; Tilley 2005). If anything, 
therefore, attitudes towards immigrants have become less negative over time as 
the population has become increasingly more socially liberal (Harding 2017). This 
can be seen from responses to a BES question on the belief that ‘there are too many 
immigrants’ asked at various points over the last forty or so years (see Figure 5.12). 
These confirm that people were, if anything, a little less likely to believe there are 
too many immigrants in Britain in 2015 than they were in previous decades and 
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had become much less likely to believe there are too many immigrants by the 
time of the 2017 Election. Growing intolerance does not appear to lie behind 
recent responses to immigration or the rise of UKIP.20
That the electorate is not getting more intolerant does not mean, however, that 
dislike of immigration is not present. As we can see from Figure 5.12, there has 
always been a substantial anti-immigrant bloc of voters who could be mobilized if 
the issue became (and stayed) politically salient. The decision to allow unfettered 
EU immigration ahead of all other major recipient countries provides the ideal 
shock for this political mobilization.
We examine the impact of Brexit as an electoral shock in Chapter  9, which 
examines how the EU has moved from being a predictor of UKIP support to 
being almost as important a predictor of Conservative voting as economic right-
wing attitudes. While UKIP largely vanished in 2017, their raison d’etre has only 
grown in importance.
20 The role of challenger parties in promoting as well as seizing upon new issues has been highlighted 
by, among others, de Vries and Hobolt (2012). However, the rise in concern about immigration is unlikely 
to be simply a consequence of UKIP’s presence: as our over-time data shows, immigration became salient 
in the public and media agendas before UKIP became an electorally viable party. This is consistent with 
the findings of extensive cross-country over-time comparisons conducted by Bohman and Hjerm (2016) 































Figure 5.12 ‘Do you think that too many immigrants have been let into this country, 
or not?’
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6
The Global Financial Crisis
The word shock suggests something short and sharp. This does not mean that shocks 
only have short-term effects. A major shock is—by our definition—per sist ent and 
impossible to ignore. Shocks have the potential to reshape politics for a prolonged 
period of time, as happened in the case of the Global Financial Crisis.
The Global Financial Crisis, which began in 2007–8, was the most significant 
financial crisis since the Great Depression of the 1930s. The financial crisis was a 
major policy shock, causing substantial disruption to the economy and unprece-
dented financial support to the banking sector by the British government. The 
financial crisis resulted in a major competence shock for Labour, as voters began 
to see them as less trustworthy on the economy. In the subsequent 2010 General 
Election, Labour lost power after thirteen years of government and the Conservatives 
formed a coalition government with the Liberal Democrats. However, the 2010 
General Election did not mark the end of the political impact of the Global 
Financial Crisis. The crisis dominated British politics between 2010 and 2015. 
We show in this chapter how it played a role in the outcome of the 2015 General 
Election, seven years after the escalation of the financial crisis in Britain.
Focusing on the shock of the Global Financial Crisis offers several novel insights 
into economic voting, the outcome of the 2015 General Election, and the ways 
in which shocks have electoral effects. The economic vote is usually thought of 
as a short-term mechanism: a reward or punishment for the incumbent depend-
ing on recent economic conditions (see Lewis-Beck and Stegmaier 2000 for a 
review). Voters are thought to be ‘myopic’, focusing only on the recent or immediate 
state of the economy. The short-term economic vote is certainly part of the eco-
nomic voting story in 2015: the Conservatives did better among people who thought 
the economy was improving in the run-up to the 2015 General Election, and Labour 
did worse. However, we show that the economic vote can have a much longer time 
horizon. We demonstrate one way in which it does so: voters can continue to blame 
parties for past economic performance and carry over those memories and evalu-
ations into future elections.
The Global Financial Crisis impacted directly on perceptions of Labour’s eco-
nomic competence, but it also created a political opportunity for the Conservatives. 
The Conservatives won votes in 2015 by successfully piling blame for the aftermath 
of the financial crisis onto the previous Labour government. The Conservatives 
achieved this by attributing responsibility for the level of UK debt to Labour and 
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by winning electoral support on the basis of the widely perceived need for aus-
terity measures: reductions in public spending to reduce the national debt and 
the size of the budget deficit. This shows how politicians can capitalize on old 
shocks to score new political points by persuading voters to attribute new blame 
for past policies and their effects. The nature of shocks means they can provide 
political opportunities well into the future.
6.1 The shock of the Global Financial Crisis
The Global Financial Crisis was a profound economic shock with wide-reaching 
consequences for the economy and financial institutions in the UK and inter-
nationally. The crisis began with the collapse of the US subprime mortgage market, 
which precipitated an international banking crisis. The US bank Lehman Brothers 
was forced to file for bankruptcy in September 2018, and others in the US were 
expected to follow. Despite the US Federal Government providing significant 
financial support to the US banking sector, banks continued to face severe diffi-
culties borrowing money, and house prices dropped sharply. These problems spilled 
over to British banks in the autumn of 2018, leading to the nationalization of 
Northern Rock, a major high street mortgage lender. To stave off a larger banking 
crisis, the British government underwrote UK banks in the form of loans and guar-
antees (‘the bailout of British banks’) to the tune of £500 billion. The rescue package 
was designed to shore up economic and public confidence in the banking system 
and achieve, in Chancellor Alastair Darling’s words, nothing less than the prevention 
of panic and social disorder.1 The bailout package resulted in the government—and 
the UK taxpayer—becoming a major shareholder in Lloyds Bank and in RBS. The 
EU followed the UK government’s initiative of investing vast amounts to maintain 
confidence in their national banking systems, with international coordination by 
seven central banks to lower interest rates to calm the crisis.
Despite substantial government intervention in the crisis, a period of wide-
spread recession followed: a global economic downturn, a debt crisis in the Eurozone, 
and a period dubbed ‘The Great Recession’ (see Bermeo and Pontusson 2012 for a 
review). The Great Recession ‘was a once-in-a-century event which disrupted the 
economies of most of the world’s advanced democracies’ (Clarke et al. 2016, 30). 
British GDP saw its largest drops in 2008,2 but the question of when Britain would 
enjoy an economic recovery—and in particular a drop in the rising costs of fuel 
and other goods—ran well into the period after the 2010 General Election. Inflation 
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One political outcome of the Global Financial Crisis was a period of ‘austerity’ 
in British public policy: substantial reductions in public spending, resulting in—
among other things—a prolonged wage-increase freeze for public sector workers. 
The incoming Conservative–Liberal Democrat coalition committed to reducing 
the size of the national debt and the budget deficit. The degree to which the 
Conservative–Liberal Democrat coalition sustained this policy is contested (as 
was its necessity) but the ‘age of austerity’ was to dominate the politics of the 
period after the 2010 General Election. Austerity only declined in political focus 
due to the subsequent political preoccupation with Brexit. It was only in October 
2018—a full ten years after the start of the financial crisis—that Prime Minister 
Theresa May declared, somewhat controversially, ‘the end of austerity’4 in her 
speech to the Conservative Party Conference, and the October 2018 budget 
promised public spending increases.
The penalty to the Labour Party: long-term  
perceptions and political opportunities
On the face of it, the Labour government might have been expected to avoid a 
substantial electoral penalty for its handling of the financial crisis. The Labour 
government’s handling of the crisis—in particular the banking bailout—was not 
without praise, and Labour reminded voters that this was an international bank-
ing crisis, caused by failures made by international financial institutions. After all, 
the counterfactual of what might have happened had Labour not intervened so 
decisively could have been extremely severe. However, the Conservatives pointed 
to Labour’s public spending as part of the problem, arguing that the size of the 
national debt and budget deficit were exacerbating Britain’s economic problems 
and compounding the impact of the crisis. The decision to use £500 billion, 
with the justification that the banks were ‘too big to fail’, was a very difficult 
pill to swallow for voters, likely to be especially difficult for those in the most 
demanding economic circumstances. Moreover, presiding over a significant 
recession—regardless of actual levels of responsibility—is not good news for any 
government. The 2010 General Election saw a five-point swing from Labour to 
the Conservatives, with the economy an important influence on electoral choice 
(Whiteley et al. 2013; Johnston and Pattie 2011; Chzhen, Evans, and Pickup 2014). 
If voters thought the economy had worsened prior to 2010—and 59 per cent did—
they were less likely to vote for Labour in 2010. This electoral penalty was likely to 
have been particularly pronounced for people and households who saw a decline 
in their income due to the crisis, or who were affected in other direct ways 
4 https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/av/uk-politics-45733093/theresa-may-s-full-speech-to-2018- 
conservative-conference
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(Singer 2018). The shock meets our definition for being highly salient: an unmissable 
event that was noticeable and unavoidable for British voters, and which remained 
especially salient in the long-term for those people most affected.
One reason the shock of the crisis continued into 2015 is that the financial cri-
sis had a long-term impact on Labour’s reputation for economic competence. 
From thereon, the Conservatives became more trusted on the economy, reversing 
Labour’s lead on the economy that the party had enjoyed since the early 1990s. 
The question of Labour’s competence on the economy had dogged Labour before 
the 1990s. It was only following the Exchange Rate Mechanism crisis (in 1992) 
which badly damaged the Conservatives’ reputation for economic competence, that 
Labour had a commanding lead over the Conservatives on economic competence. 
This lead continued until the Global Financial Crisis of 2008. Much also changed 
between 2010 and 2015: the Conservatives gained an increased lead on the econ-
omy as the economy began to improve in 2013 and subsequently, and that lead 
 widened further as the parties approached the 2015 General Election. While we can 
only speculate about what a different Labour strategy during this period might have 
achieved, it is highly unlikely that the lead the Conservatives gained in 2010 could 
have been reversed between 2010 and 2015 in the absence of another major 
economic shock. Shocks tend to substantially alter party reputations for compe-
tence, and are unlikely to be fundamentally reversed in the course of ‘normal’ 
politics (Green and Jennings 2017). The impact of the crisis continued to damage 
Labour’s chances as Labour went into the 2015 Election. Below we show that pre-
2010 economic evaluations carried forward to shape vote choices in 2015, and one 
mechanism through which this happened was via Labour’s competence on the 
economy. In line with conventional theories of economic voting, the main bene-
ficiary of Labour’s troubles on the economy was the main alternative party of 
 government, the Conservatives. More unusually, however, from an economic 
voting perspective, a smaller party—UKIP—also benefited from Labour’s 
 economic difficulties. Like the Conservatives, UKIP picked up voters who thought 
the economy was struggling before 2010. What distinguished UKIP  voters from 
Conservatives on the economy in 2015 was that UKIP voters did not see the economy 
getting any better.
Another reason the crisis continued to damage Labour, a full seven years later, 
is that the crisis dominated the competition between the major parties between 
2010 and 2015. The shock of the financial crisis provided a significant political 
opportunity which the Conservatives took advantage of. It is important to note 
that, had the financial crisis not been such a salient and important economic and 
political shock, the potential for parties to mobilize public opinion and competi-
tion around it would have been lower.
Labour was increasingly blamed for the consequences of the financial crisis 
after the 2010 General Election—in particular for the level of UK debt. The crisis 
was used as justification for spending cuts aimed at reducing the size of the 
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national debt and cutting the budget deficit. This served to benefit the Conservatives, 
helping them stave off some electoral blame for the negative consequences of 
austerity, and it also placed Labour in a difficult strategic position. Labour could 
either admit that spending had been too high prior to 2010 and commit to the 
reduction of the deficit (thereby appearing economically re spon sible but support-
ive of the policies of austerity), or deny that the deficit was too high and argue 
against the necessity of austerity. Blaming Labour for the size of the national debt 
had a substantial impact on Labour’s electoral support in 2015, even once we take 
into account Labour’s earlier blame for the crisis. Furthermore, support for the 
Conservatives was greater among those who thought that austerity was necessary. 
We demonstrate below how both explanations provide a mechanism through 
which the long-term effects of pre-2010 economic evaluations influenced vote 
choices in 2015.
6.2 Estimating the long-term and short-term  
economic vote in 2015
To assess whether ratings of the economy prior to 2010 (the evaluations closest in 
our dataset to the financial crisis) also had an impact on the 2015 General Election, 
we need to compare the effects of the 2015 economy on vote choice in 2015 (the 
short-term economic vote) with evaluations of the economy in 2010 on vote choice 
in 2015 (the long-term economic vote). Furthermore, in order to explain the long-
term effects of pre-2010 evaluations, we need to assess the degree to which these 
effects run through the competence ratings of the Labour Party in 2015, blame for 
Labour’s responsibility of the crisis in 2010 and Labour’s responsibility for the 
level of UK debt in 2015, and the impact of voters’ assessments of the necessity of 
austerity.
We use a dataset that follows respondents across both the 2010 BES internet 
panel and the 2015 internet panel to examine the long-term impact of voters’ 
evaluations of the economy. The model we estimate is a multinomial logit model 
of 2015 vote choice among English voters.5 The model estimates the likelihood of 
voting for each of the Conservatives, Labour, Liberal Democrats, UKIP, and the 
Green Party6 as a function of retrospective socio-tropic (how well the national 
economy is doing) economic evaluations measured in 2010 and 2015.7 We control 
5 For reasons of comparability we exclude voters in Scotland and Wales.
6 For reasons of space we do not report the results for the Green Party, which were generally not 
substantially related to economic perceptions.
7 The question asks ‘How do you think the general economic situation in this country has changed 
over the last 12 months? Has it:’ 1) Got a lot worse, 2) Got a little worse, 3) Stayed the same, 4) Got a 
little better, 5) Got a lot better. Answers are taken from the pre-campaign wave of the 2010 BES 
Internet panel and wave 4 (also the pre-campaign wave) of the 2014–15 BES Internet panel.
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for respondent age, gender, income, education, economic left–right and 
 liberal–authoritarian values (measured with IRT models, see Tables A6.1 and A6.2 
in the appendix), 2010 immigration attitudes (Table A5.4 in the appendix), and 
2010 and 2015 party identity strength, specified as alternate-specific predictors.8
The nature of the data means our analysis has some limitations. Variables that 
we would ideally have measured before the financial crisis, such as political values, 
are not measured until 2014–15 because these questions were not asked as part of 
the 2010 panel. Likewise, we include controls for partisanship measured in 2010 
and 2015. The downside of this is that they could themselves be affected by 
the  crisis. Economic values might change in response to the economic crisis 
(Gonthier 2017) and some voters might update their partisanship in response to 
political performance (Fiorina  1981). The inclusion of ‘downstream’ variables 
biases statistical estimates of effect size (Rosenbaum 1984). This is likely to lead us 
to underestimate the effect of economic evaluations. We cannot simply ignore 
these controls, however. The overwhelming weight of evidence shows that eco-
nomic perceptions are highly coloured by partisanship (Wlezien, Franklin, and 
Twiggs  1997; Bartels 2002; Evans and Andersen  2006; van der Eijk et al.  2007; 
Evans and Pickup  2010; Pickup and Evans  2013; Healy et al.  2017).9 Excluding 
these controls is likely to lead to a substantial overestimate of the effect of eco-
nomic evaluations. We report the results from our models (see Table A6.3 in the 
appendix) with our most stringent set of control variables, and expect the results 
to represent the lower bound of the substantive size of effects.
Figure 6.1 shows the estimated relationship between 2015 vote choice and eco-
nomic evaluations measured before the 2010 General Election, in the immediate 
aftermath of the crisis (left-hand side of Figure 6.1)—and economic evaluations 
measured before the 2015 election (right-hand side of Figure 6.1). The right panel 
shows a strong effect of 2015 economic perceptions that fits with a classic economic 
voting story: the Conservatives were rewarded for the perception of an improving 
economy, and punished if the economy was perceived as getting worse. Note also 
that, consistent with other research on coalition governments and economic voting 
(Duch and Stevenson 2013; Duch, Przepiorka, and Stevenson 2015), the Liberal 
Democrats get very little reward for an improving economy (see also Chapter 7). 
Conversely, we see the inverse relationship for the opposition parties. Voters who 
thought the economy had got worse were more likely to vote Labour. We also see 
8 By ‘alternate-specific predictors’ we mean that the party identity part of the model is specified 
such that a specific party identity only directly impacts on the probability of voting for that party 
(though it will still have an indirect effect on voting for other parties). For example, we estimate the 
effect of Labour Party identity strength on voting Labour rather than Conservative, but not on voting 
UKIP rather than Conservative.
9 There is also some evidence that it is not just answers to survey questions that are coloured by 
partisanship but actual economic behaviour (Gerber and Huber 2009), although the veracity of this 
finding has been disputed (McGrath 2017).
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a similar slope—albeit at a lower absolute level—in the relationship between 
economic perceptions and voting UKIP.
Moving to the left panel, to the effects of pre-2010 economic evaluations, we 
see that economic evaluations measured five years earlier are still substantially 
related to 2015 vote choice. British voters in 2015 were not simply myopically voting 
on short-term economic changes that took place in the run-up to the 2015 election. 
Voters who thought the economy was doing badly in 2010 continued to punish 
Labour in 2015. What is perhaps most interesting, however, is that 2010 economic 
evaluations exert little influence on whether someone is likely to be a Conservative 
or Liberal Democrat voter. There is a relationship, however, between 2010 economic 
evaluations and the probability of voting Labour and the probability of voting 
UKIP. This pattern distinguishes the long-term economic vote we see here from 
the classic economic vote which sees economic voting as occurring between the 
two major alternative parties of government. The long-term economic vote bene-
fited UKIP in the 2015 General Election.
The combined effect of both 2010 and 2015 economic evaluations is that Labour 
fared worst among those who thought the economy was doing badly in 2010 and 
who thought it was doing well in 2015. The Conservatives did best among those 
who thought the economy was doing well in 2015. The Liberal Democrats fared 
badly across the range of economic perceptions in both years. UKIP did best among 
those with the most pessimistic evaluations—those who thought the economy 
was doing badly in both 2010 and 2015.
It is also important to remember that it is not just the slopes of regression 



























2010 Evaluations 2015 Evaluations






















Figure 6.1 Predicted probability of 2015 vote choice by 2010 and 2015 economic 
evaluation
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In 2015 the British economy had begun to recover from recession, as inflation and 
unemployment both declined. At the same time, concerns over the economy 
abated (measured by the percentage of people listing the economy as the most 
important issue) and there was increasing economic optimism (Clarke et al. 2016). 
According to the BES panel data we are using here, the proportion of people think-
ing the national economy was getting better before the 2010 General Election was 
23 per cent, whereas this figure was 46 per cent before the 2015 General Election.
How can we account for the persistence of this long-term economic effect in 2015? 
We identify three ways in which the shock of the economic crisis persisted into 
2015—its effect on evaluations of Labour’s competence, attributions of responsi-
bility for government debt, and attitudes towards the necessity of austerity.
6.3 The crisis as a competence shock
Public perceptions of governing competence are prone to change over the 
long-term in response to external shocks (Green and Jennings 2017). Figure 6.2 
shows the percentage of people rating Labour and the Conservatives as ‘best’ 
on the economy, between 1990 and 2018. The Conservatives had been dom-
inant on economic competence under Margaret Thatcher and John Major until 
Britain crashed out of the Exchange Rate Mechanism in September 1992 
(‘Black Wednesday’), which acted as a major competence shock. The ERM crisis 
was followed by a period of division and damaging stories of sleaze for the 
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Figure 6.2 ‘Best party on the economy’, 1990–2018
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Conservatives’. Under Tony Blair, and initially under Gordon Brown, Labour 
had a commanding lead over the Conservatives on the economy—a lead that 
lasted for around fifteen years and three general elections. Labour lost its lead in 
2009 in the wake of the financial crisis and the subsequent Great Recession. 
However, the Conservatives’ economic lead was not commanding until shortly 
before the 2015 Election (and then subsequently reached its maximum around 
the 2017 General Election).
The loss of Labour’s reputation on the economy around 2009 was in some 
senses inevitable. As we argued above, Labour was bound to take some reputa-
tional damage simply by being in government during a profound economic crisis. 
Voters tend to punish incumbents irrespective of that government’s actual ability 
to control a particular outcome (Achen and Bartels 2016). The Labour government’s 
approach to the financial crisis was dramatic and—in some quarters at least—
unpopular. Many found it difficult to understand how a government could afford 
to spend £500 billion on the financial sector that had just acted so irresponsibly. 
Furthermore, Labour had adopted a ‘light touch’ attitude towards regulation 
of the financial sector prior to the financial crisis. New Labour saw the City as 
an engine of economic growth which could be harnessed to benefit society as 
a whole—perhaps epitomised by Peter Mandelson’s infamous remark that New 
Labour was ‘intensely relaxed about people getting filthy rich as long as they 
pay their taxes’. Furthermore, Labour was being blamed for the crash by political 
opponents. Indeed, it ‘proved to be a very potent message in the 2010 General 
Election, so much so that echoes of it were still being heard in 2015’ (Clarke et al. 
2016, 39). That is to say, the claim that Labour was to blame for the crisis was 
powerful in 2010 and it was still being made effectively in 2015.
To demonstrate the effect of competence as a mediating mechanism for the 
long-term effect of the economic vote in 2015, we add respondents’ ratings of how 
well Labour would handle the economy in 2015 to our model of 2015 vote choice. 
Figure 6.3 reports the predicted probabilities of voting for each party in 2015 across 
the range of Labour’s economic handling evaluations in 2015. We see a similar 
pattern to Figure  6.1: Labour was most likely to win votes from people who 
thought Labour would handle the economy well, whilst the Conservative and 
UKIP picked up votes from those who thought Labour would handle the econ-
omy badly. Adding the mechanism of competence to the model also substantially 
reduces the apparent effect of long-term 2010 economic perceptions on 2015 
Labour vote choice.
Again, it is not just the slope of these lines that is important but the underlying 
distribution of responses. Figure 6.2, earlier, showed a stark change in how people 
felt about Labour’s economic competence before and after the financial crisis. We 
can see just how important a difference this made to Labour’s vote share in 2015 
by showing the predicted probabilities of voting Labour at Labour’s mean pre-
crash economic handling rating, (measured at the pre-2005 BES wave) and 
Labour’s mean economic handling in 2015 (from the pre-election wave in 2015). 
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This is shown in Figure 6.4. The predicted likelihood of voting Labour in 2015 is 8 
percentage points higher at pre-crash values for economic competence than if we 
hold Labour’s competence at post-crash values—a substantial difference.
We should be cautious in putting too much weight on this sort of counterfactual. 
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Figure 6.4 Predicted probability of voting Labour in 2015 by perceptions of Labour’s 
handling of the economy, showing the 2005 and 2015 mean perceptions
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Conservatives in 2015, or even beaten them outright, had its competence not been 
affected much earlier by the financial crisis. We can surmise that the Conservatives 
would not have emphasized competence as a campaign strategy if Labour’s com-
petence had not lagged behind the Conservatives’. The bases of voters’ decisions 
are to some extent endogenous to party strategies: competence matters more in 
electoral choice when the question of competence is made salient by political 
events and actors (Green and Jennings 2017).
6.4 The crisis as political opportunity
Political competition around the crisis dominated the politics of the period 
between 2010 and 2015. The Conservatives took two very clear positions: (i) that 
there was an urgent need to reduce the national debt and the budget deficit (the 
cost of borrowing for the level of public expenditure) and this meant that the 
government needed to pursue a range of difficult and painful austerity measures, 
and (ii) that these policies were necessary because Labour had been profligate in 
office, sustaining a dangerous level of spending, worsening the impact of the 
financial crisis on the British economy, and making austerity necessary. These 
political messages were not an inevitable outcome of the financial crisis and 
recession that occurred before 2010. They were a clear political strategy to 
increase the extent to which Labour was blamed for the level of UK debt, to 
 harness the relative Conservative competence on the economy, and to rule out 
alternatives to austerity as a means of creating prosperity (Clarke et al.  2016). 
George Osborne (then Conservative Chancellor of the Exchequer) seized upon 
the political opportunity that had been created by the crisis. After Labour’s 2010 
defeat, Liam Byrne, Chief Secretary to the Treasury under Brown, left a note to 
his incoming successor in which he lamented: ‘I’m afraid there is no money.’ 
It had been intended as a light-hearted and friendly gesture (Byrne 2015) but the 
letter was repeatedly brandished by Conservative politicians during the 2015 
Election campaign to underline their argument about Labour’s profligacy in 
office. The Conservative campaign message as the parties approached the 2015 
General Election was that the choice was one of ‘competence versus chaos’: 
 competence under the Conservatives or chaos under Ed Miliband’s Labour Party. 
A recurring theme was Labour’s—and Ed Miliband’s—unsuitability to govern given 
their previous hand ling of the economy.
The politics of austerity placed Ed Miliband in a bind. He could either distance 
Labour from the spending decisions made by Gordon Brown and concede that 
the level of UK debt was too high (and by implication that it contributed to the size 
of the economic crisis in Britain), or defend the spending decisions of the Labour 
government to argue against austerity but run the risk of accepting blame for the 
level of UK debt. The Conservatives were able to capitalize on those difficulties.
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The blame game and austerity
Voters blamed a range of actors for the financial crisis itself. In 2010, 52 per cent of 
BES respondents thought international financiers were responsible, and 73 per cent 
chose to blame British banks. Relatively few people thought Labour was respon-
sible for the crisis: only 39 per cent mentioned the Labour government and 
36  per  cent mentioned Gordon Brown specifically.10 By 2015, however, Labour 
was widely seen as being responsible for the aftermath, with 55 per cent of BES 
survey respondents saying Labour was responsible for the level of UK debt.
We examine the effect of apportioning blame to Labour by adding these vari-
ables to our model of 2015 vote choice. Figure 6.5 shows the marginal effects of 
blaming Labour for the crisis in 2010 and blaming Labour for the level of debt in 
2015 on the probability of voting for each party in 2015. The left panel shows that 
there is no statistically significant effect of blaming Labour for the crisis. The right 
panel shows, however, that there was a statistically significant and large effect of 
blaming Labour for the level of debt. This operated to the detriment of Labour 
and the benefit of the Conservatives.
The perception that Labour were responsible for high levels of debt was a prob-
lem for Labour, but the politics of austerity were more complex than this simple 
story. As Figure 6.6 below shows, the vast majority of both 2010 Labour and 2010 
10 Note that these figures represent the chance to ‘tick all that apply’, so respondents could say 
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Figure 6.5 Marginal effects of blaming Labour for the financial crisis in 2010 and blaming 
Labour for the level of debt in 2015 on the probability of voting for each party in 2015
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Conservative voters (and respondents overall) thought that eliminating the deficit 
was important. Even among 2010 Labour voters, very few (9 per cent) thought 
that eliminating the deficit was completely unnecessary.
In order to assess the effect of views about austerity, we combine answers to a 
number of questions about the necessity and method of cutting the deficit, and 
whether cuts to public spending, local services, and the NHS had gone too far 
using an IRT model (shown in Table A6.4 in the appendix).
We add this combined variable to our model of 2015 vote choice, again assess-
ing the degree to which this explanation accounts for the long-term effect on the 
economy. Figure  6.7 shows the predicted probabilities of voting for each of 
the  four largest parties across the combined measure. The more pro-austerity a 
respondent was, the greater the probability that they voted Conservative (and the 
more likely they were to vote UKIP), whereas Labour vote choice in 2015 was 
stronger among respondents who were more anti-austerity, even controlling—as 
we do—for left–right political values. This graph demonstrates the importance for 
the Conservatives of justifying their policy of austerity. Voters who were 
 persuaded of the need of austerity were more likely to support the Conservative 
Party in 2015, an effect that had the potential to shift 2010 Labour voters as 
well as former Conservatives. Both of the effects we report here—for blaming 
Labour for the level of UK debt, and agreeing that austerity is necessary—are 
also significant in models only analysing 2010 Labour voters. That is to say, 
Labour’s support among those who voted for the party in 2010 was also reduced 
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Figure 6.6 Necessity and desirability of reducing the national deficit among 2010 
labour and Conservative voters
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the belief that austerity was a necessary policy response. Both models suggest that 
these were additional effects resulting from the political competition around the 
crisis, changes in evaluation that took place between 2010 and 2015.
6.5 The Global Financial Crisis in  
a context of partisan dealignment
We note that the impact of the Global Financial Crisis was large and sustained 
because the shock was large and sustained. However, it also happened within a 
context of a more volatile electorate, less rooted to parties via strong partisan attach-
ments. A simple illustration can serve to highlight this point.
Our story about long-term economic voting effects, of pre-2010 election 
 economic evaluations on 2015 vote choice, is based, in part, on the long-lasting 
reputational damage of the crisis on Labour’s economic competence. Figure 6.8 
shows the relationship between party identity strength among 2005 Labour voters 
and evaluations of Labour’s economic competence, in 2010. The weaker the iden-
tification in 2005, the less positive Labour’s competence rating. If we imagine that 
more people fall into the right-hand side of Figure 6.8, it follows that Labour’s 
economic competence would not have fallen back to the same levels as it did after 
2010, and the Conservatives, on the flip side, would not have been as positive.
To summarize, if there were more party identifiers in the electorate, and more 
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Figure 6.7 Predicted probability of vote choices by austerity attitudes
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been greater stability in economic evaluations and greater stability, therefore, in 
the response to the economic conditions that were precipitated by the Global 
Financial Crisis and great recession, and the subsequent political competition in 
response to them.
6.6 What about the 2017 General Election?
Only two years later, the importance of the Global Financial Crisis at the 2017 
Election could not have been more different. As Figure 6.2 clearly showed earlier, 
Labour’s perceived competence on the economy continued to flounder. Indeed, 
the 2017 Conservative competence lead over Labour was even greater than it was 
in 2015. Despite this, Labour increased its vote share considerably in 2017. The key 
to understanding the 2017 Election is, as we discuss in more detail in Chapter 9, 
Brexit. Without pre-empting our discussion of the direct impact of the EU refer-
endum on the 2017 here, it is important to understand how the aftermath of the 
referendum affected the ongoing influence of the financial crisis on vote choice.
The most obvious effect of the EU referendum is that Brexit rapidly displaced 
austerity as the key object of political contention. This happened in two ways. 
First, and most obviously, discussion about Brexit itself took centre stage as the 
country grappled with how it would leave the EU. Second, one early consequence 
of the vote to Leave was a loosening of austerity as the new Chancellor, Philip 
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Figure 6.8 2010 Labour Party identity strength and Labour’s economic competence, 2015
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Meanwhile, under new leader Jeremy Corbyn, Labour took up active opposition 
to austerity, and with public support for austerity faltering, the Conservatives 
seemed reluctant to push the austerity issue in the 2017 Election campaign.
Brexit also affected the politics of the economy in 2017 indirectly. As we have 
already discussed, partisanship influences the way in which people perceive the 
political and economic world. As Figure 6.9 shows, after the referendum, whether 
someone voted Leave or Remain played a similar role. For the two years prior to 
the referendum, there is little to distinguish the mean retrospective economic 
evaluations of Leave and Remain voters; in the aftermath of the referendum, how-
ever, Remain voters became slightly more pessimistic about how the economy 
had already changed.
Together, these effects resulted in the rapid evaporation of the effects of the 
financial crisis on vote choice. Building on our previous model of vote choice, we 
now model the 2017 vote, adding 2017 economic evaluations to our model, and 
additionally controlling for 2017 party identity and the EU referendum vote (see 
Table A6.5 in the appendix). Figure 6.10 shows the predicted probability of voting 
for each party according to 2010, 2015, and 2017 economic evaluations. The right-
hand panel shows that economic evaluations were still an important predictor of 
vote choice in 2017. However, the left and centre panels show that earlier economic 
evaluations were no longer significant predictors of vote choice in 2017.
Together, the different elections demonstrate that economic voting is not a 
static phenomenon that always has equal effects—or the same kinds of effects—in 
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Figure 6.9 Retrospective economic evaluations 2014–17
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that responds to short-term economic considerations and political choices only 
in the context of one election. Shocks—and economic shocks—can have long-
lasting electoral consequences, they can be magnified and accentuated by pol it ical 
competition, but they can also cause different considerations to be overwhelmed 
by new factors. This further points to a contextual understanding of political 
behaviour, and to the importance of better understanding the varied consequences 
of electoral shocks.
6.7 Conclusions
Shocks, if they shape elections, do not necessarily only have consequences in the 
immediate election following the shock. In this chapter we demonstrated that 
the Global Financial Crisis left a long-lasting mark on the way voters decided 
how to choose between political parties in a subsequent election: in 2015. Such 
was the size, magnitude, and salience of the financial crisis that voters carried 
forward their previous evaluations of the economy into their vote choice in 2015. 
Furthermore, because of the way in which shocks create political opportunities, 
Labour was further harmed in 2015 because voters blamed Labour for the size of 
the national debt and the necessity of austerity. The Conservatives were able to 
compete around the crisis, attributing blame towards Labour as well as benefit-
ing from a short-term upturn in the economy that happened prior to the general 
election in 2015.
The implications of this chapter are important for understanding the economic 
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Figure 6.10 Predicted probability of 2017 vote choice by 2010, 2015, and 2017 
retrospective economic evaluations
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short-term nature of the economy to understand electoral choice in this election 
(or perhaps, in many other elections). While the improving economic conditions 
benefited the Conservatives in 2015, this has to be seen in the much larger eco-
nomic context that continued to overshadow British politics and the mem or ies of 
British voters. We also showed that the Global Financial Crisis, and its aftermath, 
was not only relevant to the votes for the two largest parties in 2015: Labour and 
the Conservatives. Our explanation also accounts for some of UKIP’s success in 
2015. UKIP benefited in 2015 from long-term economic evaluations prior to 2010, 
and from perceptions of Labour’s economic (in)competence. That is to say, we 
find an effect of long-term economics on UKIP’s vote share in 2015. In a system in 
which multiple parties compete for votes, not all ‘performance’-based assessments 
will see vote-switching between the government and the main party of opposition, 
as traditional models of economic voting commonly assume. Minor parties can 
be outlets for dissatisfaction about economic performance, as UKIP was in 2015.
Our analysis, then, brings new insights to bear on the literature on economic 
voting. One such insight is how economics and economic performance can be a 
source of support for populist parties, such as UKIP. Another is how voters’ eco-
nomic assessments might have much longer consequences than has previously 
been assumed. The majority of the economic voting literature sees the economic 
vote as a short-term effect of recent economic evaluations on the outcome of an 
election.11 However, emerging evidence for the nature of a longer-term economic 
vote (see Hellwig and Marinova 2015; Wlezien 2015) suggests that electorates can 
blame governments long into the future. One way this happens is via long-term 
disruptions to reputations for party competence (Green and Jennings  2017). 
A reputation, once lost, is very hard to recover, such that past governments can 
suffer an electoral penalty long after they have lost office. In this chapter we 
demonstrated the way in which political blame can accentuate, prolong, and even 
add new blame to parties that have previously been in government. The ‘blame 
game’ does not need to be understood as something that takes place at the time of 
a shock or a crisis. In the example of the Global Financial Crisis, the blame over 
the level of UK debt happened after the election in which Labour lost office 
(2010), and helped win the Conservatives the election in 2015.
Electoral shocks shape electoral behaviour in important, and potentially long-
lasting ways. This chapter has demonstrated how shocks can remain relevant in 
public opinion and electoral choice long after they occurred. If a shock is suffi-
ciently memorable and parties still compete around its legacy, then there is no 
reason to assume that voters will only blame a party or a government in one election. 
A large shock will not be easily forgotten—or forgiven. This might well be relevant 
11 A range of examples include: Kramer (1971); Tufte (1978); Lewis-Beck (1990); Campbell (1992); 
Alesina, Londregan, and Rosenthal (1993); Lewis-Beck and Stegmaier (2000); Duch and Stevenson 
(2008); Kayser and Wlezien (2011); and Achen and Bartels (2016).
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for some of the other shocks that we document in this book, and in shocks that 
have yet to take place. If Britain leaves the European Union in such a way that 
there is a deeply felt economic cost, and if one party’s reputation for competence 
is badly damaged, there is no reason to think that will not impact on the electoral 
behaviour of British voters for multiple elections. That is just one of the lessons 
we can draw from the long-lasting electoral impact of the Global Financial Crisis.
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7
Reward, Blame, and Guilt by  
Association? 
The Electoral Collapse  
of the Liberal Democrats
In 2010, the Liberal Democrats recorded their highest general election vote share 
since 1983 (as the SDP-Liberal Alliance) and their largest number of seats since 
1929 (as the Liberal Party). In 2015 they won only 8.1 per cent of the vote, only a 
third of what they managed five years earlier, making it their worst performance 
since 1970. As a result, they faced almost complete electoral wipe-out, winning 
only eight seats, losing forty-nine of the fifty-seven they had won in 2010. The fall 
in the Liberal Democrat vote was the largest single election drop in support for 
any party in Britain since 1931, when the Liberals had been similarly annihilated 
in the aftermath of a coalition.
Two years later, in 2017, some hoped that the Liberal Democrats—as Britain’s 
most consistently pro-EU party—might ride an anti-Brexit wave to recovery. 
Instead, the Liberal Democrats only made a net gain of four seats and lost a further 
half point of vote share.
In this chapter we explore the reasons behind the 2015 collapse and failure to 
recover in 2017. Part of this story is well known—left-leaning Liberal Democrat 
voters deserted in droves (cf. Cutts and Russell 2015)—but the full picture is more 
complex. In many countries, junior partners do badly in elections following coali-
tion participation (Buelens and Hino 2008). Parties in coalition governments 
always face a trade-off between the unity of the coalition government and the 
distinctiveness of their party image. Some argued that this dilemma was particu-
larly acute in an adversarial political system such as Britain’s (McEnhill 2015). 
As we will show though, it was not the nature of British politics that sunk the 
Liberal Democrats in 2015, but the nature of the Liberal Democrats’ support. The 
Liberal Democrats were particularly poorly suited to withstand the potential 
electoral backlash of coalition because they had few partisan voters and relied 
heavily on tactical support. These problems were compounded by perceptions of 
viability—the more unpopular the Liberal Democrats became, the less likely it 
seemed they would be able to win seats. The less likely they were to win seats, the 
less point there was in lending the Liberal Democrats a tactical vote.
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These problems continued in 2017 with little sign of recovery. What the simi-
larity in the 2015 and 2017 Liberal Democrat vote share conceals, however, is that 
there was considerable turnover beneath the surface. Less than a fifth of those who 
voted for them in 2017 had voted for them in 2010 before the coalition was formed. 
Moreover they only retained 50 per cent of those that supported them in 2015.
7.1 The 2010–15 coalition
The hung Parliament following the 2010 Election was, in part, the result of the long-
term trend of declining support for the two major parties and the rise of the 
political fortunes of ‘other’ parties, particularly the Liberal Democrats (Chapter 2). 
The 2010–15 Conservative–Liberal Democrat coalition government was the first 
peacetime coalition in Britain since the 1930s and was most British voters’ first 
experience of coalition government. In this chapter we consider how the hung 
Parliament and the subsequent experience of coalition government acted as a 
shock to the British political system. Although, unlike the other shocks in this 
book, it was entirely a product of electoral politics, we can consider it an electoral 
shock for several reasons. First, it was not an inevitable outcome of the normal 
electoral  process. The hung Parliament was contingent on a number of factors, 
including the closeness of the Conservative and Labour vote share and a strong 
performance of the Liberal Democrats, together with a long-term decline in the 
number of marginal seats which has reduced the tendency of the first-past-the-
post system to deliver large majorities for the leading party (Curtice 2010). Indeed 
it was not just a hung Parliament that was contingent but a hung Parliament with 
a particular configur ation of seats that meant the Liberal Democrats could only 
form a viable coalition with the Conservatives (Cowley and Kavanagh 2015). Even 
very small shifts in party support could have opened up a different set of post-
election possibilities.
Second, the coalition was hard for voters to ignore: the Westminster Parliament 
had been considered the model of single-party majority rule (Webb 2000), yet the 
2010 Government was clearly and unambiguously a coalition with Nick Clegg, the 
Liberal Democrat leader, taking a high-profile position as deputy prime  minister. 
Third and perhaps most crucially, it had the potential for enormous electoral 
 consequences. For most of the period since their formation in 1988, the Liberal 
Democrats had carefully navigated a path of ‘equidistance’ between the major par-
ties to avoid alienating voters from either side of the political spectrum (Russell 
and Fieldhouse 2005). However, in more recent elections the Liberal Democrats 
had positioned themselves as part of a ‘progressive alliance’, and were regarded by 
many as being more left-wing than Labour (Russell and Fieldhouse 2005). Prior to 
2015, many Liberal Democrat voters were Labour supporters voting tactically, and 
Liberal Democrat voters were generally more sympathetic to Labour than to the 
Conservatives (Russell, Fieldhouse, and MacAllister 2002). By entering a coalition 
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with the Conservatives there was a clear danger they risked upsetting the carefully 
constructed appeal they had spent many years building.
From the beginning of the Conservative–Liberal Democrat coalition, many 
observers believed it would not end well (Bale  2012). As the Victorian Prime 
Minister Benjamin Disraeli—once remarked, ‘England does not love coalitions.’
At first glance this appears to be true. Together, the coalition parties lost 14.4 
per cent of the vote at the 2015 Election, the largest swing against a British gov-
ernment since the expansion of the franchise in 1918 (Green and Prosser 2016). 
Of  course, however, this punishment was not equally shared between the 
Conservatives and the Liberal Democrats. It would be fairer to say Britain does 
not love junior coalition partners. Figure 7.1 show the Liberal Democrat’s polling 
performance in the run-up to and immediate aftermath of the 2010 Election. 
Public support for the Liberal Democrats plummeted almost as soon as they joined 
the coalition. By July 2010 the Liberal Democrats were polling at 16 per cent, 
7 percentage points lower than their performance at the 2010 Election. By the end 
of August they had reached 12 per cent. By the end of 2010 they had polled below 
10 per cent for the first time. The rapid fall of the Liberal Democrats in the polls—
which occurred largely before the publication of the Browne Review of Higher 
Education Funding—belies the commonly held view that the Liberal Democrats 
were seriously damaged by the abandonment of their pledge to abolish tuition 
fees.1 At the 2015 Election the Liberal Democrats lost two-thirds of their vote and 
1 Although the tuition fees issue became a stick that was used to beat the Liberal Democrats, its 























Figure 7.1 Liberal Democrat polling share in the run-up to and aftermath of the 
2010 election
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forty-nine of their fifty-seven MPs. The Conservatives seemed to avoid punishment 
altogether and increased their vote share by 0.8 per cent, winning twenty-four 
more seats than they did in 2010.
In this chapter we show that the damage to the junior coalition partner was not 
simply the consequence of accountability in coalition government or dislike of 
coalition in general, but rather the consequence of this specific coalition. The most 
obvious consequence of going into coalition with the Conservatives is that the 
Liberal Democrats were punished by their left-wing supporters. However, this is 
only part of the story. Figure 7.2 shows the size of the flow of votes to and from 
the Liberal Democrats between 2010 and 2015. It shows that in 2015 the Liberal 
Democrats not only lost votes to Labour and the other progressive parties, but 
that a large chunk (20 per cent) of 2010 Liberal Democrat support actually went 
to their coalition partners, the Conservatives, and a not inconsiderable propor-
tion (11 per cent) ended up voting UKIP—perhaps the ideological polar opposite 
of the Liberal Democrats in the British party system. These losses were com-
pounded by the failure to recruit new voters. Figure 7.2 also shows that the Liberal 
that it had a large effect on Liberal Democrat support. As well as the fact that Liberal Democrat sup-
port collapsed before the tuition fees announcement, other pieces of evidence suggest that, at most, 
tuition fees had a small impact on Liberal Democrat votes. In incumbent Liberal Democrat seats 
where they had won over 28 per cent of the vote in 2010, they lost only slightly more votes in seats 
with relatively large numbers of students (23.9 points) compared to seats with relatively few stu-
dents (21 points) (Curtice, Fisher, and Ford  2016). Additionally, less than 1 per cent of lost Liberal 



















Figure 7.2 2010 and 2015 vote choice of 2010 and 2015 Liberal Democrats voters
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Democrats gained a small number of voters from other parties in 2015. But for 
every vote they gained, the Liberal Democrats lost eight.
The Liberal Democrat to Conservative flow and the electoral geography of 
Liberal Democrat MPs are key to understanding how the Conservatives managed 
to win a majority at the 2015 Election. It is clear that Labour were the main bene-
ficiaries of defecting Liberal Democrat voters. In terms of seats, however, the 
Conservatives won twenty-seven former Liberal Democrat seats to Labour’s 
twelve. The explanation of this apparent discrepancy was the nature of party com-
petition in Liberal Democrat seats. In most (thirty-eight) Liberal Democrat seats 
the Conservatives were the second largest party at the 2010 Election, while Labour 
was second in only seventeen. Competition in Liberal Democrat–Conservative 
seats was also much closer than Liberal Democrat–Labour seats. At the 2010 
Election, the Conservatives had twice as many votes as Labour on average in 
Liberal Democrat-held seats. Consequently, although on average the Labour vote 
went up in Liberal Democrat seats and the Conservative vote went down, the 
Conservatives were better positioned to benefit from the collapse in Liberal 
Democrat support.
The small increase in the Conservative share of the vote in 2015 conceals large 
changes under the surface. Although the Liberal Democrats lost 15.1 percentage 
points of the vote, Labour and the Conservatives only increased their vote share 
by a combined 2.1 percentage points. At the individual level, the Conservatives 
lost large numbers of voters at the 2015 Election and were particularly damaged 
by the rise of UKIP, as we discussed in Chapter 5. However, the defection of  voters 
from the junior coalition partner to the senior helped cover those losses.
In this chapter we show how the Liberal Democrats’ choice to join the coalition 
and the backlash of their left-of-centre base not only had disastrous consequences 
in 2015 but also continued to damage their chances of recovery in 2017. We find 
that the Liberal Democrats faced a problem common to other junior coalition 
partners: the difficulty in claiming credit for government achievements. Ultimately, 
however, the electoral impact of these problems was minimal. Most of the Liberal 
Democrat collapse can be attributed to the nature of Liberal Democrat voters.
7.2 The nature of the Liberal Democrat vote
After their formation in 1988, the Liberal Democrats maintained a policy of ‘equi-
distance’ between the Conservatives and Labour. However, under the leadership 
of Paddy Ashdown and later Charles Kennedy, the Liberal Democrats repositioned 
themselves as part of a broader anti-Conservative alliance. During this period, 
centre-left voters were actively encouraged to switch tactically between Labour 
and the Liberal Democrats depending on the local electoral context (Russell and 
Fieldhouse 2005). Building on local viability and carefully targeted campaigning, 
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they increased their number of seats to forty-six in 1997, peaking at sixty-two in 
2005, aided by the convergence of the Conservative and Labour parties (Green 
2015) and dissatisfaction with Labour over the Iraq War (Fieldhouse, Cutts, and 
Russell 2006).
That the electoral fortunes of the Liberal Democrats went hand in hand with 
their adoption of an anti-Conservative position means that it is unsurprising 
that many Liberal Democrat voters were angry and disappointed that their vote 
for the Liberal Democrats resulted in a Conservative-led coalition government. 
Moreover, compared to Labour and Conservative voters, Liberal Democrat sup-
port has been different in two regards. First the Liberal Democrat vote has his-
torically been ‘soft’, with much lower levels of partisanship and a high reliance 
on tactical support. This lack of a strong partisan core meant that many Liberal 
Democrat voters viewed the Liberal Democrat participation in government 
unfiltered by a Liberal Democrat partisan screen, whilst some viewed it through 
the lens of Labour partisanship. Second it has been particularly reliant on local 
campaigning and support from tactical voters, which dried up in the wake of 
the coalition.
A weak partisan base
Compared to the major parties, the Liberal Democrats have always suffered from 
a lack of strong attachment to the party. The proportion of Liberal Democrat 
 voters who say they have a Liberal Democrat party identity has historically been 
much lower than that of the two major parties (Russell and Fieldhouse  2005). 
Liberal Democrat identifiers have also historically been less likely than other par-
tisans to vote for their natural party (Crewe 1985; Norris 1997). Moreover, Liberal 
Democrat voters have also been the most likely to switch parties between elec-
tions (Crewe 1985; Russell and Fieldhouse 2005).
This was still the case in 2010 when they entered coalition. Figure 7.3 shows 
that, according to the BESIP, the proportion of Liberal Democrat voters in 2010 
who identified with the party was substantially lower than the Conservatives or 
Labour, particularly those who identified strongly with the party. Also notable is 
the number of Liberal Democrat voters who identified with no party—indeed the 
Liberal Democrats won most of its votes among those who did not have a party 
identity in 2010—and those who identified with another party. In total, only half 
of 2010 Liberal Democrat voters identified with the party, and only one in ten of 
those saw themselves as very strongly Liberal Democrat, with 44 per cent of identi-
fiers seeing themselves as not very strong Liberal Democrat. A fifth of 2010 Liberal 
Democrat voters had a Labour Party identity and 5 per cent had a Conservative 
Party identity.
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The absence of a large partisan core to the Liberal Democrat vote meant that 
the problems faced by junior coalition partners were likely to land particularly 
heavily on the Liberal Democrats.
As we will see, Liberal Democrat partisans were more likely to give the party 
credit for positive changes during the coalition government. Previous research 
shows that partisanship ‘raises a perceptual screen through which the individual 
tends to see what is favourable to his partisan orientation (see Chapter 4). The 
stronger the party bond, the more exaggerated the process of selection and per-
ceptual distortion will be’ (Campbell et al. 1960, 133). Partisan voters are more 
likely to receive favourable information about their party because they pay atten-
tion to information relevant to their own party, receive communications from the 
party, and have more interactions with party activists (Adams, Ezrow, and Somer-
Topcu 2014). Partisans are also more likely to engage in motivated reasoning—
political cognition is an affectively driven cognitive process and partisan voters 
are likely to process political information in ways which maintain their existing 
partisanship (Lodge and Taber 2005; Lodge and Taber 2013; Redlawsk 2002; Erisen, 
Lodge, and Taber 2014). This helps explain why partisan voters are likely to see 
their party as being more influential in a coalition (Meyer and Strobl 2016).
If the Liberal Democrats had started with a stronger partisan base in 2010 it is 
likely that their role in the coalition would have been seen favourably by a larger 





























Figure 7.3 Party identity of Conservative, Labour, Liberal Democrat 2010 voters
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Tactical voting and local campaigning
The second aspect of the nature of the Liberal Democrat vote that may have 
affected its electoral fortunes in coalition government is the importance of local 
campaigning (Cutts 2014; Johnson 2014; Russell and Fieldhouse 2005) and support 
from those who tactically vote Liberal Democrat to keep out their least preferred 
of the Conservatives and Labour (Fieldhouse, Shryane, and Pickles 2007). Figure 7.4 
shows the self-reported reasons for voting Conservative, Labour, or Liberal 
Democrat in the 2010 British Election Study. Compared to the Conservatives and 
Labour, fewer voters supported the Liberal Democrats because they thought they 
had the best policies or the best leader, and a much higher proportion said they 
voted Liberal Democrat when they really preferred another party or for tactical 
reasons. This made them vulnerable to desertion as a result of being seen to have 
taken sides by joining the coalition.
The majority (56 per cent) of those who loaned their vote to the Liberal 
Democrats when they really preferred another party were Labour supporters. 
As  suggested above, those who voted Liberal Democrat to keep out the 
Conservatives were unlikely to be happy with the Liberal Democrats going into 
coalition with the Conservatives and this is likely to have led to a ‘tactical unwind’ 
(Fisher and Curtice 2006), with Labour supporters seeing no reason to lend the 























Figure 7.4 Stated reason for voting for party in 2010 by party voted for
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However, this tactical unwind may have extended beyond Labour supporters 
(and other supporters of other progressive parties like the Green Party) who were 
angered by the Liberal Democrats going into coalition with the Conservatives. 
The main challenge faced by third parties in the UK is overcoming the ‘credibility 
gap’ they face because of the first-past-the-post electoral system (Russell and 
Fieldhouse 2005). Historically, the Liberal Democrats have used local elections to 
demonstrate their electoral viability in particular areas (MacAllister, Fieldhouse, 
and Russell  2002; Cutts  2014; Russell and Fieldhouse  2005). Governing parties 
generally lose votes in British local elections (Prosser  2016c) and the Liberal 
Democrats were no different, and indeed they fared particularly badly, averaging 
14.5 per cent of the projected national share of the vote at local elections between 
2011 and 2014—just over half the 28 per cent they recorded in 2009.2 Combined 
with their poor showing in the national polls, this is likely to have severely harmed 
perceptions of the local viability of Liberal Democrat candidates. As well as 
left-leaning tactical voters abandoning the Liberal Democrats out of anger at their 
participation in a Conservative-led government, the resulting collapse in the 
viability of Liberal Democrat candidates is likely to have led tac tic al voters to 
desert the Liberal Democrats more generally.
7.3 The effects of coalition participation
The central dilemma of coalition government is managing the trade-off between 
the compromises necessary for stable government while retaining a distinctive 
partisan profile (Martin and Vanberg  2008). Previous analysis of the coalition 
agreement suggests that the Liberal Democrats were successful at negotiating the 
compromise necessary for stable government, but less successful at maintaining a 
distinctive party profile. A comparison of the Conservatives and Liberal Democrat 
2010 electoral manifestos and the coalition agreement shows that in some respects 
the Liberal Democrats got a good deal. About 75 per cent of Liberal Democrat 
manifesto pledges made it into coalition agreement, compared to about 60 per cent 
of Conservative pledges (Hazell and Yong 2012), and the overall policy pos ition of 
the coalition agreement was closer to the Liberal Democrat manifesto than the 
Conservatives (Quinn, Bara, and Bartle 2011). However, not all manifesto promises 
are viewed with equal importance by voters (Mellon, Prosser, et al. 2018). Many of 
the Liberal Democrat ‘wins’ in the coalition agreement were on relatively unim-
portant or low-salience issues (Bale 2012) and several flagship Liberal Democrat 
policies—the proposed constitutional reforms like the AV referendum and a 
2 British local elections are held in a rotating combination of different councils and no official 
national results are reported. The ‘projected national share of the vote’ is the national vote estimated 
and reported by the BBC.
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wholly or mainly elected House of Lords—ultimately proved disastrous (Hazell 
and Yong  2012). Overall, ‘the Liberal Democrats’ focus on “minor” policies 
blinded them to the far more important issue of how to manage the economy, a 
matter which they agreed with—or conceded to—the Conservatives’ (Hazell and 
Yong 2012, p. 40).
Similarly, although the Liberal Democrats secured a greater proportion of 
ministerial and cabinet posts than their share of government MPs, these largely 
took the form of junior ministers spread across departments and all the ‘great 
offices of state’ were held by Conservatives. The Liberal Democrats’ tactics in both 
the coalition agreement and their ministerial appointments was to try to sell the 
idea of coalition government to the British public and show that it could be just as 
effective and efficient as single-party government.
The experience of coalition in other countries suggests that, as coalitions con-
tinue, parties of government will seek to differentiate themselves in order to win 
votes (Martin and Vanberg 2008). This can be seen in the Conservative–Liberal 
Democrat coalition. Once the government was settled and the Liberal Democrats 
realized they were facing an enormous electoral backlash, they sought to claim 
credit for particular government policies and for blocking Conservative pro posals 
(Cutts and Russell 2015). However the lack of key portfolios made it difficult to 
sell the contribution of the Liberal Democrats to the government (Russell 2010; 
McEnhill 2015; Cutts and Russell 2015).
Research from other countries suggests that junior partners are generally not 
given much credit for the government’s achievements (Anderson  2000; Duch 
and Stevenson  2008; Fisher and Hobolt  2010), and the experience of Liberal 
Democrats proved to be no different. Many voters do not follow day-to-day 
policymaking and instead use heuristics to aid their political decision-making 
(Lau and Redlawsk 2001). In coalition government, the prime minister’s party is 
seen to be in control of the agenda and so receives the credit and blame for the 
government’s actions.
In order to examine attributions of responsibility for policy changes during the 
coalition government we use a set of questions about change and responsibility in 
six policy areas from the pre-election wave of the 2015 BES internet panel: the econ-
omy, cost of living, the National Health Service, schools, immigration, and crime.3
3 For each policy area, respondents were asked either ‘Do you think that each of the following are 
getting better, getting worse or staying about the same?’ (the economy, NHS, and schools) or ‘Do you 
think that each of the following are getting higher, getting lower or staying about the same?’ (cost of 
living, immigration, and crime). Answers were giving on a five-point scale. Respondents were then 
asked ‘Thinking about the changes you just described, who do you think these are the result of?’ The 
answer options were not mutually exclusive, and here we make use of whether or not respondents 
thought the ‘Conservatives in UK government’ and/or the ‘Liberal Democrats in UK Government’ 
(coded as a binary variable, 1 = party responsible for change in policy area).The other answer options 
were ‘the last Labour UK government’, ‘the Scottish government’ (if the respondent was in Scotland, 
‘the Welsh government’ (if the respondent was in Wales), and ‘none of these’.
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Figure 7.5 shows that, as we would expect from the comparative literature, the 
Conservatives receive considerably greater attributions of responsibility than 
the Liberal Democrats. Between 50 per cent and 73 per cent of respondents said 
the Conservatives were responsible for changes in each policy area, while only 
17 per cent to 21 per cent say the same thing about the Liberal Democrats.
Previous research has also suggested that partisan identifiers are more likely to 
give their own party credit for achievements in coalition (Meyer and Strobl 2016). 
If this was true in 2015 then, among Liberal Democrat identifiers at least, the 
party might get some credit for coalition. To test this we modelled whether each 
coalition partner was held responsible for a range of policy areas as a function of 
their pre-coalition (2010) party identification.4 The results show a number of 
 consistent patterns across the six policy areas. First, respondents were consistently 
less likely to attribute responsibility for policy changes to the Liberal Democrats. 
With the exception of two of the policy areas, even Liberal Democrat partisans 
were less likely to attribute policy success to the achievements of their own party 
rather than the Conservatives. Only for the NHS and education do Liberal 
4 We specify a series of logistic regression models, with separate models for the Conservatives and 
Liberal Democrats in each policy area. The dependent variable is a binary variable where 1 = the party 
responsible for change in policy area. The independent variables are perceived change in the policy 
area, the respondent’s 2010 party identification (none, Conservative, Liberal Democrat, any other 
party), and self-reported levels of political attention (0: No attention–10: A great deal of attention). Full 
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Figure 7.5 Attributions of responsibility to Conservatives and Liberal Democrats for 
change in six policy areas during 2010–15 coalition
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Democrat partisans attribute responsibility for policy success to the Liberal 
Democrats at the same rate as Conservative partisans do to the Conservative Party.
Perhaps more importantly, the extent to which each partner was given credit 
for a policy area depended on whether the change in that area was regarded as 
good or bad. This is best illustrated using the example of the economy, although a 
very similar pattern is found across each policy area. Figure 7.6 shows the predicted 
probability of holding the Conservatives or the Liberal Democrats responsible for 
changes to the economy by whether a respondent thought the economy had got 
better or worse. We plot separate graphs for non-party identifiers, Conservative 
identifiers, Liberal Democrat identifiers, and identifiers with any other party com-
bined (measured at the same time as responsibility attributions). Conservative and 
Liberal Democrat partisans are much more likely to say their party is responsible 
for positive changes in the economy and not responsible for negative changes, 
while partisans from other parties are more likely to say the governing parties 
were responsible if they think the economy was getting worse but were not 
responsible for any improvements.
Two things are particularly interesting. First, the non-partisan respondents gen-
erally act somewhere in between partisan groups when attributing responsibility to 
the Conservatives, being less likely to attribute success to the Conservatives than 
Conservative partisans, but also less likely to attribute failure to the Conservatives 
than other partisans. However non-partisans act almost exactly the same as other 
partisans when attributing responsibility to the Liberal Democrats, only attributing 











































































Change in the economy
Figure 7.6 Attribution of responsibility for change in the economy
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Second, Liberal Democrat partisans act like other partisans when attributing 
responsibility to the Conservatives, holding the Conservatives relatively more 
responsible when they thought the economy had got worse. Like Conservative 
identifiers, they are also relatively more likely to credit their own party if they 
thought the economy was getting better. Notwithstanding this, in absolute terms, 
Liberal Democrat partisans were equally likely to credit the Conservatives as their 
own party when they thought the economy had got a lot better.
There was little reciprocal generosity from Conservative partisans, who were 
less likely than non-partisans and partisans of other parties to attribute responsi-
bility to the Liberal Democrats for any changes to the economy, except when they 
thought the economy had got a lot worse. An exception to this general pattern 
occurs for the NHS and education, where Conservatives give a tiny bit more 
credit to the Liberal Democrats than other- and non-partisans do.
These results make it clear that the Liberal Democrats suffered from the same 
problem faced by other junior coalition partners—they were not held responsible 
by most voters for the actions of government, and so were unlikely to be rewarded 
for any government successes.
7.4 Explaining the 2015 collapse
We have considered some of the reasons for the Liberal Democrat collapse in 
2015, including the reliance on tactical votes coupled with the desertion of left-
leaning voters; the lack of credit they received for achievements in government; 
the reduced viability resulting from their poor poll showing; and the low level of 
partisan identification. To evaluate how important a role each of these factors 
played, we model the 2015 votes of English respondents who voted Liberal 
Democrat in 2010 in the combined BES 2010–15 panel data.5
We restrict this model to 2010 Liberal Democrat voters because we are primar-
ily interested in the desertion of 2010 Liberal Democrat voters, which contributed 
so heavily to their poor performance in 2015. The loyalty rates of 2010 Liberal 
Democrats was around one in four (as we saw in Figure 7.2), compared to the 
average retention rate between 1964 and 2010 for the Liberal Democrats of three 
in five and of around four in five for Labour and the Conservatives. Of course, 
retention is only half the story—the Liberal Democrats also failed to recruit new 
5 We estimate a multinomial logistic regression restricted to voters in England because the exist-
ence of nationalist parties in Scotland and Wales means those voters have a different choice set. We 
model vote choice in 2015 as a function of variables measured in wave 4 of the BES 2015 panel: feelings 
towards the political parties, the perceived relative chances of the Liberal Democrats winning the 
respondent’s constituency compared to the Conservatives and Labour, perceptions of changes to the 
economy and whether the Liberal Democrats were responsible for those changes, and feelings towards 
Nick Clegg. The results of this model are shown in Table A7.2 in the appendix.
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voters to replace those they had lost. However, trying to estimate who might have 
been recruited to the Liberal Democrats had circumstances been different would 
push the logic of our counterfactual approach beyond what it is capable of showing. 
We therefore focus here on why previous supporters abandoned the Liberal 
Democrats.
Using the model, we then estimate what proportion of 2010 Liberal Democrats 
would have voted Liberal Democrat in 2015 under a series of counterfactual condi-
tions and compare them to the proportion that actually did in reality: 28 per cent. 
These are illustrated in Figure 7.7.
The first counterfactual examines the role of attribution of responsibility for 
changes to the economy. We estimate this counterfactual to test the extent to which 
the Liberal Democrats fell victim to the problem of attribution common to junior 
coalition partners. To do so, we model what the Liberal Democrat vote share 
would have been if everyone held the Liberal Democrats responsible for changes 
to the economy. This represents a ceiling for what the level of attribution of respon-
sibility might be, but, as Figure 7.7 shows, this does next to nothing to the esti-
mated Liberal Democrat retention rate. Indeed, if anything it reduces the Liberal 
Democrat vote slightly, though this difference is not statistically significant. The 
lack of change here is likely to be because in the counterfactual there are more 
people who think the economy got worse holding the Liberal Democrats respon-
sible for this negative change. The Liberal Democrats may have faced difficulty 
getting credit for the achievements of the coalition government, but they also 






























Figure 7.7 Estimates of the proportion of 2010 Liberal Democrat voters voting 
Liberal Democrat in 2015 under different counterfactual conditions
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We estimate the other counterfactuals by substituting the values of the vari ables 
used in the model with the answers the same respondents gave to the same ques-
tions before the 2010 Election. Doing so enables us to answer the question of 
what would have happened in 2015 if respondents still had similar perceptions of 
the Liberal Democrats as they did before they entered the coalition with the 
Conservatives. First, we estimate the effect of feelings towards Nick Clegg. The Clegg 
counterfactual suggests that even if Nick Clegg had been as popular as he was at 
the height of ‘Cleggmania’, on its own this would have made no difference to Liberal 
Democrat losses.
Next, we estimate the effect of changing feelings about the Liberal Democrats 
as a party. The answer, unsurprisingly, is that the Liberal Democrats would have 
retained more of their voters, and would have kept around 42 per cent of those 
who voted Liberal Democrat in 2010, fourteen points more than they did in reality. 
Although this is a large change, it is important to note that even if people still liked 
the Liberal Democrats to the same degree as they did in 2010, the model estimates 
they still would have lost nearly six in ten of their previous voters (considerably 
higher than typical Liberal Democrat losses).
In part this is due to how voters felt about the other parties. It is not just the 
absolute levels of how voters feel about political parties that determines their vote 
but rather how much they like each party relative to the other parties. If feelings 
towards all the parties had stayed the same as their 2010 levels the Liberal Democrats 
would have kept 48 per cent of their vote, an additional 6 points higher than the 
effect of feelings towards the Liberal Democrats alone.
However, even if feelings towards all parties had stayed at the same levels as 
2010 the Liberal Democrats still would have retained substantially fewer voters 
than their usual levels of retention. The final counterfactual points to one reason 
for this—as the perennial third party in British politics, the Liberal Democrats 
have long faced a ‘credibility gap’—whereby people who might otherwise have 
voted Liberal Democrat voted for a different party because they thought they 
stood no chance of winning their constituency. With the collapse of the Liberal 
Democrats in the opinion polls and local elections, it would not be surprising if 
the credibility gap exacerbated the Liberal Democrats collapse. The counterfactual 
analysis supports this idea—if respondents’ perceptions of the relative chances 
of  the Liberal Democrats compared to Labour and the Conservatives were the 
same as their 2010 perceptions, the Liberal Democrats would have kept 58 per cent 
of their vote, which is statistically indistinguishable from their 2005–10 levels of 
retention (and in line with their historical retention rates).
These counterfactuals raise the question of why people’s feelings about the 
Liberal Democrats changed between 2010 and 2015. We are also interested in the 
changes in feelings towards the Liberal Democrats among those who did not vote 
Liberal Democrat in 2010, as these formed the pool of potential recruits. To investi-
gate these questions, we model the change in feelings about the Liberal Democrats 
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between 2010 and 2015 using a linear regression model, controlling for how they 
felt about the Liberal Democrats at the outset (see Table A7.3 in the appendix). 
We focus on a combination of 2010 and 2015 predictors: respondents’ positions on 
the economic left–right and liberal–authoritarian values scales, and whether, and 
how strongly, they identified with the Liberal Democrats before the coalition.
Figure  7.8 shows strong effects for both left–right and liberal–authoritarian 
values. Perhaps unsurprisingly given the widespread perception that the Liberal 
Democrats were an anti-Conservative progressive party, the feeling scores of 
those on the left dropped by about twice as much as those on the right. Conversely 
however, the relationship with liberal–authoritarian values runs in the opposite 
direction—with more authoritarian voters becoming more hostile to the Liberal 
Democrats than liberal voters. In other words, following coalition, the Liberal 
Democrats became more unpopular among more left-wing voters while maintain-
ing popularity among their traditional core support: voters with liberal social values.
Figure  7.9 shows that changes in feelings towards the Liberal Democrats 
depended strongly on prior partisanship, reported before the 2010 Election. 
Conditional on their political values, the largest decrease in liking the Liberal 
Democrats was among those voters who did not identify with the party or only 
identified weakly (who also tended to start from a lower level to begin with). By 
contrast, very strong Liberal Democrat identifiers, on average, liked the party as 
much in 2015 as they had in 2010. This suggests that, had they had a stronger par-
tisan core, the Liberal Democrats would have experienced a much less dramatic 
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Figure 7.8 Change in feelings towards Liberal Democrats 2010–15 by economic 
left–right and liberal–authoritarian values
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Among 2010 Liberal Democrats, we also find that changes in feelings about the 
Liberal Democrats depend on why they voted Liberal Democrat in the first place. 
Those who voted for the Liberal Democrats because they thought they had the 
best policies were the most stable in their feelings about the party (though even 
these dropped by nearly two points), while those who voted Liberal Democrat 
because they liked Nick Clegg, and particularly those who voted tactically for the 
party, experienced the largest drops in support.
7.5 2015–17: The recovery that never happened
After their electoral disaster in 2015, Nick Clegg resigned as leader and was 
replaced with Tim Farron. However, a new leader seemed to do little to repair the 
damage that had been done by the coalition, and the Liberal Democrats con tinued 
to flounder in the polls. Following the EU referendum in 2016 (which we discuss 
in Chapter  9), the Liberal Democrats set out an unambiguously pro-European 
position and called for a second referendum on the terms of Brexit. Glimmers of 
a possible recovery appeared in late 2016 when the Liberal Democrats won the 
Richmond Park by-election, and they began to nudge ever so slightly upwards 
in the polls.
These first shoots of a recovery came to a crashing halt with the announcement 
that there would be an early election in 2017. The Liberal Democrats found them-
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Figure 7.9 Change in feelings towards Liberal Democrats 2010–15 by strength of 
Liberal Democrat identity in 2010
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Labour voters—perhaps seeing no other viable option—began to flood back to 
Labour (Mellon et al. 2018a). The most media attention the Liberal Democrats 
received during the campaign was not of the sort they wanted, as Farron, an 
Evangelical Christian, faced repeated questions about whether he thought gay sex 
was a sin.
The 2017 Election results were a mixed bag for the Liberal Democrats. In terms 
of votes, the 2017 Election saw the further erosion of Liberal Democrat support 
with a decrease in their share by half a percentage point. In terms of seats, the 
result was more positive, as they finished the election with a net gain of four 
seats. However this result hides considerable turnover in Liberal Democrat MPs. 
Half of the 2015 Liberal Democrat seats were lost—including the seat of former 
leader Nick Clegg—as was their recently won by-election seat of Richmond Park. 
These losses were offset by regaining seven seats they had lost in 2015 and one 
they had lost in 2010.
The churn in Liberal Democrat seats is the first clue that there was more 
switching to and from the Liberal Democrats beneath the surface than their similar 
votes shares in 2015 and 2017 would suggest. What the stability in overall vote share 
conceals is that on some measures, the Liberal Democrats experienced a partial 
recovery between 2015 and 2017, but this was offset by further losses. We can see 
this in Figure 7.10, which shows the outflow of Liberal Democrat 2015 voters and 
the origins of their 2017 voters. The key difference between this figure and the 
equivalent plot for 2010–15 (Figure 7.2) is that although the Liberal Democrats 


















Figure 7.10 2015 and 2017 vote choice of 2015 and 2017 Liberal Democrats voters
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by  similar gains from other parties. Relatively speaking, in 2017 the Liberal 
Democrats continued to lose votes to Labour more heavily than to the Conservatives, 
with 29 per cent of their 2015 voters defecting to Labour and 18 per cent to the 
Conservatives. By contrast, in 2017 they recruited more voters from the 
Conservatives (26 per cent of their 2017 vote previously voted Conservative) than 
from Labour (19 per cent).
While Figure 7.10 demonstrates that the Liberal Democrats electoral per form-
ance stabilized in 2017 it does not suggest any hint of return to the pre-coalition 
situation. Our data also indicate (not shown in Figure 7.10) that there was little 
sign of the Liberal Democrats recovering a substantial proportion of those sup-
porters who deserted after the coalition. Only 19 per cent of their 2010 supporters 
voted for them again in 2017, making up around half (52 per cent) of their 2017 
support. These included 32 per cent who had stayed with them in 2015 and a 
further 20 per cent who returned in 2017 having not voted Liberal Democrat 
in 2015. However, these returners represented only 10 per cent of all those who 
had deserted the Liberal Democrats in 2015. In other words, the damage done by 
the 2010 coalition shock to Liberal Democrat support persisted in 2017.
When we examined the 2015 collapse of the Liberal Democrats, our counter-
factuals suggested that two factors were particularly important in explaining the 
collapse in the Liberal Democrat vote in 2015: how people felt about the party 
and how well people expected the Liberal Democrats to do in their constituency. 
We examine how each of these factors changed in 2017 in turn.
First, we examine how feelings towards the Liberal Democrats changed between 
2015 and 2017 using the same model we used to examine changes between 2010 
and 2015 (see Table A7.3 in the appendix). Figure 7.11 shows the predicted level of 
change in feelings towards the Liberal Democrats by economic left–right and 
liberal–authoritarian values. For left–right values, there is a gentle slope indicating 
that economically left-wing people increased their liking of the Liberal Democrats 
slightly more than right-wing people. The most important aspect of this relation-
ship, though, is its relative flatness—people across the economic dimension were 
likely to feel more positively about the Liberal Democrats in 2017 than they did in 
2015. By contrast, there is a much steeper relationship between feelings towards 
the Liberal Democrat and liberal–authoritarian values, as liberals became more 
favourably disposed towards the Liberal Democrats in the two years after the 2015 
Election while social conservatives stayed more or less where they were.
We also know authoritarians became much more negative about the Liberal 
Democrats from 2010 to 2015 (as shown earlier in Figure  7.8). Together these 
changes mean that Liberal Democrat support was much more closely aligned with 
political values than it had been before they entered the coalition (Figure 7.12). In 
2010, on the economic left–right dimension, feelings towards the Liberal Democrats 
were relatively even across the left and centre of the scale before dropping off on 
the right-hand side of the scale. Following the coalition with the Conservatives, 
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in 2015 there was a much greater drop in pro-Liberal Democrat feelings on the 
left-hand side of the scale than on the right (as shown earlier in Figure 7.8). In 
2017 there was an uneven recovery (Figure 7.11) as feelings towards the Liberal 
Democrats recovered on the left, leaving a peak in the centre of the distribution 





 ← Left-wing Right-wing → ← Liberal Authoritarian →



















Figure 7.11 Change in feelings towards Liberal Democrats 2015–17 by economic 
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Figure 7.12 Relationship between economic left–right and liberal–authoritarian 
values and feelings towards the Liberal Democrats in 2010, 2015, and 2017
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pattern similar to that seen in 2010 but at a considerably lower level of favourability. 
On the liberal–authoritarian dimension, the Liberal Democrats have always been 
more popular on the liberal end of the scale, but with a larger fall among social 
conservatives in 2015 (Figure 7.8) and a stronger recovery among social liberals in 
2017 (Figure 7.11), feelings towards the Liberal Democrats were much more closely 
aligned with liberal–authoritarian values than they had been previously. This sug-
gests the Liberal Democrat party post-coalition was much more reliant on a trad-
itional liberal support base rather than on the anti-Conservative centre-left voters 
that had driven its support before 2010. Undoubtedly this uneven recovery was 
partly driven by attitudes towards Brexit which, as we show in Chapter 9, are 
strongly related to liberal–authoritarian values.
Earlier we showed that a lack of Liberal Democrat Party identification made 
the party more vulnerable to decline in 2015. But how did their soft base affect 
their recovery in 2017? We can investigate this by looking at how feelings changed 
among pre-coalition Liberal Democrat identifiers (Figure 7.13). This shows a mirror 
image of the 2010–15 relationship (Figure 7.9), with the least change among none 
and other party identifiers and increasing positive changes as Liberal Democrat 
identity gets stronger. This suggests that their weak partisan base may also have 
contributed to the failure to recover in 2017.
Even though the Liberal Democrat recovery was lopsided, overall, they were 
more popular in 2017 than 2015, with mean likes scores increasing from 3.4 to 3.8. 
How then, can we explain why their vote share actually went down in 2017? The 
answer is largely due to the fact that, in most seats, the Liberal Democrats were 























None/Other Not very strong Fairly strong Very strong
Liberal Democrat Party Identity Strength
Figure 7.13 Change in feelings towards Liberal Democrats 2015–17 by strength of 
Liberal Democrat identity in 2010
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expectations of how well they would do in respondents’ constituencies in 2010, 
2015, and 2017, we can see that the Liberal Democrats’ ‘expectation gap’ problem 
got worse between elections. Figure  7.14 plots the perceived likelihood of the 
Liberal Democrats winning a respondent’s constituency against the rank ordering 
of Liberal Democrat vote share in that seat at the previous election. Between 2010 
and 2015 there was a sharp drop in how well voters thought the Liberal Democrats 
would do in their constituencies across the board. Between 2015 and 2017 we see a 
curious pattern. In places where the Liberal Democrats had no chance of winning, 
expectations recovered slightly (we might think of this improvement as going 
from ‘no chance’ to ‘next to no chance’). In the seats where the Liberal Democrats 
had the best chance of winning (based on previous per form ance), their perceived 
likelihood of winning actually fell even further.
As we discussed earlier, overcoming the expectations gap has been a perennial 
problem for the Liberal Democrats. Participation in coalition not only destroyed 
their good standing with many of their potential supporters, it also damaged their 
credibility as a viable electoral force. Some of the electorate seemed at least par-
tially willing to forgive the Liberal Democrats by 2017, and they had been gaining 
steady ground in local and parliamentary by-elections, but perhaps the election 
came too early for them.
We can put all of these factors together by running a model of Liberal Democrat 
vote choice in 2017 (see Table A7.4 in the appendix) and estimating a series of 
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Figure 7.14 Perceived likelihood of Liberal Democrats winning a respondent’s 
constituency in 2010, 2015, and 2017 by rank of Liberal Democrat vote share at 
previous election
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model. Because of the different context of the 2017 Election, unlike the earlier 
model, here we include both defections and recruitment to see the overall effect 
of the change in attitudes towards the Liberal Democrats. These counterfactuals 
are shown in Figure 7.15, and show clearly that we cannot explain the failure of 
the Liberal Democrats to perform better by any single factor. Instead, it was the 
combination of feelings towards the Liberal Democrats, feelings towards other 
parties, and perceptions of Liberal Democrat viability.
The counterfactuals estimate that, on their own, feelings towards the Liberal 
Democrat leader would have made no difference to Liberal Democrat performance. 
If feelings towards the Liberal Democrats had recovered to 2010 levels, the 
Liberal Democrats would have gained an additional 5.2 percentage points of the 
vote. Combined with feelings towards other parties, this would have increased 
by an additional 2.8 points, and with perceptions of viability adding a further 
3.6 points. Taken together, this would have meant a doubling of the Liberal Democrat 
vote share, putting them roughly back on par with their 2010 performance.
7.6 Conclusion
After five years of coalition government, the 2015 Election saw the dramatic collapse 
of the Liberal Democrat vote—seeming to confirm Disraeli’s adage that Britain 
‘does not love coalitions’. However, a more nuanced examination of what happened 
between 2010 and 2015 suggests that the collapse of the Liberal Democrats was 
Observed 2017 vote share
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Figure 7.15 Estimated proportion voting Liberal Democrat in 2017 under different 
counterfactual conditions
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due to the nature of this specific coalition, and not because Britain in general is 
somehow unsuited to coalition government.
Our analysis shows that the Liberal Democrats faced a problem common to 
junior coalition partners in other countries—the difficulty of claiming credit for 
government success. Voters were much more likely to hold the Conservatives 
responsible for both positive and negative changes in multiple policy areas.
Going into coalition government was particularly damaging to the Liberal 
Democrats because of the nature of their support base—characterized by low 
 levels of partisanship, a centre-left and socially liberal bias in political values, and 
a heavy reliance on tactical support. This made the Liberal Democrats unsuited to 
withstand the electoral costs of coalition participation, especially coalition with 
the Conservatives.
Perhaps the most noticeable symptom of this was an uneven drop in support, 
with economically left-wing voters turning against the party in 2015. Added to 
this, low levels of partisanship meant that many Liberal Democrat voters viewed 
the compromises and trade-offs inherent in coalition government unfiltered by a 
favourable ‘partisan screen’. Perhaps even more problematically for the Liberal 
Democrats, a large proportion of their voters saw their participation in coalition 
through the lens of Labour partisanship—something unlikely to result in a 
favourable view of the Liberal Democrats in coalition with the Conservatives, 
regardless of their achievements in government.
The nature of the pre-coalition Liberal Democrat support base also acted as a 
brake on their recovery after 2015. Strong Liberal Democrat partisans were rela-
tively quick to forgive the Liberal Democrats, with their feelings towards them 
returning to pre-coalition levels by the time of the 2017 Election. However there 
were very few of these voters, and non-partisan and tactical supporters were much 
less forgiving. The nature of politics in the aftermath of the EU referendum—
which we will discuss in detail in Chapter  9—also contributed to the un even 
nature of the Liberal Democrat recovery. Feelings towards the Liberal Democrats 
recovered substantially among social liberals, who saw eye to eye with the Liberal 
Democrats on Brexit. More socially conservative voters, many of whom had given 
the Liberal Democrats tactical support in the past (an aspect of the Liberal 
Democrat vote that has perhaps been poorly understood), were much less forgiving.
Absolution was not the only challenge faced by the Liberal Democrats in 2015 
and 2017. The collapse of support for the Liberal Democrats in the polls and their 
losses in local elections over the 2010–15 Parliament created a vicious cycle for the 
Liberal Democrats, first in 2015 and continuing into 2017. As their support plum-
meted, the Liberal Democrats looked a less good bet for tactical voters hoping to 
block a rival party from winning seats. We showed that perceptions of the likeli-
hood of the Liberal Democrats winning local constituencies had a significant 
impact on whether 2010 Liberal Democrats chose to vote for the Liberal Democrats 
again in 2015, regardless of changes in voters’ feelings towards them. The same 
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was true in 2017. Although there were glimmers of a recovery in late 2016, they 
were not enough to overcome perceptions that the Liberal Democrats were 
unlikely to win in most seats.
Looking at the bigger picture, the electoral fortunes of the Liberal Democrats 
are closely tied with the rise—and sudden collapse—of party system fragmenta-
tion in British elections. The rising vote share for ‘other’ parties since 1970 was in 
large part due to increasing support for the Liberal Democrats. The collapse of 
the Liberal Democrats had two seemingly contradictory effects on party system 
fragmentation. In 2015, former Liberal Democrat voters helped to prop up sup-
port for Labour and the Conservatives, but also boosted the shares of the other 
small parties—UKIP, the Greens, and the SNP.
In 2017, when these other small parties faced challenges of their own, the 
absence of a viable third party option in the Liberal Democrats meant that many 
voters had nowhere to turn but to the Conservatives or Labour. It was not imme-
diately obvious, but the collapse of the Liberal Democrats was the first step in the 
sudden contraction of the British party system that took place in 2017.
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A Tale of Two Referendums
One of the most significant factors behind the fragmentation of party support at 
the 2015 General Election was the success of the SNP and the collapse of Scottish 
Labour. The 2015 Election was Labour’s worst performance in Scotland in terms 
of vote share since 1918 and the best ever achieved by the SNP. By 2017, although the 
SNP gains had receded from the high of 2015, the picture in Scotland had changed 
fundamentally. The Conservatives, who had held no more than a single Scottish 
seat since 1992, pushed Labour into third place. Scotland has seen unique levels of 
volatility in recent general elections and these changes, and their ex plan ation, are 
an essential part of understanding GB-wide change.
The SNP’s share of the nationwide vote increased from 1.6 per cent in 2010 to 
4.7 per cent in 2015, making a large contribution to the rise in challenger-party 
voting at the national level. However, the local picture was even more dramatic. In 
2010, Labour won forty-one of fifty-nine seats in Scotland with over 40 per cent of 
the Scottish vote, while the SNP won only six seats with 20 per cent of the vote. 
In 2015, Labour could muster only 24 per cent of the popular vote and a single 
Westminster seat, while the SNP won 50 per cent of the vote and all but three of 
the fifty-nine Scottish seats. The SNP landslide made them the third lar gest party 
in the Westminster Parliament. Much of this success persisted into the 2017 General 
Election but the SNP’s vote share fell by thirteen percentage points between 2015 
and 2017 to 37 per cent and the party lost twenty-one of their fifty-six seats. The 
main beneficiaries were the Scottish Conservatives, whose vote doubled to 29 per 
cent and who gained thirteen seats. Scottish Labour’s vote recovered slightly to 
27 per cent, but they won only seven seats, making them only the third largest party.
What precipitated these dramatic changes in electoral fortunes? In this chapter, 
we consider how an electoral shock—the Scottish independence referendum—
altered the basis of political alignments in Scotland. We demonstrate that the 
referendum brought about a shift in the underlying structure of political alle-
giances through widespread changes to political identities and the nature of their 
relationship to party support. We show how the referendum acted as a catalyst 
for Labour’s collapse in Scotland in 2015, leading to a realignment of voters 
and parties according to whether they supported Scottish independence. This 
realignment occurred primarily because the referendum aligned attitudes towards 
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independence and party choice more closely rather than because it substantially 
increased support for independence. Having voted in favour of Scottish inde-
pendence, Yes supporters appeared unable to reconcile themselves with supporting 
a unionist political party.
Scottish electoral politics was further disrupted by the EU referendum in 2016, 
which cut across both traditional party lines and the emergent independence 
divide. This second shock led to a largely unexpected Conservative revival at the 
2017 General Election. As in the rest of Britain, the EU referendum drew voters 
back to the main parties, reversing the fragmentation of 2015 (see Chapter 9) but 
maintaining high levels of electoral volatility.
This, then, is the tale of how two referendums—and two electoral shocks—can 
help explain dramatic political changes in the 2015 and 2017 General Elections, as 
they unfolded in Scotland.
This first part of the chapter examines the impact of the Scottish referendum 
on voting in the 2015 General Election. We then consider how the EU referendum 
brought about a Conservative resurgence in Scotland in 2017.
8.1 The independence referendum: An electoral shock
The Scottish independence referendum took place on 18 September 2014 and was 
the result of a long-running campaign for independence led by the SNP since their 
formation in 1934. The Scottish government announced the decision to hold the 
referendum following the SNP victory in the Scottish Parliamentary Elections 
of 2011. It required the agreement of the UK Parliament, which the coalition gov-
ernment in Westminster formally provided in the 2012 Edinburgh agreement.
Formally, both campaigns were non-partisan, but the major Westminster par-
ties (and their Scottish counterparts) all lined up to back the Better Together cam-
paign, while the SNP dominated the Yes Scotland campaign, although Yes Scotland 
did involve members of other parties including the Scottish Greens and Labour 
for Independence. The result of the referendum saw the pro-Union (‘Better 
Together’) side winning by a margin of 55 per cent to 45 per cent, despite a dramatic 
narrowing of their lead in the polls in the run-up to referendum day. The referen-
dum followed a hard-fought campaign and the turnout rate of 85 per cent—the 
highest ever recorded for a vote in Scotland—underlined the high level of engage-
ment across the electorate.
Many of Labour’s electoral problems were brewing well before the referendum 
was announced. Although Labour had won the majority of Scottish seats in every 
general election since 1959, they had come second to the SNP in the Scottish 
Parliamentary elections in 2007 and 2011. Notwithstanding this, Labour had 
enjoyed a comfortable lead in the opinion polls (for Westminster elections) in 
Scotland throughout the period from the 2011 Scottish Parliament Election through 
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to April 2014, when the referendum campaign was in full swing (Figure  8.1). 
However, from then on the picture changed dramatically. The referendum cam-
paign seemed to damage Labour’s popularity, which continued to erode right 
through to the 2015 General Election, which delivered Labour’s worst defeat in 
Scotland since 1918. There was very little sign of recovery for Labour in 2017 
when  they fell into third place behind the Conservatives. The most dramatic 
period of decline for Labour immediately followed the referendum, which 
reflected a strengthening of the alignment between independence referendum 
voting and party choice in the immediate post-referendum period.
8.2 Labour’s decline, 2014–15
The decline in Labour’s popularity was not spread evenly across the population. 
Data from the BES internet panel and the Scottish Referendum Study (SRS) 
(Henderson et al. 2014) reveal that the referendum had little impact on the voting 
intentions of Scots who voted against independence (Figure  8.2). Rather, the 
shifts in Scottish voting behaviour occurred primarily among those who sup-
ported independence: large numbers of whom deserted Labour and switched 
their allegiance to the SNP.
Figure  8.2 shows that while around two-thirds of Yes voters intended to 





























Figure 8.1 SNP, Labour, and The Conservatives in the polls: Westminster voting 
intention, March 2011–June 2017
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approximately 20 per cent still intended to vote Labour. Despite the SNP lead 
among pro-independence voters, Labour’s comfortable lead among unionists 
meant that Labour was still ahead in the opinion polls at the start of 2014. 
The  picture changed very little in May following the European Parliamentary 
Elections, in which the SNP won the most votes in Scotland by a margin over 
Labour of 29 per cent to 25 per cent: a narrower victory than in the 2009 European 
elections. After the independence referendum in September 2014, however, a 
dramatic change occurred: 83 per cent of Yes voters now intended to vote SNP 
(an increase of 13 points compared to the immediately pre-referendum wave) 
compared to only 6 per cent who intended to vote Labour (a decrease of 5 points 
from the pre-referendum wave). By the time of the General Election in 2015 
90 per cent of Yes voters reported voting for the SNP.
8.3 From referendum voting to party choice
In Chapter 3, we set out how major political events can act as shocks that alter the 
structure of political alignments. In this chapter, we explore the mechanisms by 
which one such event—the Scottish independence referendum—had precisely 
this effect. By choosing sides in the referendum, many voters faced potentially 
conflicting political loyalties, and were therefore forced to reconsider both their 
partisan allegiances and their political values. For example, could Labour identi-









































Figure 8.2 General election vote intention of Yes and No voters, 2014–15
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opposing the Labour backed ‘No’ campaign, with continuing to support Labour? 
In short, the answer appears to be ‘no’.
The most common understanding of electoral behaviour is that people cast 
votes that reflect their political preferences and party attachments. Previous 
research has shown that the reverse causal ordering can also be true: the act of 
casting a vote for a party may lead to changes in voters’ attachments to parties 
(Markus and Converse 1979; Dinas 2014). This is one way in which second-order 
elections—where the ‘costs’ of voting for different parties are lower—provide 
opportunities for small parties to gain support and increase their perceived via-
bility in subsequent first-order elections (Farrer 2015; Prosser 2016b; MacAllister, 
Fieldhouse, and Russell 2002).
Referendums present a rather different set of circumstances and opportunities, 
but they have the potential for influencing first-order elections in a similar fashion. 
The main difference is that a referendum is not a straightforward competition 
between parties. In this sense, we might expect the potential for spillover to be 
reduced. For example, if parties are not in direct competition with each other, the 
result cannot act as a guide to voters about electoral viability and hence stra-
tegic voting. However, if a referendum is structured by party competition—that 
is, the political parties are openly campaigning on one side of the debate or the 
other—then a referendum campaign might expose previously latent issues in 
party choice, raising the salience of a potentially cross-cutting political cleavage. 
For example, the Parti Quebecois enjoyed an increase in both vote share and seats 
in the 1981 Quebec provincial elections (Clarke 1983) that followed the unsuccess-
ful 1976 referendum campaign.
Insights from political and social psychology help explain why attitudes and 
attachments might shift as a result of political behaviour. Voters engage in  mo tiv ated 
reasoning in order to reconcile new political information with their pre-existing 
views and behaviours (Lodge and Taber  2013). Motivated reasoning tends to 
increase the stability of political attitudes and alignments, and the act of voting can 
buttress voters’ affective orientations towards a pre-existing attitude or af li ation. 
For example, partisanship can be reinforced by voting because voting provides 
signals about group identity, which in turn strengthens partisan ties (Dinas 2014). 
However, the same process can lead to a change in political attitudes and align-
ments in the event of one-off or idiosyncratic political behaviours. For example, 
Bølstad et al. (2013) find a positive effect of tactical voting on preferences for the 
party voted for, attributing this to the reduction of cognitive dis son ance: having 
voted for a party it is harder to dislike that party and it is easier to like it.
In political psychology, partisan identification has been likened to social iden-
tity (Greene  1999; Huddy  2001; Greene  2004; Huddy, Mason, and Aarøe  2015; 
Huddy 2013). Social Identity Theory (Tajfel and Turner 1979; Tajfel 1981) suggests 
that a person’s perceptions of other members of a group can affect their attitudes 
and norms through a process of self-categorization and meta-contrast whereby 
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group members maximize inter-group differentiation and minimize within-group 
differentiation (Turner et al. 1987). Self-categorization may therefore lead a per-
son to more strongly differentiate between their own party and its opponents 
(Duck, Hogg, and Terry 1995; Greene 2004). Moreover, an individual’s behaviour 
may reinforce their group identification (if the behaviour is aligned with their 
identity), especially when that behaviour is public.
If political partisanship can form the basis of social identity and self- 
categorization, it seems plausible that other salient political divisions might also 
act as a basis for social identities. In the case of the Scottish referendum, the cam-
paign and the position that citizens adopted was highly salient and socially sig-
nificant. The referendum therefore had the potential to make Yes-voting Labour 
sup porters regard Labour as part of an out-group (‘unionists’), and the SNP as 
an  in-group (‘nationalists’). Competing social identities could lead to a switch 
or  weakening of party identification among Labour supporters who voted Yes. 
Certainly, such a shift would reduce the cognitive dissonance of combining pro-
Labour and pro-independence identities. This dissonance (and its resolution) is 
nicely summed up by a quotation from a Yes voter on whatscotlandthinks.org: ‘I am 
a trade unionist and coming from a Labour supporting background I should be 
red through and through but I could never vote for such a bunch of lying toe rags.’
By shifting the basis of voter identity from being defined by a party to an alter-
native form of self-categorization (nationalist versus unionist), the referendum 
weakened the salience of traditional partisanship. Moreover, an increase in the 
salience of a new group identity (e.g. ‘nationalists’ or ‘Yes voters’) can override the 
attitudes and norms associated with other groups the person identifies with 
(Mullen, Brown, and Smith  1992; Eifert, Miguel, and Posner  2010). In other 
words, citizens moved their attitudes and norms into line with those of their new 
identity. In the case of Yes voting, these attitudes and norms would be feeling 
more Scottish, more pro-independence, and less favourably inclined towards 
those on the unionist side—including the Labour Party.
While it is possible for citizens to hold multiple political identities, it seems 
likely that identifying with the Yes campaign (or as a nationalist-separatist) 
might supplant existing party identities because these identities came into direct 
conflict with Labour identification. This is particularly the case given the high 
salience of Scottish independence and the strong identity-basis of the Scottish 
independence campaign.
8.4 Labour’s dwindling base
The crucial shift we wish to explain in this chapter is the exodus of Labour voters 
between spring 2014 and May 2015. Comparing wave 1 (February 2014) and wave 
6 (May 2015) of the internet panel, we find that one third of all those who 
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 supported Labour in early 2014 shifted to the SNP by the time of the 2015 General 
Election, and these made up 12 per cent of all Scottish voters. This is not to say 
that there was no important change prior to 2014, but the 2015 BES panel data 
(which started in February 2014) is still able to capture a substantial proportion of 
the shift from Labour to the SNP. Because of our interest in the collapse of Labour 
voting in 2015, in the following analysis, we focus on Scots who intended to vote 
Labour when we first interviewed them in 2014. Figure 8.3 provides an illustra-
tion of how Yes voters in this group intended to vote in Westminster elections at 
two key moments (immediately prior to the referendum, and immediately after 
the referendum), and how they actually voted at the 2015 Election. The thickness 
of each block is proportional to the size of the group, with the darker blocks indi-
cating those intending to vote Labour and the lighter blocks indicating those 
intending to vote SNP (and actually doing so in the final time point).
Immediately before the referendum, about two-thirds of previously Labour-
supporting Yes voters were still intending to vote Labour, a proportion which 
dropped to less than half in the immediate aftermath of the referendum. By the 
time of the 2015 Election, Labour only hung onto a small minority of its previous 
supporters on the Yes side: around four in five Yes voters who had intended to 
vote Labour fifteen months earlier voted for the SNP in 2015.
As we discussed in Chapter  4, the independence referendum took place in 












Figure 8.3 Flow of votes between Labour and SNP for initially Labour-supporting 
Yes voters between key periods in the run-up and aftermath of the Scottish 
independence referendum
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mo tiv ation to resolve conflicting demands in ways which maintain existing 
 identities and so we would expect fewer strong Labour identifiers to defect to the 
SNP after the referendum, which is what we see in Table 8.1. However, such was 
the im port ance of the referendum that even a majority of very strong Labour 
identifiers in February 2014 who voted Yes switched to the SNP (but did so at a 
rate more than 20 points lower than non-identifiers).
For ‘No’ supporters, we would not expect a conflict between their political 
identities—voting No was perfectly compatible with continued support for the 
unionist Labour and Conservative parties—and so we would expect less switch-
ing between parties following the referendum.
The preceding analyses have shown how voting for independence was closely 
related to shifts in attitudes and party support in the run-up to and after the refer-
endum. We are interested in whether the referendum as a shock had an effect on 
vote choice, and if so, whether this was due to a change in people’s attitudes and 
identities, or a change in the relationship between those attitudes and identities 
and vote choice. To investigate this, we turn to multivariate longitudinal models 
to provide evidence of the most likely direction of causal effects. These models 
allow us to estimate the effects of variables we are interested in on referendum 
vote choice as well as the reverse, so we are able to get a good picture of any two-
way relationship.1 In other words, we can show how attitudes, evaluations, and 
identities informed referendum vote choice, and in turn how these were affected 
by that vote choice.
8.5 The independence referendum effect
Our key objective is to measure the effect of Independence Referendum voting 
in tention and referendum vote on switching to the SNP, while controlling for those 
1 Although we cannot completely isolate the causal effect due to the possibility of reciprocal  causality, 
our cross-lagged models minimize this problem by measuring the explanatory variables in the 
 preceding time point and by allowing us to control for lagged versions of the dependent variable. 
A simplified illustration of the structure of these models is shown in Figure A8.1 in the appendix.
Table 8.1 Proportion of Labour/Yes voters switching to the 
SNP by pre-referendum Labour party identity strength
Labour Identity Strength % Voting SNP in 2015
None/Other party 83
Not very strong 80
Fairly strong 79
Very strong 61
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factors (measured in the previous wave) that affected referendum vote, as well as 
other factors that might have precipitated switching.
Before examining the impact of the referendum on the outcomes of interest, 
we should note that many of the factors that influenced general election vote 
choice also influenced referendum voting. Explaining referendum vote choice 
is  not the main aim of this chapter, but it is worth noting that, controlling for 
prior referendum vote intention, the main influences on referendum vote in 
May 2014 were devolution preferences2 and feelings towards the party leaders 
(see Table A8.2 in the appendix for the full results of the cross-lagged model). 
Prior to the referendum, approval of the Scottish government and hypothetical 
economic expectations also played a role in predicting referendum vote intention. 
Referendum vote was also influenced by devolution preferences, satisfaction with 
UK democracy, and expectations about the Scottish economy if Scotland became 
independent.
Our models also account for vote intention at the previous wave, vote at the 
2010 Westminster and 2011 Holyrood elections, British and Scottish national 
identity, approval of Scottish government performance, party leader like scores, 
devolution preferences, and satisfaction with democracy in the UK. Given these 
very comprehensive controls, it is perhaps not surprising that referendum vote 
intention has no significant impact on general election vote intention in the first 
wave, and is only marginally significant in the second wave. However after the 
referendum had taken place, referendum voting has a statistically significant and 
substantively large effect in every subsequent wave. We illustrate the impact of 
referendum vote (intention in pre-referendum waves) on switching to the SNP if 
the respondent did not intend to vote SNP in the previous wave in Figure 8.4. 
The plot shows a large increase in the effect of referendum vote between the 
pre-referendum and post-referendum waves. This suggests that voting in the 
referendum—nailing one’s colours to the mast in that election—had a greater 
effect on party choice than intention alone. More specifically, voting Yes directly 
led to an increase in the probability of voting SNP in the 2015 General Election 
among erstwhile Labour supporters. Referendum vote continues to predict 
switching in the further post-referendum waves, but the effect has a declining 
magnitude as the election approaches. The size of the effect declines before May 
2015, reflecting the fact that, by that point, all but a handful of Yes voters had 
already switched to the SNP (as shown in Figure 8.2).
2 These were measured on a latent scale estimated with an IRT model, using respondent prefer-
ences for whether the Scottish government should have control of different policy areas (Welfare, the 
NHS, Defence, Tax, and Policing), see Table A8.1 in the appendix.
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8.6 Changing identities?
In February 2014, 89 per cent of our cohort of Labour supporters identified with 
the party, but this fell to 75 per cent by March 2015 and 65 per cent by May 2015 
(post-election). However, this fall occurred mainly within those who voted Yes in 
September 2014: Labour identity among Yes voters in this group fell from 84 per cent 
in February 2014 to 37 per cent in May 2015. Although Labour identification also 
fell among No voters, the equivalent drop was much smaller, from 90 per cent to 
77 per cent.
To reveal the extent to which these shifts in identity result from referendum 
voting or from some other change in attitudes or evaluations we look to our 
model. Figure  8.5 shows the impact of referendum vote on identifying with 
Labour and the SNP, allowing for the same control variables as the vote choice 
models. The pattern is very similar to that seen for the effect of the referendum on 
switching to the SNP: before the referendum there is no clear and consistent effect 
of referendum vote intention on identifying with Labour. However, following the 
referendum, those who voted Yes were less likely to continue to identify with 
Labour in every subsequent wave.
We cannot model SNP identity before the referendum vote for the simple rea-
son that there are so few SNP identifiers among our cohort of Labour supporters. 
























































May 2014 Pre-referendum         
Post-referendum
March 2015 May 2015
Figure 8.4 The average marginal effect of referendum Yes vote (intention) on 
switching to the SNP if not intending to vote SNP in the previous wave
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with the SNP. Nearly half (45 per cent) of this group (all of whom had intended to 
vote Labour in February 2014) who voted for independence identified with the 
SNP by the time of the General Election in May 2015. Thus, the referendum also 
had an indirect effect on party choice at the general election through its influence 
on party identification. Indeed, it is worth noting that in the 2015 post-election 
wave, SNP party identity was a very strong predictor of switching to the SNP for 
the first time.
8.7 Changing evaluations and attitudes
Changes in party support and identification do not occur in isolation from political 
attitudes and evaluations. Table 8.2 shows the aggregate change in various attitudes 
among our cohort of Labour supporters between the start of our study in 
February 2014 and March 2015 (pre-election). There are large changes in the 
approval of the Scottish government, feelings towards the party leaders, and party 
identity, especially among those intending to vote for independence. Just over half 
(55 per cent) of the Yes-voting respondents approved of the Scottish government 
in February 2014, and this increased to nearly three-quarters (74 per cent) in 
March 2015. Yes voters became more negative in their feelings about Ed Miliband 
after the referendum, while No voters were stable in their opinions. The largest 
changes are how Yes and No voters felt about the SNP leaders. Before the refer-
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Figure 8.5 The average marginal effect of referendum Yes vote (intention) on 
identifying with Labour and the SNP
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about Alex Salmond, with Yes voters on average liking Salmond by 3.1 points 
more than No voters. Before the 2015 Election, Yes voters on average liked 
Sturgeon by 4.8 points more than No voters.3 Although there were only small net 
changes in Scottishness, Britishness, and satisfaction with UK democracy, changes 
in Britishness and satisfaction with UK democracy moved in opposite directions 
for Yes and No voters, with Yes voters becoming more Scottish and No  voters 
more British. Scottishness, on the other hand, increased slightly among both Yes 
and No voters. It is also worth noting that the percentage of these who intended 
to vote Yes among February 2014 Labour supporters was only 17 per cent, but 
28 per cent reported voting Yes in September 2014.
Together these findings suggest that referendum voting precipitated a change 
in attitudes towards devolution, evaluations of Scottish government performance, 
satisfaction with UK democracy, Scottish and British identities, ratings of pol it ical 
leaders, as well as directly affecting vote choice and partisan identification. To test 
this more thoroughly, we modelled these variables as dependent variables in the 
same modelling framework (Table A8.2).4 What we find is that all the ex plana tory 
variables from our vote choice model were predicted by referendum vote choice 
3 In part these changes also reflect the fact that, on average, people liked Nicola Sturgeon more 
than Alex Salmond. Measured in the post-referendum wave (the only time point we have ratings for 
both leaders), Yes voters had a mean rating for Sturgeon of 5.9 and Salmond of 5.5 and No voters rated 
Sturgeon 2.1 and Salmond 1.4. Interestingly, No voters also liked Nicola Sturgeon more after the refer-
endum than before it, though their overwhelming feeling was still negative.
4 The explanatory variables include the lagged version of the dependent variable, party identifica-
tion, referendum vote choice/intention, and the same range of controls as previously.
Table 8.2 Aggregate changes in attitudes by wave (Labour t1 supporters)













Scottishness (1–7) 5.4 5.5 6 6.1 5.2 5.3
Britishness (1–7) 5.4 5.5 4.4 4.3 5.8 5.9
Devolution preferences  
(z score)
−0.2 −0.2 0.3 0.4 −0.4 −0.4
Approve of Scottish 
government (%)
25.4 35.9 55 74.4 13.3 21
Satisfied with UK 
democracy (1–4)
2.4 2.3 2 1.9 2.5 2.4
Like Miliband (0–10) 5.9 5.6 5.6 4.7 6 6
Like Salmond/Sturgeon 
(0–10)
2.6 4 4.8 7.5 1.7 2.7
Identify with Labour (%) 88.6 75.2 84 50 90.3 84.7
Identify with SNP (%) 2.3 10.7 6.7 35.3 0.6 1.5
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throughout the period, with the exception of Scottish national identity, which was 
only significantly affected by referendum vote in the immediate aftermath of the 
referendum. In other words, through Yes voting, the referendum helped shift atti-
tudes in favour of the SNP by leading to a reduction in British identity, increased 
approval of the Scottish government, preference for a more radical devolution of 
powers, and a reduction in satisfaction with UK democracy. One example of how 
attitudes were influenced by referendum voting over the period is illustrated in 
Figure 8.6 which shows how referendum voting was associated with a decrease in 
feelings of Britishness (and to a lesser extent an increase in Scottishness), espe-
cially immediately after the referendum.
Social Identity Theory suggests that feelings towards leaders are strongly influ-
enced by their position as in-group members (Hogg 2001; Haslam, Reicher, and 
Platow 2010). Figure 8.7 illustrates the effect of referendum Yes vote (intention) 
on how voters felt about Ed Miliband and the leader of the SNP (Salmond 
before and immediately after the referendum, Sturgeon before the 2015 Election). 
Referendum vote (intention) is a strong influence on how voters felt about party 
leaders, particularly the leaders of the Yes side and the SNP. An almost identical 
pattern is found for approval of the Scottish government (not shown), the effect 
of which also peaked in the immediate run-up to the referendum.
In the following section we explore how, by altering the distribution and align-
ment of political attitudes and evaluations, referendum voting indirectly led to an 
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Figure 8.6 Average marginal effect of referendum Yes vote (intention) on national 
identity (1–7 scale)
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8.8 What if the referendum never happened?
Did people switch to the SNP because the referendum led to changes in the 
underlying attitudes that underpinned their vote choice, or were their attitudes 
relatively stable while the relationship between attitudes and vote choice changed? 
In order to further illuminate how the referendum affected the 2015 General 
Election voting, we decompose the shift in party support as a result of the refer-
endum into (i) changes in the distribution of attitudes, evaluations, and identities 
and (ii) changes in the alignment of attitudes and party choice.
We estimate the predicted share of the vote the SNP might have achieved under 
a series of counterfactual conditions, where post-referendum data about the atti-
tudes and preferences shown in Table 8.2 are substituted for the same respond-
ents’ pre-referendum data in a (pre-referendum) model of SNP vote intention 
(see Table A8.3 in the appendix for the results of this model). From this, we can 
see how much change in voters’ attitudes, evaluations, and identities contributes 
to the increase in SNP support, as opposed to any change in how those attitudes 
align with vote choice.
Figure 8.8 shows the predicted proportion of 2010 Labour voters voting SNP in 
the pre- and post-referendum models. The proportion intending to vote SNP in 
the pre-referendum model (May 2014) was 13 per cent while the proportion who 
actually voted SNP was 33 per cent. The first two counterfactuals—holding refer-
endum vote and political attitudes at pre-referendum levels—both show negli-
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Figure 8.7 Average marginal effect of referendum Yes vote (intention) on feelings 
towards Labour and SNP party leaders (0–10 scale)
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13.8 per cent and 13.4 per cent respectively, neither of which is statistically 
 significantly different to the actual pre-referendum proportion). The counterfac-
tuals indicate that party identity and leader ratings account for part of the increase 
in SNP support: the predicted proportions were 16 per cent and 20 per cent 
respectively, both of which are statistically significantly different to the baseline. 
Combining all the counterfactual conditions together gives a predicted propor-
tion of 23.9 per cent—an increase of 10.3 percentage points—just over half of the 
actual 20 percentage point change.
It is clear from this counterfactual analysis that changes to underlying attitudes—
such as national identity, preferences for devolution, satisfaction with British 
democracy, and approval of the Scottish government—play only a small part in 
explaining the sudden rise of the SNP after the referendum. Instead, changes in 
variables relating to political identity—partisanship and feelings towards political 
leaders—can explain about half the shift of Labour voters to the SNP after the 
referendum.
What also changed after the referendum is how attitudes, evaluations, and 
identities aligned with party choice. Examining the differences in coefcients 
between the pre- and post-referendum models tells us that there were several 
important changes to how attitudes, evaluations, and identities predict SNP voting 
(see Table A8.3 in the appendix). While Britishness has a similar coefcient 
between models, Scottishness does not predict SNP voting before the referendum 
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Figure 8.8 Counterfactual effect of change in attitude on voting for the SNP among 
2010 Labour voters
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devolution preferences do not predict SNP voting pre-referendum but do 
 post-referendum. Interestingly, although there are considerable changes to the dis-
tribution of leader ratings after the referendum, the coefcients for both SNP leaders 
and Miliband are much smaller after the referendum. This indicates that although 
feelings about leaders changed substantially, the effect of these feelings actually 
diminished, suggesting that changes in feelings about leaders largely result from 
other changes in political identities and alignments, rather than being a major 
contributing factor in and of themselves. Finally, the magnitude of the coefcient 
for referendum vote increases by 70 per cent, supporting the claim that it was the 
act of actually casting a vote in the referendum, and not simply the intention, that 
is important for understanding the post-referendum realignment.
In summary, we have shown that voting for independence in the referendum 
had a strong effect on switching vote intention (and ultimately actual vote) from 
Labour to the SNP. This was mainly because of a crystallization of support for the 
SNP among Yes voters and, more generally, among those with pro-independence 
attitudes, rather than a large-scale shift in support for independence. We now turn to 
the General Election of 2017 in which the wheels came off the SNP bandwagon.
8.9 The EU referendum and 2017 General Election
Although the SNP remained the largest party in Scotland at the 2017 Election, 
they lost over a quarter of their vote share and twenty-one of the fifty-six seats 
they had won in 2015. However, Labour was not the prime beneficiary of this 
reversal. Instead, the Scottish Conservatives nearly doubled their vote share from 
15 per cent in 2015 to 29 per cent in 2017, picking up twelve seats, and became the 
second largest party in Scotland (the first time they beat Labour at a General 
Election in Scotland since 1959). Labour only modestly improved their vote share 
by 2.8 percentage points and picked up six seats, while the Liberal Democrats 
managed to gain three seats despite a slight decrease in their share of the vote.
What explains these sudden changes in electoral fortunes?
On the one hand, Labour won over 15 per cent of 2015 SNP voters compared 
to only 8 per cent for the Conservatives (Table 8.3). Many of these were voters 
returning home, with 39 per cent having voted Labour in 2010 compared to 
only 14 per cent SNP and 20 per cent Liberal Democrat. Crucially, however, 
almost a  quarter of 2015 Labour supporters defected to the Conservatives in 
2017, compared to only 7 per cent in the opposite direction. So what lay behind 
this un usual ly high level of switching between the major parties? We have 
already seen how the 2014 independence referendum led to the rise of the SNP 
in 2015 at the expense of Labour, and we have shown how the political divisions 
created by a referendum counteracted traditional party loyalties. In this section, 
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we explore how a second shock to the Scottish party system—the 2016 EU 
 referendum—interacted with the earlier shock of the independence referendum. 
In Chapter 9, we examine the impact of the EU referendum on electoral politics 
in more detail, and show how it exposed cross-cutting political divisions. Here 
we explore the impact of the EU referendum in Scotland, and more specifically 
how, in com bin ation with the Scottish independence referendum, it brought 
about the surprising result we saw in 2017.
As we have already seen, the Scottish independence referendum created clear 
divisions in Scottish politics. The SNP, the cheerleaders for independence, were 
unambiguously in favour of staying in the EU, and, following the vote to leave, 
tried to leverage Brexit to force a second independence referendum with the 
aim  of keeping Scotland in the EU (McHarg and Mitchell  2017). The Scottish 
Conservatives, united against independence, were divided over Brexit during the 
EU referendum campaign, but took a clear stance in favour of Brexit following 
the referendum result, albeit one that is generally seen as more soft-Brexit sup-
porting than their English counterparts (McEwen  2018). Scottish Labour, also 
against Scottish independence, tried to carve out a position on the EU somewhere 
between the SNP and the Conservatives.
The EU referendum clearly cut across the divisions over Scottish independence, 
with around 60 per cent of both Yes and No voters in the 2014 referendum voting 
to remain in the EU. Using data from the BES internet panel on how  people voted in 
both the 2014 independence and 2016 EU referendums produces four categories 
of respondents (excluding respondents who did not vote in one or both referen-
dums). The two largest groups were those that voted No in 2014 and Remain in 
2016 (34 per cent of voters in 2017) and Yes/Remain voters (28 per cent), followed 
by No/Leave voters (22 per cent), and finally Yes/Leave voters (16 per cent). 
We look at how each of these groups voted in the 2015 and 2017 elections.
Figure  8.9 shows that those who voted for independence in 2014 and for 
Remain in the EU referendum voted heavily in favour of the SNP at both elections. 
These are the voters whose position was in line with SNP policy. As we saw above, 
the vast majority of Yes voters supported the SNP following the independence 
Table 8.3 2015–17 vote flow, Scotland
2015 Vote 2017 Vote
Con Lab LD SNP
Conservative 86.1 6.5 3.5 3.9
Labour 24.2 61.5 6.1 6.5
Liberal Democrat 36.2 14.8 44.3 4.6
SNP 8.1 15.2 1.8 74.0
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referendum, and, notwithstanding the normal impact of SNP performance and 
everyday politics, those that agreed with the party on Brexit had no reason to 
desert it in 2017. The vast majority (92 per cent) of Yes/Remain voters voted SNP 
in 2015 and this level of support only declined slightly (84 per cent) in 2017.
The importance of the EU referendum in restructuring voting in Scotland is 
illustrated quite dramatically by the change among Yes/Leave voters, 89 per cent 
of whom voted for the SNP in 2015 compared to only 57 per cent in 2017 
(Figure 8.10). More than four in ten respondents in this group switched to another 
party in 2017, with similar proportions going to the Conservatives and to Labour. 
Given the Conservatives’ low base in this group in 2015, their success in attracting 
one in five of Yes/Leave voters in 2017 highlights the importance of the EU refer-
endum. Just as Labour’s position on the independence referendum cost Labour 
votes in 2015, in 2017 many SNP voters were driven away by the party’s strong 
pro-Remain stance.
Those that both voted against independence and to Remain in the EU made up 
the largest share of the four groups in the Scottish electorate. Figure 8.11 shows 
that, despite its poor performance overall, Labour dominated this group in 2015, 
winning around half of these voters. In 2017, however, Labour lost about one in 
five of these voters to the Conservatives, with a smaller share going to the Liberal 
Democrats. Smaller numbers of 2015 Conservatives and Liberal Democrats also 
shifted to Labour, cancelling out some of these losses. Altogether, Labour only 












Figure 8.9 2015 and 2017 vote choice for Scottish independence Yes and EU 
referendum Remain voters
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large number of Labour voters and around one in three 2015 Liberal Democrat 
voters, the Conservatives increased their share of this group from 21 to 33 per cent 
between 2015 and 2017. Although the Conservatives were more clearly associated 
nationally with a hard Brexit, the softer approach from the Scottish Conservatives, 
together with a strong position against a second independence referendum clearly 





























Figure 8.11 2015 and 2017 vote choice for Scottish independence No and EU 
referendum Remain voters
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Perhaps more crucial to the Scottish Conservatives’ success were the No/Leave 
voters, whose referendum votes were most in line with the Conservative positions 
on independence and Brexit. Figure 8.12 shows that this group split almost evenly 
between the Conservatives and Labour in 2015, but that, in 2017, the Conservatives 
won almost three times as many of these voters as Labour (65 per cent versus 
23 per cent). A closer inspection of the flow of votes among this group reveals 
that the Conservatives picked up nearly half of 2015 Labour voters, six in ten 2015 
Liberal Democrats, and the vast majority of 2015 UKIP voters (Figure 8.12). The 
SNP also lost over three-quarters of their support among this group, 96 per cent 
of whom opposed a second independence referendum. The effect of these changes 
was to nearly double the Conservative share of the vote in this group to 65 per cent, 
helping them become the second largest party in Scotland.
As we saw earlier in this chapter, pro-independence voters rapidly shifted to the 
SNP in 2015, virtually wiping Labour off the electoral map. In 2017, Yes/Remain 
voters mainly stayed loyal to the SNP, but the SNP suffered heavy losses to the major 
unionist parties among Yes/Leave voters. The relative success of the Conservatives 
in attracting a substantial minority of No/Remain voters—despite the national 
party’s hard-line position on Brexit—also significantly contributed to their increased 
vote share. By contrast, Labour performed relatively poorly among the No/Leave 
group, losing a large proportion of these voters to the Conservatives. The ability 
of the Conservatives to capture No/Remain voters as well as a clear majority of 
No/Leave voters clearly reflects the importance of the two referendums in defin-
















Figure 8.12 2015 and 2017 vote choice for Scottish independence No and EU 
referendum Leave voters
OUP CORRECTED PROOF – FINAL, 18/11/19, SPi
158 Electoral Shocks
The relative strength of the new political identities forged in the heat of two 
referendum campaigns shaped the outcome of the 2017 General Election in 
Scotland, opening the way for a Conservative recovery based on a strong unionist 
and Brexit message. We asked a battery of questions about identification with the 
Yes/No side in the Scottish referendum (in April 2017) and with the Leave/Remain 
side in the EU referendum (based on similar questions relating to social identities) 
and found that a large proportion of No/Remain voters more closely identified 
with ‘No’ than with ‘Remain’ (39 per cent). Among this group, the Conservatives 
led Labour by 45 per cent to 34 per cent. Among those who identified more 
strongly as ‘Remain’ than ‘No’ (36 per cent), Labour led the Conservatives 53 per cent 
to 20 per cent.
The emergence of the Brexit dimension and how it cut across the independ-
ence referendum is illustrated in Figure  8.13 and Figure  8.14, which show how 
devolution and European integration preferences aligned with vote choice in 2015 
and 2017.5 As explained earlier in this chapter, devolution preference was a strong 
predictor of referendum vote in 2014 and, through that, 2015 General Election 
vote. This is illustrated in the top panel of Figure 8.13, which shows how SNP 
5 The dependent variable is reported vote in 2015 and 2017. Independent variables are stable value/
attitudinal positions measured as latent variables generated from IRT models (results shown in the 
appendix) using responses to (i) economic left–right (Table A6.1) and (ii) authoritarian–liberal (Table 
A6.2) values batteries, (iii) devolution preferences (Table A8.4), and (iv) EU scale (Table A8.5). The 
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Figure 8.13 Predicted probability of voting for each party by devolution scale
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voting rises steeply as voters move towards the nationalist end of the scale, while 
controlling for liberal–authoritarian, left–right, EU, and immigration attitudes. 
However, in 2017, while this effect is still strong, it is somewhat more muted than 
it was in 2015. This is mirrored by a weakening of the relationship between Labour 
voting and devolution preferences. This suggests that that there may have been a 
slight weakening of the impact of the independence referendum by 2017 as Labour 
regained support among nationalists at the expense of the SNP. By contrast, 
Conservative voting rose across virtually the full range of devolution preferences, 
although the increase was greatest among unionists. Although slightly weakened 
compared to 2015, the independence cleavage was still of paramount importance 
in structuring party support in Scotland. We can gauge this by comparing indica-
tors originally designed to measure the strength of class alignment. The Thomsen 
index (also known as log odds measure of class voting—a measure of relative 
class voting) calculated for the SNP versus other parties for Yes and No voters was 
3.4 in 2015, falling to 3.2 in 2015.6 These are both extremely high values if we 
benchmark them against the height of British class voting during the post-war era 
6 The log odds is calculated as the natural log of (% Yes-voting SNP/%Yes-voting other): 
(%  No-voting SNP/% No-voting other). The simple odds (not logged) dropped more dramatically 
from 29.8 to 24.2. An alternate measure is the Alford index (measured here as % Yes-voting SNP—% 
No-voting SNP) which dropped from 69 in 2015 to 64 in 2017. For reference, the Alford index of class 
voting from 1945 to 1960 in Britain was 37.3 (Nieuwbeerta and De Graaf 1999). All measures suggest 
that independence voting dropped in 2017, but the level was still extremely high compared to measures 
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Figure 8.14 Predicted probability of voting for each party by EU scale
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(1945–60) when the Thomsen index of class voting was 1.64 (Nieuwbeerta and De 
Graaf  1999). The independence cleavage was weakened by the EU referendum, 
but not by a vast amount.
Figure 8.14 reveals how the cross-cutting impact of Europe (defined by attitudes 
towards integration with the European Union) became much stronger in 2017, 
partly explaining the weaker pull of devolution preferences. The figure shows that 
having anti-European attitudes was a much stronger predictor of Conservative 
voting in 2017 than in 2015.7 This is mirrored in the weakening of support for the 
SNP among anti-EU voters. In short, the rise of the European dimension accounts 
for the rise of the Conservatives at the expense of the SNP in 2017. In contrast, 
the net effect of EU attitudes on the Labour vote barely changed between 2015 
and 2017. Although we saw above that Labour lost a large number of Leave sup-
porters to the Conservatives, they also lost substantial numbers of Remain voters 
(also to the Conservatives) and gained some Leave supporters from the SNP.
We can also examine the effects of the two referendums on SNP partisanship. 
The interaction of the two referendums is a clear illustration of the capacity for a 
new shock to disrupt the effects of an earlier one. Figure 8.15 shows trends in the 
strength of SNP partisanship among those who voted Yes in the independence 
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Figure 8.15 Strength of SNP identity among 2014 Scottish independence referendum 
Yes voters who voted Remain and Leave in the 2016 EU referendum, on a scale where 
0 = no/other party id, 1 = not very strong Conservative id, 2 = farily strong 
Conservative id, 3 = Very strong Conservative id
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referendum and later voted Remain or Leave in the 2016 EU referendum. 
 Leave-voting independence supporters started with slightly stronger SNP identities, 
but both Leavers and Remainers moved in parallel in the run-up to, and aftermath 
of, the Scottish independence referendum. Once we reach the EU referendum, 
however, there is a divergence in trends. Remainers felt slightly more strongly 
SNP compared to the year before, while Leavers had begun to waiver, though they 
still felt fairly strongly SNP. In the wake of the EU referendum there was an 
immediate and sharp drop in the strength of SNP identity among Leavers which 
did not recover by the 2017 election.
Overall, the 2017 General Election outcome in Scotland reflected the impact of 
two electoral shocks. First, the consequences of the independence referendum 
were still being felt, allowing the SNP to remain dominant over Labour (albeit to 
a lesser degree than in 2015). Overlaid on this was the impact of the EU referen-
dum, which contributed to the resurgence of the Scottish Conservatives.
8.10 Conclusions
The 2015 General Election was disastrous for Labour, not least because of their 
collapse in Scotland. The reduction in Labour’s Scottish vote and the rise of the 
SNP contributed significantly to the overall fragmentation of party support in the 
2015 General Election. The Scottish independence referendum acted as a shock to 
a system that was already unstable due to the long-term weakening of party iden-
tities and the decline of Labour’s traditional class-based appeal. In this chapter, we 
have shown how the independence referendum precipitated a shift in allegiances 
of those backing independence—to the extent that 90 per cent of Yes voters voted 
for the SNP, including most of those who had still intended to vote Labour early 
in 2014. Overall, Labour lost one-third of its supporters to the SNP between early 
2014 and the 2015 General Election (and nearly half since 2010), the vast majority 
of whom voted for independence. To put it simply, Yes voters could not reconcile 
a Labour vote with the position they had taken on the referendum.
This shift occurred in two phases. First, there was a gradual drift to the SNP 
before the referendum, when there was considerable crossover between party 
support and positions on independence. This process continued between the 
referendum and the 2015 General Election, when party alignments crystallized 
along the independence cleavage. The peak effect of the referendum on changes 
to party identity, attitudes, and vote choice was in September 2014—immediately 
after the referendum—but it continued to have an effect on each wave through 
to election day. Moreover, these changes to vote choice in 2015 were linked to 
chan ging partisan identities. Yes voting increased the likelihood of identifying 
with the SNP and reduced identification with Labour. Changes in party identifi-
cation were driven primarily by referendum vote choice, especially in the period 
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following the referendum, with Yes voters much less likely to continue identifying 
with Labour and more likely to identify with the SNP. Only 30 per cent of those 
supporting Labour in February 2014, and who ended up voting SNP, identified 
with Labour in May 2015 (compared to 80 per cent at the outset). In other words, 
shifts in voting were associated with shifts in party identification.
Voting Yes also led to a change in political attitudes in a direction consistent 
with and more favourable to the SNP and less favourable to Labour. Through this 
effect on attitudes, voting Yes indirectly led to an increase in the probability of 
voting SNP in the 2015 General Election. However, we demonstrated that only a 
fraction of Labour’s loss of 2010 voters to the SNP was attributable to changes in 
attitudinal positions. The impact of the referendum on political attitudes was less 
about changing people’s minds (to become more Scottish-minded or more pro-
devolution), than it was about a strengthening of the alignment between these 
attitudes and party support. After the referendum had taken place those who had 
voted Yes in 2014 were no longer prepared to lend Labour their support. In this 
sense, in terms of our theory of electoral shocks, the independence referendum 
acted as a shock to the salience of nationalism, devolution, and independence. 
Voters’ position on independence simply mattered more after the independence 
referendum than they had before. However, the post-referendum strengthening 
of the relationship between independence attitudes and party identification and 
voting in the independence referendum may also have acted as a shock to the 
image of the Labour Party in Scotland, causing voters to see it primarily as a party 
of the union rather than as a party of the left. The data available and models pre-
sented here do not allow us to differentiate between the impact of the changing 
salience of the independence issue and the changing image of the parties.
We have shown that the Scottish independence referendum had a profound 
realigning effect on party support in Scotland, cementing the link between SNP 
voting and pro-independence attitudes, and contributing to the fragmentation of 
party support across Britain as a whole, in 2015. However, the SNP could not rest 
on their laurels: by 2017 the Scottish electorate had contributed to a reversal in 
party fragmentation and the rise of the two-party national vote. A second elect or al 
shock in the form of the EU referendum disrupted the new political equilibrium in 
Scotland. While the SNP remained the largest Scottish party in the UK Parliament, 
they lost considerable ground to both the Conservatives and Labour, who won 
over a substantial proportion of pro-independence Leave voters. Meanwhile, 
among anti-independence Leave voters, the Conservatives became the favoured 
party. In the space of three general elections, the Scottish party system was com-
pletely transformed. The SNP moved from third place in 2010 to first in 2015 and 
2017; Labour fell from first to third; and the Conservatives rose from fourth to 
second. These dramatic changes were the result of two major electoral shocks in 
the shape of two referendums less than three years apart. In the following chapter, 
we discuss the wider impact of the Brexit shock across Britain as a whole.
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9
Brexit and the Reshaping of 
British Electoral Politics
In April 2017 Prime Minister Teresa May announced an early general election in 
the expectation of achieving an increased majority to strengthen her hand in 
Brexit negotiations, and to provide a mandate for the government’s Brexit strategy. 
The outcome was quite the opposite, with the Conservatives losing their overall 
majority (despite winning 42.4 per cent of the vote) and relying on a confidence 
and supply arrangement with the DUP in order to govern. Labour’s revival under 
Jeremy Corbyn, which deprived the Conservatives of their anticipated majority, 
helped produce the highest two-party share since 1970. Moreover, not only did we 
see a return to ‘two-party politics’, but a restructuring of the basis of this two-party 
support. To give just two examples: in 2017 Kensington—the most affluent con-
stituency in the country and one of the most cosmopolitan—fell to Labour for the 
first time ever; while Stoke-on-Trent South, a poor working-class area in a strug-
gling former industrial city, went from Labour to the Conservatives—again for 
the first time ever. Within two years of the 2015 Election we had seen the political 
map of Britain redrawn.
In this chapter we show that the shock that led to these changes was the 
outcome of the 2016 referendum on Britain’s membership of the EU. The EU 
referendum resulted in strategic decisions by political parties that brought 
about substantial changes in the alignment of party voting. Electoral competi-
tion between the two main parties, dominated ideologically since the Second 
World War by concerns relating to redistribution, taxation, and the free 
market versus social protection, now also focused on the EU, immigration, 
and liberal–authoritarian values. For the first time in modern history, economic 
left–right competition between Labour and the Conservatives was accom-
panied by a commensurate emphasis on a second cultural, or social, dimension 
of politics.
As a consequence of this transition in the links between voters’ attitudes and 
their choice between Labour and the Conservatives, we also saw the rising im port-
ance of two key social bases of politics: education and age. This saw Labour become 
the party of the younger and more highly educated voter, and Conservatives the 
party of older voters and those without such qualifications.
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9.1 The evolving EU divide
As we discussed in Chapter 5, in recent decades, party positions towards the EU 
have become increasingly structured along the cultural dimension (Prosser 2016d). 
In the early days of Britain’s membership of the EEC, party divisions over Europe 
fitted relatively neatly into Britain’s traditional economic left–right axis of political 
competition. The single market was seen as a predominately capitalist enterprise 
on the left—among its most pronounced antagonists being the iconic left-wing 
figure Tony Benn—and was opposed by the Labour Party in the 1980s, while 
being favoured by pro-market Conservatives. However, as European integration 
progressed and parties switched their positions. Labour became increasingly pro-
EU following their 1989 policy review and subsequent endorsement of the EU 
project by Tony Blair. At the same time, there was increasingly open Euroscepticism 
among the Conservatives in the 1990s. Together, these changes broke the link 
between economic left–right positions and the EU at the party level (Evans and 
Butt 2007; Evans 1999a). Likewise, as European integration changed, so too did the 
nature of voter attitudes towards European integration, which shifted from eco-
nomic left-wing concerns about market integration to liberal–authoritarian issues 
like immigration and cultural threat (van Elsas and van der Brug 2015; Eichenberg 
and Dalton 2007; McLaren 2002; McLaren 2006; Tillman 2013).
Following the realignments of the 1990s, European integration had become in 
effect a cross-cutting political cleavage with the potential to be a vote loser for both 
the divided Conservatives (Evans 1998) and for a Labour Party that was moving 
away from the values of its core working-class base (Evans 2002; Evans  1999a). 
Nonetheless, these cross-cutting effects were of only minor political significance. 
A more fundamental shock was necessary for them to transform politics.1 As 
one of us remarked at the time: ‘Europe now cross-cuts the left–right basis of 
voting . . . at present this impact remains small. Yet it may become more important 
as integration proceeds and new and possibly more contentious questions than 
even monetary union arrive inescapably on the political agenda’ (Evans 1999a). 
As we saw in Chapter 5, before the growth of immigration from the 2004 and 
2007 accession countries, the EU question did not have the salience to transform 
politics. The increasing salience of immigration and the emergence of UKIP as an 
attractive destination for Conservative defectors (whether MPs or voters) was an 
obvious motive for Cameron’s strategy of promising a referendum on the EU. By 
promising a vote on the EU, Cameron hoped Eurosceptic MPs and voters would 
not defect to UKIP, who were obviously advocating such a policy (Evans and 
Menon 2017; Prosser 2016a). The limited public salience of the EU twenty years 
1 Monetary Union may have exercised Tony Blair, the prime minister of the time, but it had little 
impact on the electorate because his Chancellor, Gordon Brown, removed it from the agenda 
(Evans 2003).
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ago—even though there was even then intensive in-house fighting among the 
Conservative elite—is indicated by the failure of James Goldsmith’s Referendum 
Party to obtain much support in the 1997 General Election when running on, in 
effect, a similar platform to that advocated later by UKIP (Heath et al. 1998).
As we saw in Chapter 5, the public salience of the EU increased over the years 
following the 2004 accession of primarily Eastern European countries from which 
there were high rates of immigration. Even then, however, concern about Britain’s 
relationship with the EU itself was still muted. People were more concerned about 
immigration. Following the 2016 referendum, however, the salience of the EU 
itself increased substantially. In every wave of the BES panel study we asked about 
the most important issue (MII) facing the country. Even in 2015, Europe was only 
mentioned as the most important issue by 3 per cent of respondents. By 2017 it 
had become the most cited issue, named by no less than 36 per cent (it reached 
this point in the pre-EU referendum wave of the BESIP).2 Brexit had arrived as a 
focal concern of the British public. To understand how Brexit then affected vote 
choice in 2017, we need first to understand the Brexit vote itself.
9.2 Social divisions, values, and Brexit
While the underlying causes of support for Brexit are complex, previous research 
has shown that voting to leave the EU was strongly associated with a number of 
social characteristics and political values (Hobolt  2016; Goodwin and Milazzo 
2017). In particular, Brexit supporters were more likely to be older, male, less well-
off, and far less likely to have higher educational qualifications than Remain sup-
porters. Leave voters were also much more likely to oppose immigration and hold 
authoritarian attitudes.
Figure 9.1 shows how voting for Brexit varied by values and attitudes in the 
BES internet panel. Brexit voting was strongest among people with more socially 
conservative views, as indicated by responses on the liberal–authoritarian scale, 
and anti-immigration attitudes, while economic left–right values had no relation-
ship with Brexit voting. This confirms findings elsewhere (Evans and Menon 2017; 
Kaufmann 2016): Brexit was about differences in social and cultural preferences, 
not economic inequality. It also helps to explain the social divisions that under-
pinned Brexit.
As has been known for some time, economic and liberal–authoritarian values are 
differentially distributed across the population: left–right economic values tend to be 
2 Despite this, Brexit was barely discussed as an issue by key figures during the campaign. As noted 
in Chapter 2, the discussion focused on a wide variety of other policy issues including social care, fox 
hunting, responses to terrorist attacks, and austerity. In the minds of many of the voters however, the 
most important factor at stake in the election was Brexit, see Prosser (2017).
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influenced by economic circumstances such as income, while liberal–authoritarian 
ones are more closely connected with education and age (Heath, Evans, and Martin 
1994; Evans, Heath, and Lalljee 1996). These patterns are also reproduced in our 
surveys. Figure 9.2 shows the mean scores on the left–right scale (where higher is 
more right-wing) and on the liberal–authoritarian scale (where higher is more 
liberal). The young, the highly educated, and those with very high levels of income 
are distinctively more liberal in their responses on the liberal–authoritarianism 
scale, although the relationship with income is not linear (as the poorest are also 
more liberal than those in the middle income range).3 On the left–right scale the 
more educated and those with higher incomes are more economically right-wing, 
whilst the relationship with age is curvilinear (the youngest and oldest being most 
left-wing).
We would therefore expect these sources of social division to be expressed 
similarly when it came to voting in the referendum. Given the relationship between 
demographics and attitudes, we would expect demographic voting patterns 
to align with their attitudinal correlates: income should follow a similar pattern to 
left–right economic values, and age and education to liberal–authoritarian values. 
This is exactly what we see in Figure 9.3: pronounced differences by age and edu-
cation—with younger and more highly educated people being far more likely to 
vote to remain in the EU. The effects of income are noticeably weaker than the 
gradients for age and education, although they are still present, with high-income 
respondents more likely to vote to remain. This income gradient is primarily a 
3 The curvilinear income effect is likely to be a result of the confounding effect of age, which as well 
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Figure 9.1 Brexit voting by key attitudes
OUP CORRECTED PROOF – FINAL, 18/11/19, SPi
BREXIT AND THE RESHAPING OF BRITISH ELECTORAL POLITICS 167
result of the link between higher education and higher income. Once education 
and age are controlled for, the effects of income are much reduced. The effects of 
education and age are largely removed by the inclusion of attitudes (left–right, 
liberal–authoritarianism, and immigration), indicating that the differences 
between young and old and between more and less educated are largely driven by 
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Figure 9.2 Bivariate relationship between economic right and authoritarian values, 
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Figure 9.3 Brexit voting by key demographics
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The issue of Leave versus Remain clearly cut across the traditional values 
dimension of British politics—economic left–right. However, it was not inevitable 
that this cross-cutting issue would disrupt vote choice in 2017. To understand why 
it did, we need to consider how the parties reacted to the strategic opportunities 
provided by the Brexit vote.
9.3 Post-Brexit Party strategy and voters’ perceptions
In the run-up to the referendum, the parties—especially the Conservatives—had 
been split. Importantly though, most of the leadership of the party—and the official 
government position—was in favour of Remain. Following the EU referendum, 
however, Theresa May staked a claim for being the party of Brexit (‘Brexit means 
Brexit’ as she repeated on numerous occasions), and the vast majority of the 
Conservative Party followed suit. At the Conservative Party annual conference in 
Birmingham in October 2016 the prime minister made clear that the UK would 
control immigration, make its own laws, and strike trade deals with third 
 countries with an overt rejection of a ‘Norway’ or ‘Switzerland’ model: Brexit 
meant ‘hard Brexit’.
The motivations for this are easy to understand given the geographic distribu-
tion of Brexit votes and the rise of UKIP on the Conservatives’ Eurosceptic flank. 
The Leave versus Remain divide cut across Labour and Conservative constituencies 
in various ways. Traditionally Conservative areas in Lincolnshire, East Anglia, 
and Kent had already seen UKIP garner significant support in 2015, and they 
formed the rural heartland of the Brexit vote in 2016 (Boston topped the chart 
with 75.6 per cent voting Leave). Various Conservative coastal towns with older 
populations had also seen substantial levels of UKIP voting in 2015, and likewise 
witnessed Leave victories.
Alongside these rural and coastal constituencies, smaller cities and northern 
towns—traditional Labour heartlands—also disproportionately voted to Leave. 
Stoke-on-Trent, dubbed ‘Brexit central’ during its February 2017 by-election, had 
a Leave vote of 69.4 per cent, while Hartlepool saw 69.4 per cent vote similarly. In 
both places, UKIP had received reasonable levels of support in 2015. A pro-Brexit 
stance placed both Midlands and northern working-class Labour Leave-voting 
seats in reach and held out the prospect of killing off UKIP.4 This was a goal 
assisted by the implosion of UKIP, who in the aftermath of the referendum lost 
both their main reason for existing and their charismatic leader, Nigel Farage.
4 Of course, the risk from this strategy was losing support in certain large cities. Labour strongholds 
such as Manchester (60.4 per cent) and London (59.9 per cent) were pro-Remain. Presumably, how-
ever, the apparently enfeebled pro-Remain parties—Labour under a very unpopular Corbyn and the 
discredited Liberal Democrats—were assumed to have been unlikely to make yet substantial further 
gains in areas where they were already strong.
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A key part of the Conservative Party positioning itself as the party of Brexit 
was the pledge to end freedom of movement. As we discussed in Chapter 5, the 
Conservatives had long promised to reduce net migration but in practice had 
achieved very little. In part this was due to the inability to end EU freedom of 
movement (though non-EU immigration also remained high under the Cameron 
government). Leaving the EU gave the Conservatives considerably greater scope 
to control Britain’s immigration policy. Figure 9.4 shows that there was a remark-
able increase in the number of people who thought the Conservatives would be 
able to reduce immigration after the EU referendum. This perception was closely 
related to UKIP–Conservative flows, with 2015 UKIP voters who perceived the 
Conservatives as being able to handle immigration in 2017 almost twice as likely 
to defect as those who still perceived the Conservatives as unable to control 
immigration.
However, it was not just on immigration that the Conservatives appealed to 
Brexiteers. Figure 9.5 shows changing perceptions of party positions on the EU 
among Leave and Remain voters. It shows that, post-referendum, the Conservative 
Party successfully redefined themselves as the more hard-line party on Europe 
among Leave voters—precisely the voters the Conservatives sought to attract. 
Remainers had long seen the Conservatives as Eurosceptic and saw them as even 
more so after the referendum, but the shift among Leavers was far more dramatic. 
Leave voters on average moved from regarding the Conservatives as being in 
favour of further EU integration before the referendum to seeing them as very 






































Pre-referendum   
    Post-referendum December 2016
April 2017
               May 2017
Figure 9.4 Ability to reduce immigration
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As Figure 9.6 shows, no such changes occurred for Labour who, in contrast to 
the Conservatives, had been equivocal about their Brexit position, criticizing the 
government’s handling of the negotiations while maintaining that they too sup-
ported leaving the EU. Despite some ambiguity over what Labour’s actual pos-
ition on Brexit was, it was widely perceived to be softer than the Conservatives. 
The two parties were now clearly demarcated on the key issues of EU immigration 
and Brexit.
To further explore the effects of these changes, we estimated the counterfactual 
difference in 2017 vote share if the perceptions of party positions had not changed 
from their pre-referendum level to their pre-2017 election level. We estimated 
this as a conditional logit model with alternative specific coefficients for self and 
party distance on three policy scales: left–right, EU, and immigration, and a binary 
variable for each party measuring their perceived likelihood of successfully 
reducing the level of immigration if they were in government, and controlling for 
which party the respondent voted for in 2015. We estimate the vote choice model 
using pre-election values for the distance and immigration competence variables 
(see Table A9.1 in the appendix for the results). The counterfactual is then esti-
mated by substituting the same respondents’ pre-referendum values for the 
observed 2017 values for all parties simultaneously. The counterfactual shows that 
two changes were important—Conservative EU distance, and the Conservative’s 
immigration competence (Figure  9.7). If these variables had not changed from 
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Figure 9.5 Perceived Conservative position on EU integration
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Figure 9.7. Change in 2017 vote share under counterfactual observations of voter–party 
left–right, EU, immigration distance, and perceptions of immigration competence
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vote share would have been 3 to 4 percentage points lower than it actually was, 
with UKIP’s vote share correspondingly higher.5
9.4 Brexit, values, and realignment
To see the effect of the referendum on the way attitudes towards EU integration 
mapped onto major party competition we can compare how support for the 
major parties changed among pro- and anti-EU people between 2015 and 2017. 
The changing alignment of vote choice between 2015 and 2017 is illustrated in 
Figure  9.8 which shows the percentage point change in the vote share of the 
Conservatives and Labour by EU attitudes, liberal–authoritarian values, attitudes 
towards immigration, and economic left–right values.6 In 2015, the Conservatives 
5 The counterfactual UKIP vote for EU distance would have been higher because of the drop in 
vote share won by the Conservatives under the pre-referendum perception of Conservative EU dis-
tance (rather than a change in the perceived position of UKIP).
6 Because we are interested in change between 2015 and 2017, rather than use votes in a referendum 
that took place a year after the 2015 election, we operationalize EU attitudes in the same way as our 
other scales, by pooling answers to questions in multiple waves of our panel (for more detail see Table 
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Figure 9.8 Bivariate relationship between liberal–authoritarianism, economic 
left–right, anti-immigrant attitudes and anti-EU attitudes, and change in the 
Conservative and Labour vote share 2015 to 2017
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already enjoyed a considerable advantage over Labour at the anti-EU side of the 
scale, but in 2017, this advantage increase sharply. While Labour made gains on 
the pro-EU side, the change in Labour vote was less strongly related to EU atti-
tudes than the Conservative vote.
When we look at liberal–authoritarian values and attitudes towards immigra-
tion (which are both highly correlated with support for Brexit), we see a similar, 
albeit slightly less pronounced, shift in party support. The Conservatives took an 
increased share of socially conservative voters between 2015 and 2017, while 
Labour took a higher share of socially liberal voters. The same pattern is even 
more noticeable for attitudes towards immigration: those opposed to immigration 
became substantially more likely to vote Conservative, whilst those more 
 favourably disposed to immigration were increasingly more likely to vote Labour. 
The Conservatives’ increased share of anti-EU, anti-immigration, and authoritar-
ian voters reflected their recruitment of a large proportion of 2015 UKIP voters. 
In contrast, when we look at change along left–right lines—a values dimension 
which we saw above (Figure 9.1) is uncorrelated with Brexit voting—change in 
both Labour and Conservative support was almost completely unrelated to voters 
left–right position despite Labour’s leftward shift in policy, which was widely 
 recognized by the electorate.7
So far, we have looked at the issues that tap into the cultural dimension of 
 pol it ics separately. However, we know that the issues of the EU and immigration 
are closely entwined with one another, and with liberal–authoritarian values. We 
also know these issues were already important in 2015 (see Chapter 5). To assess 
the combined impact of the cultural dimension on competition between the two 
major parties, and how it changed between 2015 and 2017, we estimate a series of 
vote choice models using BES Internet Panel respondents who voted in 2015 and 
2017. Because of our interest in the competition between the major parties in our 
initial models, we restrict our analysis to English respondents who voted for 
Labour or Conservative in either election. Below we extend the analyses to voters 
for all parties and to Scotland and Wales.8 The first model estimates the role of the 
vote choice prior to the referendum, this approach gives us the additional advantage of being able to 
differentiate between strong and weak supporters of either side. This is important because strong 
Remain/Leave supporters were much more likely to change their political behaviour as a result of 
Brexit than people who did not care much either way. This measure of EU attitudes scale is a very 
strong predictor of Brexit vote, a bivariate logit model predicting EU referendum vote correctly classi-
fies 90 per cent of respondents. We measure the other variables using the same approach: liberal–
authoritarian values (Table A6.2), immigration attitudes (Table A9.2), and economic left–right values 
(Table A6.1).
7 Voters perceived the change in Labour position on economic issues moving from a mean of 3.6 in 
2015 to 2.9 in 2017 on the redistribution scale (where low is pro-redistribution) and from 3.1 to 2.6 on 
the left–right scale (where low is left).
8 Our Conservative vs. Labour model excludes Scotland and Wales because the party choice set is 
different in those countries making the Conservative–Labour contrast non-comparable due to 
infringement of the assumption of independence of irrelevant alternatives.
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economic dimension, using left–right values and attitudes towards redistribution 
(measured, like the other variables, as a derived variable from an IRT model, see 
Table A9.3 in the appendix). The second model estimates the role of the cultural 
dimension, using liberal–authoritarian values, the EU integration scale, and the 
immigration scale. The third model combines all of these variables to estimate the 
overall impact of the two dimensions. The results of these models are shown in 
Table A9.4 in the appendix.
We are not interested here in the predicted probability of voting for the 
Conservatives or Labour. Rather, we are interested in how much of the overall 
pattern of voting in each election is explained by each dimension. We assess this 
using a measure of overall model fit, McFadden’s pseudo R-squared.9 Figure 9.9 
shows this statistic for each of our three models in 2015 and 2017. As we saw in 
Figure 9.8, the relationship between vote choice and the left–right and cultural 
dimensions did change between 2015 and 2017. This is confirmed in Figure 9.9, 
which shows little change in the overall explanatory power of the political values 
but marked changes in the relative contribution of the economic and cultural 
9 Unlike the R-squared statistic in an OLS regression, McFadden’s pseudo R-squared cannot be 
interpreted in terms of proportion of variance explained. A well-fitting model will give substantially 
lower values than an equally well-fitting OLS model. McFadden suggests that a pseudo R-squared of 
between 0.2 and 0.4 represents an ‘excellent’ fit (McFadden 1979). Although by this measure, our com-
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Figure 9.9 Goodness-of-fit of three logit models of Conservative–Labour vote choice 
in England in 2015 and 2017
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dimensions. More specifically, there is a large drop in the importance of the 
economic dimension between 2015 and 2017 and a corresponding rise in the 
im port ance of the cultural dimension. We do need to be cautious about running a 
variable race over which dimension is the more important at each election as the 
pseudo R-squared for each model is affected by how well each dimension is meas-
ured as well as how important that dimension is for vote choice. Nevertheless, the 
changes are sufficiently large that we can reasonably draw the conclusion that the 
economic dimension was more important than the cultural dimension in explain-
ing Conservative–Labour vote choice in 2015. However, following the EU referen-
dum, the cultural dimension became a better predictor of Conservative versus 
Labour voting, meaning that in 2017 the importance of both dimensions was roughly 
equal. This represents perhaps the most notable shift in the value basis of major 
party competition in recent history.
Whilst Figure 9.9 shows a clear increase in the importance of the cultural dimen-
sion in Conservative versus Labour competition, we show below that switching 
from smaller parties played an important part in the restructuring of major party 
voting around Brexit. In particular, the Conservatives gained a large number of 
Leave voters who are more socially conservative from UKIP, whilst Labour made 
more gains amongst more liberal Remain voters, especially from the Greens and 
the Liberal Democrats. So was the cultural dimension better at explaining party 
choice overall in 2017 than in 2015 or was it that competition on this dimension 
simply became better at differentiating Conservative and Labour voters? To address 
this question we estimated equivalent multinomial vote choice models for every-
one who voted in 2015 and 2017.We fitted separate models for England, Scotland, 
and Wales to reflect the different choice sets available (the results are shown in 
Tables A9.5, A9.6, and A9.7 in the appendix respectively). The results for England, 
shown in Figure 9.10, suggest that there was very little change in the predictive 
power of the two dimensions when we consider vote choice across all parties. The 
importance of the economic dimension did decline very slightly in 2017 relative 
to 2015. Conversely, the importance of the cultural dimension increased very 
slightly in 2017 relative to 2015. Combining both dimensions together substan-
tially improves the fit of the model, and again it fits the data slightly better in 2017 
than it does in 2015. However, while there were small changes between these two 
elections, the relative importance of each dimension changed very little between 
2015 and 2017. The models for Scotland and Wales also include IRT scales repre-
senting respondents’ views on devolution and independence (see appendix Table 
A8.4 for Scotland and Table A9.8 for Wales). Taking these into account, in 
Scotland there is almost no change in the explanatory power of the economic 
dimension and an increase in the importance of the cultural dimension. However, 
in both years these were dwarfed by the importance of the devolution dimension. 
The picture in Wales was similar to that in England, with a small drop in the 
explanatory power of the economic dimension and an increase in the cultural 
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dimension, while the devolution dimension was much less important than in 
Scotland, and relatively less important than the economic or cultural dimensions.
In summary, while the cultural dimension became a much stronger predictor 
of Conservative versus Labour vote choice in England in 2017, in terms of overall 
party competition, both dimensions remained important to understanding the 
vote, and the overall picture is one of stability (Surridge 2018).
To show how the EU referendum triggered these changes we can examine 
when the changes in relative levels of support for different parties among Leave 
and Remain voters took place. Figure  9.11 shows the voting intention for each 
party in each wave of the BES 2014–17 panel survey. There is a very clear jump in 
Conservative support among Leave voters immediately after the referendum. The 
trend in UKIP support mirrored that of the Tories, but the decline occurred mainly 
between November 2016 and the General Election in 2017, after Nigel Farage 
resigned his leadership of the party.10 Labour support had increased among 
Remainers between the 2015 General Election and the referendum. However, 
these gains were reversed immediately following the referendum when tensions 
within the Labour Party came to a head. Labour support only recovered during 
the 2017 Election campaign, among voters from both sides of the EU divide, sug-
gesting that Labour’s 2017 campaign performance was attributable more to 
Corbyn’s election campaign than to Brexit (Mellon et al. 2018a).
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Figure 9.10 Goodness-of-fit of three multinomial logit models of Conservative, Labour, 
Liberal Democrat, UKIP, and Green Party vote choice in England in 2015 and 2017
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In order to demonstrate show how these Brexit-related changes led to 
 vote-switching between the parties, we can examine the flow of the vote between 
2015 and 2017. Figure 9.12 shows how Leave voters who started at different 2015 
party origins cast their vote at the 2017 election. Most notably, the UKIP vote 
collapsed, with by far the largest portion switching to the Tories. More than half 
of UKIP’s 2015 voters who voted again in 2017 switched to the Conservatives, 
compared with only 18 per cent to Labour and a further 18 per cent who stayed 
loyal to UKIP. Labour picked up some Leave voters from UKIP, but lost even 
more to the Conservatives.
The pattern for Remain voters is slightly more complex. As befitting their stance 
on Brexit, the Conservatives lost Remain voters to the Liberal Democrats and 
Labour (Figure 9.13). Despite having the clearest pro-EU position and a promise 
of a second referendum, the Liberal Democrats failed to pick up many more 
Remain voters than they lost. Instead, Labour, who were already the most popular 
party in 2015 among voters who voted Remain in 2016, won the lion’s share. 
Despite an ambiguous position on the single market, Labour was seen as the best 
bet for those wanting to keep closer ties with our European neighbours. Not only 
did they win over a large number of Remainers from the Conservatives, but 
also from the pro-EU Greens and Lib Dems. Nearly two-thirds of 2015 Greens 
went to Labour as well as around a quarter of Liberal Democrats. However, the 
Green defection does not seem to be primarily driven by the EU issue. Most of 
the Green voters defected to Labour before the EU referendum had taken place. 
Instead, the Green defection appears to be driven by Labour’s changing leadership 
under Jeremy Corbyn (who was personally very popular with those who voted Green 
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Figure 9.11 Party support by EU vote 2014–17
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and their dislike of New Labour.11 In fact, Corbyn was substantially more popular 
among 2015 Green voters (with a mean of 6.4 out of 10 on April 2016 like scores) 
than he was among 2015 Labour voters (with a mean of 5.7 out of 10). Importantly, 
11 In a model of switching from the Greens, attitudes to Tony Blair negatively predicted choosing 




































Figure 9.13 Where the Remain vote went
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the bulk of this switching took place prior to the EU referendum, with 40 per cent 
of 2015 Green voters (of those who stated a preference) in the pre-referendum 
wave already intending to vote Labour. Ultimately 60 per cent of 2015 Green 
 voters defected to Labour.
The cumulative effect of Brexit on party choice is clear from the relationship 
between vote choice in 2015 and 2017 and EU referendum vote (Table 9.1). In 2015, 
Labour already had a 14 percentage point lead over the Conservatives among 
voters who later voted to Remain in the EU referendum. This lead increased to 
29 percentage points in 2017. There was even greater polarization on the Leave 
side, where the Conservatives went from a 20 percentage point lead over Labour 
in 2015, to a 36 percentage point lead in 2017. In 2017, it seems clear that the 
Conservatives had become the party of Brexit, winning 63 per cent of the Leave 
vote, with Leave voters making up 71 per cent of Conservative support. In con-
trast, Labour won over half the Remain vote, relying heavily on Remain support 
which made up two-thirds (67 per cent) of their voters in 2017. The Liberal 
Democrats failed to make headway among Remainers despite a clear commitment 
to backing a second referendum, and experienced an unusually high volatility in 
their support with more than half of their 2017 voters recruited since 2015. The 
vast majority (79 per cent) of these new voters supported Remain. However, this 
recruitment did not translate into increased vote share at the aggregate level 
because they lost half of their 2015 voters with a higher rate of loss (65 per cent) 
among the 27 per cent of their 2015 voters who supported Leave.12 In Chapter 7 
12 Although the Liberal Democrats have long been a pro-EU party, they nevertheless attracted a 
large contingent of anti-EU voters in elections prior to 2017 (Russell and Fieldhouse 2005). The con-
siderable churn in their vote in 2017 is also reflected in the Liberal Democrat seats. The Liberal 
Democrats finished the election with a net gain of four seats, but this hides considerable turnover. 
Half of the 2015 Liberal Democrat seats were lost—including the seat of former leader Nick Clegg—as 
was their recently won by-election seat of Richmond Park. These losses were offset by regaining seven 
seats they had lost in 2015 and one they had lost in 2010.
Table 9.1 Vote share by EU referendum vote, 2015 and 2017
 2015 2017
  Remain Leave Remain Leave
Conservative 30 44 25 63
Labour 44 24 54 27
Lib Dem 11 5 13 3
SNP 4 2 4 1
Plaid Cymru 1 0 1 0
UKIP 1 22 0 3
Green Party 7 2 2 1
n 7,033 7,186 7,217 7,056
Source: BESIP wave 6 and wave 13 wt_new_w6w13
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we showed how the Liberal Democrats failed to recover in 2017 because of the 
lasting impact of the coalition shock on their core support, together with the 
damage to their electoral viability that entailed. As a result, they improved on 
their average 2015 level of support only among pro-European voters.
Other significant changes were also correlated with Brexit: the Greens lost 
more than four out of five of their 2015 supporters, the vast majority of whom had 
voted to Remain in the EU. As noted above, this shift largely took place before the 
EU referendum campaign, yet was still an important part of how Labour’s 2017 
vote became dominated by Remainers. Meanwhile, UKIP’s 2015 vote, almost 
entirely made up of Leave supporters, was devastated.
These patterns of switching suggest a fundamental shift in British politics. In 
total, 32 per cent of respondents voted for a different party in 2015 and 2017, a 
slightly lower percentage than switched between 2010 and 2015, although 2010, 
2015, and 2017 are the three highest recorded levels of volatility across all elections 
covered by BES panels between 1964 and 2017 (see Chapter 2). More importantly, 
however, despite spanning only a two-year period, 2015–17 saw the highest 
recorded level of combined Labour–Conservative switching as a percentage of 
Labour and Conservative voters at the previous election (in either direction) in 
any BES inter-election panel (the full series is shown in Chapter 2).13 Other elec-
tions that saw high levels of switching between Labour and the Conservatives 
took place during periods of convergence between the parties, which may 
have made it easier to jump the ‘gap’ between the two major parties. The fact that 
12 per cent of 2015 Conservative voters switched to voting for a Corbyn-led 
Labour Party indicates a major change in the political landscape.
We have shown in earlier chapters that party identification acts as a constraint 
on volatility, but did it offer any protection against the Brexit shock? Figure 9.14 
shows the retention rates for the Conservatives and Labour on each referendum 
side and for party identifiers and non-identifiers. Both the Conservatives and 
Labour retained high proportions of their 2015 voters who shared the same 
referendum side as the party majority (Leave for Conservatives and Remain for 
Labour) among both party identifiers and non-identifiers (at the time of the 2015 
election). However, among those who voted against the majority position of their 
2015 party in the referendum, there are very different retention rates for iden ti-
fiers and non-identifiers. The Conservatives lost nearly half of their non-identifying 
2015 voters who voted Remain. By contrast, the Conservatives only lost around a 
fifth of Conservative-identifying Remain voters. We see a parallel picture on the 
Labour side among Leavers. Party identification cushioned the effect of the 
Brexit shock. Had levels of party identification been higher, Brexit—as with other 
shocks—would have had a smaller impact on the outcome of the election.
13 These figures are for Britain as a whole for comparability across the whole series.
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We saw earlier how values and social characteristics were related to one another, 
and to support for Brexit. We also know that these intertwined values and social 
characteristics are related to party preferences. However, the degree to which any 
one of them is important for someone’s vote will be influenced by the extent to 
which the parties differ over the issues at stake. The EU referendum made opin-
ions on issues such as immigration and Brexit more relevant to party choice than 
they had been in 2015. We would therefore expect to see the Conservatives become 
more popular among older, less educated, and more socially conservative voters 
in 2017 compared to 2015, whilst Labour should have become more popular among 
younger, more highly educated, and more liberal voters. When we examine these 
changes, this is indeed what we see.
Figure 9.15 shows the relationship between age and vote in 2015 and 2017. There 
is a clear shift between the elections that is correlated with the demographics of 
Brexit. In 2015, older voters were more likely to be Conservative and younger 
 voters more likely to be Labour. In 2017, this trend was exaggerated even further, 
with a sharp increase in the age gradient of vote choice. This reflected the success 
of the Conservatives among the older Leave vote, many of whom defected from 
UKIP, and the success of Labour among the more pro-Remain younger  voters. 
Thus, although there was no ‘Youthquake’ in voter turnout (which among the 
18–24 year-old group was under 50 per cent in both 2015 and 2017), there cer-
tainly was a dramatic change in the electoral choices of younger voters (Prosser 
et al. 2018). The changing age relationship does not seem to be driven primarily 
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Figure 9.14 Loyalty rates 2015–17
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in the relationship. However, controlling for values and attitudes (including 
immigration and EU attitudes) does greatly reduce both the age gradient and the 
change between the two elections. This suggests that the changing age relation-
ship is driven to some degree by the stronger role that the issues of immigration 
and the EU played in Conservative versus Labour vote choice in 2017.
Similarly, when we look at education (Figure 9.16) there are large changes that 
are again correlated with the pattern of Brexit support. From one election to the 
next, we see large increases in Conservative support among those with the lowest 
levels of education and a rise in Labour support among those with the highest levels 
of education. Much of the changing relationship seems to be driven by the changing 
age and income relationships we saw in the previous figure, as educated respondents 
tend to be younger and more affluent than less educated respondents. Consequently, 
controlling for income reduces the Conservatives’ advantage among degree holders 
in 2015 and controlling for age reduces Labour’s advantage among degree 
holders in 2017. Controlling for attitudes further flattens the relationship between 
Conservative–Labour vote choice and education, indicating that the relationship 
is partly accounted for by the more anti-EU and anti-immigration attitudes of less 
highly educated voters.
There were also changes in the relationship between household income and 
vote choice between 2015 and 2017, as shown in Figure 9.17. Labour increased its 
share of the two-party vote in the richer half of the income distribution, especially 
in the upper-middle income range. The net effect of these changes was that the 
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Figure 9.15 Bivariate relationship between age and Conservative share of the Labour/
Conservative vote in 2015 and 2017
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Figure 9.16 Bivariate relationship between education and Conservative share of the 
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Figure 9.17 Bivariate relationship between household income and Conservative share 
of the Conservative/Labour vote in 2015 and 2017
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the poorest groups, who swung towards Labour.14 This is also reflected in class 
voting (measured on the 2015 and 2017 face-to-face BES and BSA surveys). They 
show Labour’s lead remaining constant among working-class voters but narrowing 
the Conservative’s lead among middle-class voters.15 Again, these income changes 
seem to partially reflect the changing age and education gradients as the relationship 
looks much more similar across the years after controlling for the other demo-
graphics and flattens further after controlling for values and issue preferences.
To summarize what we have shown here, the shock of the EU referendum greatly 
increased the link between attitudes towards the EU and Conservative versus 
Labour voting. This change propagated a series of other demographic and attitu-
dinal realignments. First, because immigration attitudes and the EU are closely 
linked (see Chapter 5), 2017 also saw a strengthening of the link between immi-
gration attitudes and Conservative versus Labour voting. Next, because immigra-
tion is also closely linked to authoritarian values, 2017 witnessed an increased link 
between authoritarian values and Conservative versus Labour voting. Finally, the 
increased salience of issues linked to the cultural dimension also strengthened 
the link between Conservative versus Labour voting and various demographic 
correlates of that dimension. Most notably, because education is associated with 
more liberal values, higher levels of education switched from predicting 
Conservative voting in 2015 to predicting Labour voting in 2017. Similarly 
because older voters are much more anti-EU, anti-immigrant, and authoritarian, 
the age gradient steepened in 2017. However, these new cleavages cut across 
existing cleavages such as income (lower income is associated with authoritarian/
economically left-wing attitudes).
9.5 Conclusions
The Brexit referendum was the biggest shock to British politics in decades and 
affected the 2017 General Election via each of the three mechanisms we described 
in Chapter  3. The Brexit vote fractured party competition in Britain. In 2015, 
14 The relationship between social characteristics, values, policy preferences, and vote choice 
changed substantially between 2015 and 2017. Inevitably however, these variables and their patterns of 
change are not independent of each other. Social characteristics predict values, which in turn predict 
policy preferences. To unravel the interdependence of these variables and to understand how Brexit 
changed the alignment of social characteristics, values, and party choice we have also estimated a 
series of SEM models. The patterns shown in the figures in the text all proved to be robust in these 
multivariate analyses.
15 The BES and BSA face-to-face surveys tell somewhat different stories about the changes in class 
voting between 2015 and 2017, but the most accurate analysis is probably to combine both surveys. 
When we do that, the Conservatives held a 13 percentage point lead over Labour among middle-class 
(higher managerial and professional plus lower professional) voters in 2015 which fell to 7 percentage 
points in 2017. Labour led by 9 percentage points among working-class (routine and semi-routine) 
voters in 2015 which increased to 10 percentage points in 2017.
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social and cultural issues such as the EU and immigration had previously driven 
voters away from the major parties. In the aftermath of Brexit, these issues drove 
the choice between the Conservatives and Labour. This was a manifestation of the 
increased salience of the issues of EU and immigration in the wake of the vote to 
leave the EU. The increased salience of these issues was also reflected in the number 
of voters who identified Europe and immigration as the most important issues 
during the 2017 campaign. Salience alone, however, does not fully explain the 
dramatic shifts seen in 2017. The shift to major party voting in line with attitudes 
towards Europe and immigration was also a product of changes in voters’ evalu-
ations of competence that followed the Brexit vote. After the referendum, the 
Conservatives’ unambiguously pro-Leave stance and their opposition to immi-
gration were seen as more credible once the EU was no longer seen as a constraint 
on their actions. We saw how, following the EU referendum, the Conservatives’ 
perceived willingness to reduce immigration rose sharply, helping them win over 
Leave voters, especially from UKIP. This was made all the easier by UKIP’s loss 
of their charismatic leader, and the internal disputes and financial chaos that 
 rendered the party ineffective.
Moreover the outcome also depended heavily on the political response to the 
Brexit vote and the resultant shifts in the image of parties. Most notable was the 
Conservative Party’s strategic decision to get firmly behind Brexit—promising to 
ensure that Brexit really meant Brexit, and to put an end to freedom of movement 
of labour from the EU. Consequently, the aftermath of the referendum changed 
Leave voters’ perceptions of where the Conservatives stood on Europe, giving 
voters a clear choice and transforming the image of the Conservatives on Europe.
Labour’s consolidation of the Remain vote was perhaps less the product of 
their position on Brexit—which was more ambiguous—and as much to do with 
traditional left–right economic divisions. Labour’s move to the left under Corbyn, 
and away from any remaining association with New Labour, drained the Green 
Party of support even before the EU referendum took place. This left the Liberal 
Democrats and Labour as the only Remain-leaning parties in contention in 
England, while the choice for Remainers also included the nationalist parties in 
Scotland and Wales.16 The Liberal Democrats did not meaningfully recover from 
the collapse in electoral viability that contributed to their 2015 losses (as identified 
in Chapter 7), and their unambiguously pro-European stance alienated many of 
their remaining Eurosceptic supporters. As a result, Labour were the only viable 
option for many English voters wishing to support a Remain-leaning party.
However, the EU referendum positions of the major parties was not all that mat-
tered, but also what kind of Brexit the parties would seek to achieve in the ne go ti-
ations that lay ahead. Labour was supported by those favouring continued economic 
16 Among Welsh BESIP respondents, Plaid Cymru won 13 per cent of Remain voters and 9 per cent 
of Leave voters.
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integration while allowing freedom of movement, whereas the Conservatives 
were strongly favoured by those who wanted to control immigration. By provid-
ing a stark choice on such a crucial national issue, the EU referendum resulted in 
a reversal of the fragmentation of support we saw in 2015, and the unprecedented 
surge in the combined two-party vote. Although Brexit was not the only ex plan-
ation for this change it was certainly important. Not only did it help bring about 
the collapse of UKIP, boosting the Conservative vote in England and Wales, but, 
as we saw in Chapter  8, it assisted the Conservative revival in Scotland at the 
expense of the SNP. On the Remain side, outside Scotland, Labour benefited from 
being the only viable party for those wanting a ‘soft’ Brexit.
The effects of Brexit on electoral alignments are not limited to values. The rela-
tionship between these values and social and demographic characteristics means 
that existing social cleavages have been disrupted. While social cleavages are typ-
ic al ly thought of as long-standing rifts in society that change only slowly, our 
analysis shows that moving from an economic basis of major party competition 
to a two-dimensional one can bring about a rapid realignment of social groups. 
Brexit has realigned voters and parties with regard to age, education, and income 
as well as along the lines of social values.
A key theme of this book is that the British electorate is now capable of very 
high levels of volatility. The gains for the major parties are by no means secure. 
Neither are the transformational changes in the ideological and value bases of 
their support, nor are the new social cleavage of education and the demise of the 
traditionally role of income and class. As we saw in Chapter 4, the fundamental 
conditions of declining party identification and high levels of voter volatility 
mean that if parties change their positions, then different voters will vote for them. 
The new support base for the Conservatives has to a large degree been taken from 
UKIP, but if the Conservatives are seen to have failed to deliver on Brexit, espe-
cially on control over immigration, then it is unlikely that these supporters will 
stick with them. Newly recruited party supporters are even less loyal than the 
average voters in our generally volatile electorate.
In the longer term, the outcome of the Brexit process can be expected to 
affect the electoral relevance of Britain’s relationship with the EU. If freedom of 
movement is finally ended, concern about immigration is likely to decline, 
making it less likely to provide a driver of support for the Conservatives, or 
indeed any other party. If immigration and Britain’s relationship with the EU 
become less salient then we are likely to see domestic economic issues and 
social divisions based on inequality re-emerge as the primary basis of electoral 
competition. Should freedom of movement continue, however, or non-EU 
immigration increase markedly, then it seems likely that parties will continue to 
compete on this issue.
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As the ramifications of Brexit play out, the longer-term impact of the Brexit 
shock remains to be seen. What is clear is that the dramatic changes between the 
2015 and 2017 General Elections were not determined primarily by traditional 
economic issues, although these continued to be important. Nor were the changes 
the result of social change—a two-year time span is a blink of an eye in that respect. 
The shifts can only be understood by reference to the biggest political shock that 
Britain has experienced for many years.
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V. O. Key (1955, 18) finished his essay on critical elections by posing the question:
what characteristics of an electorate or what conditions permit sharp and de cisive 
changes in the power structure from time to time?
In the ensuing decades, a great deal of research has considered this question. 
Lipset and Rokkan (1967) famously documented how party systems became 
frozen, and Pierson (2000) described how positive feedback effects (or increasing 
returns on electoral success) help reproduce existing patterns of party dominance. 
However, in recent decades electoral alignments have been weakening in industrial 
democracies, and party systems have experienced increased fragmentation and 
electoral volatility (Dalton, Flanagan, and Beck 1985). But why do stable patterns 
of party support break down? Critical elections theory sets out the conditions 
under which realignments are likely to take place, including institutional, ideo-
logical, and social change (Evans and Norris 1999; Mayhew 2000). We have found 
that part of the explanation for recent sharp and decisive changes does indeed lie 
in such long-term developments. However, we show that this is only part of the 
story. This book reveals how the party system has become increasingly unstable in 
Britain and how this has made it more vulnerable to the impact of electoral shocks. 
These shocks shape election outcomes whether they be realigning or otherwise, 
and have led to the dramatic election outcomes experienced in 2015 and 2017.
We identified two important trends that have created instability and volatility 
in the British party system. The first is partisan dealignment, which is driven by 
the replacement of more partisan generations with new cohorts of citizens lacking 
partisan identities. The second is the gradual decline in the vote share of the two 
major parties, and corresponding increase in support for smaller parties, at least 
until 2017 (‘party system fragmentation’). This was made possible by the rise of 
new issues outside the traditional economic left–right agenda on which new and 
smaller parties are better able to compete, and an increase in the supply of those 
parties facilitated by the expanding range of elections (especially European and 
devolved elections) in which smaller parties have been able to prove themselves 
to be viable competitors. The result of these changes is a more volatile elect or ate, 
characterized by an increase in the rate of voters switching parties between elections 
over time. The majority of British voters are now switchers, with around 60 per cent 
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switching their votes at least once over three elections. In this way, our analysis 
took us full circle to the very first volume produced using the BES: Political 
Change in Britain (Butler and Stokes 1969b), which observed the degree to which 
electoral volatility existed in the early 1960s, and the importance of this ‘short-
term conversion’ in the context of a relatively stable and aligned electorate. That 
book is broadly remembered for addressing the question of stability in elect or al 
behaviour as a result of strong class and partisan-based voting in British elections. 
In fact, it also set the stage for the importance of volatility, and provided the 
benchmark against which we can see the very substantial increase in switching in 
the British electorate, bringing us to the events of the present day.
These gradual, long-term changes to the electorate and party system, however, 
do not explain the uneven and volatile nature of recent elections on their own. 
Nor do they explain the destination of increased vote-switching: that is, which 
parties gain and lose most from volatility in any given election, and whether the 
vote-switching causes further fragmentation of the party system (as in 2015) or 
de-fragmentation of the party system (as in 2017). To understand these changes, 
another element is crucial—electoral shocks. We use the term ‘shocks’ to describe 
major political events or developments that have the potential to alter the political 
system and cut through the normal ebbs and flows of regular party politics.
We defined electoral shocks by three criteria:
 1. Electoral shocks are an abrupt change to the status quo. They are not neces-
sarily exogenous to the party system, but they are more than simply the out-
comes of normal everyday politics. They represent a significant and often 
unanticipated change.
 2. Electoral shocks are manifest over prolonged time periods and are highly 
 salient: they have the potential to be noticed and recognized even by people 
who do not have much interest in politics, and by people who might otherwise 
select information that fits their partisan beliefs and preconceptions. Electoral 
shocks are, therefore, very difficult for voters and politicians to ignore.
 3. Electoral shocks are politically relevant and they have the potential to change 
how parties are perceived and therefore to reshape the party system.
We presented evidence of five electoral shocks, each fulfilling these three 
 cri teria, and each leading to substantial changes in vote choice among the British 
elect or ate. Unlike existing approaches to understanding voting behaviour, our 
approach puts shocks at the centre of the explanation for understanding political 
change, rather than treating them as nuisance factors which interfere with ‘normal’ 
patterns of electoral behaviour. The effects of the different shocks we examined, 
however, vary considerably, both in terms of the voters and the parties that were 
affected, and also in terms of the mechanisms by which each shock mattered.
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Some electoral shocks, such as the economic crisis and Brexit, are relevant to 
most, or all, of the electorate, but not all shocks affect all voters. For example, the 
immigration shock had a much greater effect among opponents of immigration, 
who were much more likely to switch to UKIP in 2015. We also saw how the 
 formation of the 2010–15 coalition hugely affected 2010 Liberal Democrat voters, 
but was less relevant to people who supported other parties. However, the haem-
orrhaging of the Liberal Democrat vote inevitably meant a larger pool of voters 
for other parties to compete for. Similarly, the Scottish independence referendum 
only directly affected voters in Scotland, but the SNP’s success had spillover con-
sequences for party competition in the rest of the UK. The prospect of Labour 
losing many of its Scottish seats undermined their chances of winning an outright 
majority and contributed to speculation about potential coalition partnerships.
The mechanisms by which these electoral shocks led to vote-switching vary 
from case to case. We identified three ways in which shocks can affect vote-
switching: via changing perceptions of competence; changes to the salience of 
particular issues and dimensions; and changes to the social and political image of 
a party. We also pointed to the importance of shocks as political opportunities 
that increase uncertainty but at the same time create a strong pressure on political 
parties to respond in some way. Shocks can change the ways parties compete 
for and win votes, making their consequences unpredictable and contingent on 
political strategies and the politicization of shocks in public and media discourse.
Looking first at shocks to competence, in Chapter 4, we demonstrated how the 
global financial crisis damaged Labour’s reputation for economic management, 
with long-run consequences. Our analysis showed that voters who judged the 
economy as performing badly before 2010 were still punishing Labour—and 
rewarding the Conservatives and UKIP—in 2015. This is a much longer-term 
economic voting effect than has been assumed in the economic voting literature. 
It suggests that voters are able to attribute responsibility for past performance 
and—under certain circumstances—continue to punish the party perceived to be 
responsible for economic downturns over prolonged time periods. This blame 
was, of course, politically contested. Labour was blamed for the national debt 
after 2010 because the Conservatives successfully made Labour’s alleged fiscal 
irresponsibility part of political discourse. This discourse contributed to the 
Conservative Party’s arguments that the austerity measures adopted by the co ali tion 
government were necessary. This demonstrates how shocks can create pol it ical 
opportunities that can continue to shape political competition for an extended 
period of time.
Chapter  5 provided evidence for another shock that affected the perceived 
competence of parties: the surge in immigration following the UK government’s 
decision not to delay free movement of people from EU Accession countries. 
The  inability of successive governments to respond to growing concerns about 
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immigration severely damaged the perceived competence of Labour on the issue, 
and then the Conservatives. This provided the opportunity for an anti-immigration 
party to fill that gap, leading to a dramatic upsurge in anti-European attitudes and 
support for UKIP.
The immigration shock did not only work through competence. The rise in EU 
immigration also increased the salience of immigration among the electorate. 
Immigration routinely featured as one of the most important issues in BES sur-
veys in the run-up to the 2015 General Election, and was one of the two issues 
most cited by Leave voters to explain their choice in the EU referendum. Similarly, 
an increase in the salience of Scottish nationalism was a crucial aspect of the 
Scottish independence referendum shock, insofar as Westminster vote choice 
became very closely aligned with attitudes towards independence. As a result of 
the referendum campaign, the emphasis on issues beyond the dominant left and 
right economic dimension provided a basis for vote-switching in Scotland. Most 
notably, those that favoured independence deserted Labour in large numbers and 
voted for the SNP in 2015. In both these cases, the issues that underpinned voters’ 
own views on the shock—immigration and Scottish independence respectively—
became more important in determining electoral choices.
The impact of the independence referendum was not only about the salience of 
Scottish independence and devolution. In Chapter 3, we described how a shock 
may alter the social and political image of parties by forcing parties to respond 
to an issue that may have been of little importance to vote choice, and to clarify 
their position which previously may have been obscure. Although it is difficult to 
differentiate between the effect of the independence referendum shock on the 
salience of independence and its impact on the political image of Labour, it seems 
likely that both played an important role in the strengthening of the association 
between Yes voting and SNP voting in 2015. Whereas before the independence 
referendum voters could view Labour primarily through the lens of the economic 
left–right dimension, after the referendum campaign—in which Labour cam-
paigned alongside the Conservatives to stay in the UK—voters also viewed Labour 
through the prism of the battle over independence. As a result of the shock to 
both salience and party images, the referendum precipitated a shift in allegiances 
of those backing independence to such a degree that 90 per cent of Yes voters 
voted for the SNP, including most of those who had previously voted Labour. 
Labour lost nearly half of its 2010 voters to the SNP at the 2015 General Election, 
the vast majority of whom had voted for independence the previous year.
Perhaps a more straightforward example of a shock to the image of a political 
party was described in Chapter 7. The main reason that the Liberal Democrat vote 
collapsed after the formation of the 2010 coalition was not primarily about 
responsibility for unpopular policies. Rather, it was a change in what its sup porters 
perceived the party stood for once it had sided with the Conservatives—the 
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‘old enemy’ of many Liberal Democrat voters. It was the very nature of the Liberal 
Democrat support base that meant that the coalition with the Conservatives 
damaged their popularity so much. Not only was that support base predominantly 
on the economic centre-left with a social liberal bias in political values, but many 
Liberal Democrat voters were natural Labour supporters lending the Liberal 
Democrats tactical support to keep out Conservative candidates. The coalition 
therefore affected the image of the Liberal Democrats as a plausible alternative for 
moderate centre-left voters. Their more left-wing supporters were much more 
likely to grow to dislike the party after coalition than those on the right, leading 
them to desert in large numbers 2015.
As we have already noted, electoral shocks need not work through a single 
mechanism. Perhaps the biggest electoral shock of all (at least in the period in 
which we primarily focus: between 2008 and 2017) was the 2016 referendum on 
EU membership. The impact of the referendum acted through all three of the 
mechanisms we have described. First, it was a shock to salience. The EU referen-
dum raised the importance of the issue of Europe in vote choice, such that sup-
port for the major parties coalesced around how people voted in the referendum, 
and strengthened the link between immigration and major party vote choice. The 
increased salience of the cultural dimension was reflected in the number of voters 
who identified Europe and immigration as their most important issues. Second, 
we showed how, following the EU referendum, the Conservatives’ perceived 
competence to reduce immigration rose sharply, helping them win over people 
who had voted for UKIP in 2015. Third, the referendum altered the image of the 
Conservatives, such that they were now seen as the party of Brexit following 
the EU referendum. By the time of the 2017 General Election, both Leavers and 
Remainers were in firm agreement about where the Conservatives stood on 
Europe. We showed in Chapter 9 how the strategic decision to get firmly behind 
Brexit helped the Conservatives sharply increase their vote share, underling the 
importance of shocks as political opportunities. Of course, this might only have 
had a short-term electoral pay-off in 2017, and might be the root of a longer-term 
penalty depending on the outcome of Brexit.
These electoral shocks—and the political responses to them—shaped the elec-
tions of 2015 and 2017, increasing volatility and dramatically affecting the political 
winners and losers. In 2015, the net beneficiaries were the smaller parties, 
although both Labour and the Conservatives were able to capitalize on the col-
lapse of the Liberal Democratic vote. In contrast, in 2017, the clear beneficiaries of 
volatility were the two major parties, leading to the largest two-party vote share 
since 1970. The record levels of switching were possible, in part, because of the 
long-term weakening of attachment of voters to political parties and the increase 
in voter volatility we described in Chapter 4. Indeed, each of the shocks we exam-
ined had a greater impact on vote-switching among weak or non-party iden ti fiers, 
as party identification acts as a buffer against vote-switching.
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10.1 Future shocks
As we write, British politics continues to stumble through a period of seemingly 
interminable crisis. The obvious question is what will happen in future elections? 
Will levels of individual volatility remain high or will we see an increase in parti-
san loyalty? Does the abrupt shift towards two-party politics at the 2017 Election 
mark the beginning of a new era of Conservative and Labour dominance, or will 
2017 turn out to be a blip on an otherwise continued trend toward party system 
fragmentation? Will Scottish electoral politics continue to be defined by the 
nationalist–unionist dimension or will Westminster politics return to pre-eminence? 
Will issues connected to the liberal–authoritarian dimension continue to increase 
their importance or shall we see a return to the politics of left and right?
The short answer—and this will hopefully not come as a surprise at the end of 
a book about political shocks—is that it depends what happens next.
The electoral shocks we have discussed in this book were largely unanticipated 
and their consequences unforeseen. Even the effects of anticipated shocks are 
unknowable. At the time we are putting the finishing touches on this book, we 
still do not know whether Brexit will definitely happen, and, if it does, what Brexit 
will actually look like, let alone what its economic and social and political conse-
quences will be. If Brexit goes well and the economy quickly recovers, or booms, 
would divisions over Brexit be quickly forgotten? Or, given that the main drivers 
of attitudes towards Brexit, such as authoritarianism, have little to do with eco-
nomic preferences, would voting be increasingly defined by the social dimension? 
Recent elections have clearly shown that campaigning on second-dimension 
issues can be a successful strategy, and it is unlikely that future political entrepre-
neurs will forget this lesson. If Brexit goes badly and the economy crashes, however, 
might future elections be driven by Brexit blame, incompetence, and recrimination? 
An economic crash could result in the perennial issues of redistribution, austerity, 
and economic competence reasserting themselves.
We might not be able to predict with any certainty how future shocks will affect 
the fortunes of specific political parties. However, just as we have situated shocks 
in the context of long-term trends in British politics, we can point to features of 
the British electorate and institutions that might encourage or impede future 
vola til ity and fragmentation. In other words, while we might not be able to antici-
pate future shocks, we are able to identify the conditions that will be likely to 
shape their impact.
Our analysis points to two long-term factors that predict voter volatility: the 
level of partisanship and the size of the minor party vote. The size of the minor party 
vote shrunk in 2017 with Labour and the Conservatives both greatly increasing 
their vote shares. This strong two-party performance may be associated with 
lower levels of volatility at the next election, because major parties are better at 
retaining their voters than minor parties. We do have to be careful about this 
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extrapolation, however. Chapter 9 showed that Labour and the Conservatives are 
now competing on both the economic and social dimensions. Because these 
dimensions are uncorrelated in the population,1 this leaves large numbers of 
 voters for each party cross-pressured, making it potentially harder than usual for 
the major parties to retain their 2017 support. Given the high degree of po lar iza tion 
of attitudes on Leave and Remain, a compromise Brexit that pleases neither side 
has the potential to harm both Labour and the Conservatives.
One important consideration that might point towards the possibility of a 
period of primarily two-party politics is that smaller parties are likely to find 
establishing viability even more challenging than they have in recent elections. 
The 2015 Election demonstrated for UKIP what 1983 did for the SDP: diffuse 
national support is very difficult to translate into seats under the British electoral 
system. In Chapter 7 we showed that the Liberal Democrats face a viability problem 
that will likely continue to impede their electoral rehabilitation. History shows 
that the Liberal Democrats know how to overcome those viability problems 
through targeted campaigning in by-elections and local elections (Russell and 
Fieldhouse 2005), but these strategies take time. Brexit will also result in an 
important electoral change for Britain’s minor parties—the end of European 
Parliament elections. As we discussed in Chapter 4, European Parliament elections 
have provided a national platform for minor parties and have been an important 
stepping stone for later success in British elections. Via MEPs, European Parliament 
elections have provided an important source of funding and resources for smaller 
parties. Without this platform, minor parties will likely find getting their foot in 
the electoral door an even greater challenge.
The second factor influencing volatility is partisan dealignment. The level of 
partisanship no longer appears to be falling in Britain, but it does not appear to be 
increasing either. Our analysis shows that partisan dealignment has taken place 
mostly through a process of generational replacement. Therefore, any changes 
will tend to be slow, with a sudden surge in levels of partisanship seeming unlikely. 
Voters with no partisanship or low levels of party identity are much more likely to 
switch parties between elections, and so voters are still relatively unconstrained 
from switching parties. It therefore seems likely that partisan dealignment will 
continue to promote volatility at future elections. It would be a mistake, though, 
to assume that changes in partisanship can only move in one direction, or that 
partisanship must become less relevant to political decisions over time. 
Comparative research generally shows declines in partisanship across countries, 
but the size of these declines has varied substantially (Dalton 2012a; Dalton 2012b). 
Even where partisanship has declined, it does not necessarily translate into the 
kinds of volatile outcomes we have seen in Britain.
1 In the BES Internet Panel the economic left–right and liberal–authoritarian scales have a 
 cor re la tion of 0.03.
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The example of the United States is instructive. Overall levels of partisanship in 
America have declined but partisanship has become more important to vote 
choice over time (Bartels  2000; Brewer  2005). There is academic disagreement 
over whether this is because the American public has polarized (Abramowitz 2010) 
or merely sorted (Fiorina and Abrams 2008; Fiorina, Abrams, and Pope 2006) but 
the result is the same: Americans are less likely to switch away from ‘their’ party 
than in the past. The effect of polarization on volatility might be expected to 
counter the effects of partisan dealignment, making voters less willing to switch 
between parties. For example, in Chapter 4 we showed that major party voters 
who saw greater difference between the Conservatives and Labour less more 
likely to switch their votes between elections. However, since the early 1990s, not 
only have British voters become less aligned to parties, they have also become less 
polarized (Adams, Green, and Milazzo 2012), making the potential impact of 
shocks all the more powerful. Should the British electorate become more polar-
ized (as recent evidence indicates they might) then we might expect the effects of 
future shocks to be dampened.
A further lesson from the American experience of polarization is that the 
nature of political issues under contention is very important. In the US, partisan 
sorting has been shown to be driven by ‘culture wars’; issues such as race 
(Carmines and Stimson  1989), abortion (Adams  1997), gun control, and the 
en vir on ment (Lindaman and Haider-Markel  2002). These issues tend to be 
structured by authoritarianism (Hetherington and Weiler 2009), and as the sali-
ence of ‘culture wars’ issues has increased, American partisanship has in turn 
become increasingly structured by authoritarianism (Goren and Chapp  2017). 
Hetherington and Weiler (2009) argue that affective polarization has increased in 
the US because authoritarianism results in a fundamental clash of worldviews. 
People are now ‘divided over things that conjure more visceral reactions than 
economic issues (Hetherington and Weiler 2009, 11).
Until recently, Britain had largely escaped political conflict over the sorts of 
issues that have defined the American culture wars, but Brexit has highlighted 
similar conflicts. As we showed in Chapter  9, the cultural dimension is a key 
structuring factor in voters’ Brexit positions. We demonstrated the importance 
of Brexit for understanding voting in 2017, but what are the consequences for 
partisanship?
Figure 10.1 shows how the strength of Conservative Party identity among 2015 
Conservative voters varied over the waves of the BES Internet Panel for those 
who voted Leave or Remain at the 2016 EU referendum. From early 2014 to 
the EU referendum in 2016, the strengths of Conservative Party identity among 
Remain and Leave voters moved in parallel (although Remainers started off with 
weaker Conservative Party identities). Following the EU referendum, however, 
we see a divergence. Among Leavers, Conservative identity strength increased. 
Among Remainers, it declined. In other words, the large-scale switching of 
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pro-Brexit voters to the Conservatives was not simply an example of ‘short-term 
conversion’ (Butler and Stokes 1974) but also marked an underlying shift in the 
structure of partisan alignment.
Brexit might play a more direct role in influencing political identification in 
Britain by acting as an identity in its own right. Hobolt, Leeper, and Tilley (2018) 
demonstrate the degree to which people have come to identify with Remain and 
Leave as a social identity, akin to partisan identities. Indeed, BES data shows that 
people express a stronger identification on average with one of the referendum 
sides than they do with any political party, not just in the EU referendum but also 
the Scottish independence referendum.
Figure 10.2 shows the strength of party identity captured through a battery of 
items designed to measure party identification as a social identity (Bankert, 
Huddy, and Rosema 2017), compared with equivalent identity scales for the EU 
and Scottish referendums (see appendix for details). In every case, voters report 
stronger identification with their side on the cross-cutting issue than they do 
with  parties. Additionally, the proportion of people who report an identity on 
either side of the issue is higher for both referendums than for party identity. 
In other words, the decline of party identity may not necessarily reflect a decline 
in pol it ical identities more generally. Whether identification with the causes of 
leave or remain (or independence in Scotland) turns out to be sustained political 































March   
2015   
 May
2015
April   







April    




     2017
Figure 10.1 Mean strength of Conservative Party identity among Leave- and 
Remain-voting 2015 Conservative voters, on a scale where 0 = no/other party id, 
1 = not very strong Conservative id, 2 = fairly strong Conservative id, 3 = very strong 
Conservative id
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The American experience again provides some clues as to what the future 
effects of Brexit identities might look like. Mason (2015, 2016) argues that cross-
cutting identities weaken the perceived distinctiveness of different groups and 
allow people to feel like they belong to a broader range of identities, undermining 
‘the cognitive and motivational bases of in-group bias and negative emotion’ 
(Mason  2015, 131). Mason argues that racial, religious, cultural, and political 
identities have come into alignment in the US. As Americans have become 
increasingly socially sorted, affective polarization has followed. In Britain, as we 
demonstrated in Chapter 9, party choice has become more closely aligned with 
Brexit voting. The implications of that for polarization are explored in Figure 10.3. 
This shows the predicted scores (from a regression model, see Table A10.1 in the 
appendix) of how much respondents like the Conservative and Labour parties as 
a function of party strength and referendum identity immediately before the 2017 
General Election.2 The results show that when holding the strength of each iden-
tity constant, Conservative identifiers, who also identify as Leavers, feel more 
positively about the Conservatives and more negatively about Labour, compared 
to Conservatives who also identify as Remainers. Similarly, Labour identifiers 
who identify as Remainers feel more positively about Labour and less positively 
about the Conservatives than their Labour and Leave-identifying counterparts. 
This provides preliminary support for the expectation that any increasing alignment 
2 The strength of each identity is set to the overall mean strength of identity with each group 
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Identity
Figure 10.2 Strength of political identities measured using the seven-item social 
identity scales for party, EU referendum side, and Scottish referendum side
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of competing political identities has some potential to fuel affective po lar iza tion 
in Britain.
Perhaps the most powerful factor that may counteract this is the continuing 
importance of social class in British politics (Evans and Tilley 2017; Evans and 
Mellon 2016a) which cuts across the party–Brexit alignment. Even in 2017, when 
Brexit heavily influenced voting decisions, social class still proved to be an 
im port ant predictor of vote, albeit slightly weaker than in 2015. Labour, under 
Corbyn’s leadership, pursued traditional left-wing polices which appealed to its 
traditional working-class base at the same time as its socially liberal policies 
increased its appeal among highly educated professionals. Cross-cutting political 
cleavages are likely to result in lower overall levels of affective polarization. How 
cultural and economic issues structure vote choice in the future—and influence 
political identities and affective polarization—will depend on both the nature of the 
parties’ economic appeals and how they navigate the process and outcome of Brexit.
It is important not to underestimate the potential for future shocks to disrupt 
the effects of the Brexit shock. We do not have to look far for an example of one 
shock disrupting the effect of another. In Chapter  8 we showed how Scottish 
independence supporters flocked to the SNP in 2015, only for Brexit to peel 
Leave-supporting Yes voters away in 2017. In Chapter 6 we showed how the Brexit 
shock interrupted the effect of the global financial crisis.
The very nature of shocks means that it is impossible to predict the form that 

















































Figure 10.3 Predicted feelings towards the Conservative and Labour parties for 
aligned and unaligned party and Brexit identities of equal strength (wave 11 of the BES 
Internet Panel)
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House of Lords, a split in one (or both) of the major parties, to military conflict, 
economic crisis, or a major environmental catastrophe—the list of possible future 
shocks with the potential to disrupt British politics is endless. With hindsight, it 
has been possible to identify the concatenation of trends, decisions, and events 
that resulted in the shocks we have examined in this book. Future researchers will 
likewise be able to identify the portents of future shocks in our current politics. 
Undoubtedly, the seeds of future disruption have already been sown.
Our aim in this book is not to foretell future events, but to understand the 
impact of such events and to provide a new way of approaching the study of 
elections. We have set out an approach to the study of elections which emphasizes 
the interplay between the slowly evolving social and political context and the impact 
of electoral shocks. Just like complex systems in other domains, party systems 
are susceptible to change, depending on the level of inertia and volatility in the 
system and the exposure to external shocks (Prindle 2012). The long-term decline 
in partisan alignment in Britain and the rise of smaller parties have weakened 
the forces which have helped maintain the status quo and left the party system 
more volatile and more vulnerable to the impact of electoral shocks. To understand 
electoral outcomes, we need to consider not only the reaction of voters to shocks 
but the behaviour of political parties and other political actors. Electoral shocks 
present an opportunity (or a threat) to which politicians and parties must 
respond. How they do so shapes whether they are the winners or the losers of 
voter volatility.
The mechanisms by which shocks matter to electoral outcomes complement 
rather than compete with existing theories of voter behaviour. The mechanisms 
that we identified each draws directly on established theories of voter choice. 
First, to understand the impact of shocks to salience we rely on positional (spa-
tial) and salience theories of voter behaviour. Second, to understand how shocks 
to competence affect vote choices we must draw on performance and valence 
theories. Third, to understand the impact of shocks that change the social and 
political image of parties, we draw on sociological, psychological, and spatial 
theories of voter behaviour. Thus, we do not advocate abandoning any of these 
long-established theories, but rather we suggest that there is no one-size-fits-all 
model that explains voter behaviour and electoral outcomes across different 
 geographic and historical contexts. Different theories explain voter choices in 
different electoral circumstances. As those circumstances change as a result of 
electoral shocks, the relevance of one theory or another is also liable to change. 
What matters in one election or one country might not matter so much in another. 
Although we have presented evidence relating to the UK elections of 2015 and 2017, 
our approach is applicable across different contexts, even though the nature of 
electoral shocks and the underlying conditions of stability or volatility will vary.
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Father no party ID  0.653***
  (0.045)












No religion  0.297***
  (0.046)





Difference Conservative/Labour (Base = Not much difference)  
Some Difference  –0.566***
  (0.057)
Great difference  –1.087***
  (0.058)
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* p<0.05 ** p<0.01 *** p<0.001
Table A4.1 Continued
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Equation for within- and between-cohort variation
We define Act as the proportion of respondents at time t in age cohort c and Nct as the pro-
portion of age cohort c that does not identify with a political party at time t. Therefore for 





∈ …{ , , )
( )
18 19 99 100
2 1 1Ν Νc c c*A
 
and
 between cohort change
c
= −∑
∈ …{ , , )
( )
18 19 99 100
2 1 1Α Αc c c*N  
Table A4.3 Factiva Search terms used to calculate the effective number of media parties
Party Search string
Conservative (Conservative or Conservatives or Tory or Tories) AND party
Labour (Labour) AND party
Liberal Democrats (Liberal Democrat or Liberal Democrats or Lib Dem or Lib Dems or 
Lib-Dem or Lib-Dems) AND party
Green (Green Party) AND party
Plaid Cymru (Plaid Cymru) AND party
SNP (SNP or Scottish National Party) AND party
UKIP (UKIP or United Kingdom Independence Party) AND party
Respect (Respect Party) AND party
BNP (British National Party or BNP) AND party
Referendum (Referendum Party) AND party
the (control) the
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Table A5.1 Multilevel logit predicting immigration being seen 





Log(Immigration change) * Log(Immigration level) –0.122**
  (0.039)















Newspaper (Base = None)  
The Express 0.820***
  (0.123)








The Daily Telegraph 0.111
  (0.100)
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The Herald –0.821*
  (0.356)
The Western Mail –0.589
  (0.389)








N Local Authorities 787
* p<0.05; ** p<0.01; *** p<0.001
Table A5.2 Interclass correlation coefficients from the 
multilevel logit model shown in Table A5.1
Level Empty model Full model
Region 0.021 0.012
  (0.010) (0.006)
Local authority 0.047 0.024
  (0.010) (0.008)
Table A5.3 OLS model predicting yearly proportion of respondents saying immigration is 
an important issue as a function of newspaper coverage of immigration (Newspaper 
coverage and immigration levels are standardized)
 Daily Mail Daily Express The Sun All Daily Mail + 
polynomial
Daily Mail 0.101***   0.148*** 0.105***
  (0.015)     (0.026) (0.017)
Daily Express  0.034  –0.004  
    (0.021)   (0.019)  
The Sun   0.027* –0.022  
      (0.012) (0.017)  
Immigration 0.029 0.116* 0.130*** –0.003 0.023
  (0.021) (0.041175) (0.031) (0.033) (0.035)
Year 0.004 –0.002 0.000 0.004 –0.011
  (0.002) (0.005) (0.004) (0.003) (0.080)
Year2     0.001
          (0.003)
Year3         0.000
     (0.000)
Constant –7.609 3.14 –0.728 –8.099 20.988
  (3.864) (9.208) (8.803) (5.037) (159.143)
Adjusted R2 0.967 0.81 0.86 0.955 0.965
N 25 17 18 17 25
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Table A5.4 Two-parameter IRT model of 
immigration concern in the 2010 BESIP

























* p<0.05 ** p<0.01 *** p<0.001
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Table A5.5 Same vote in 2010 versus UKIP contrasts from multinomial 
logistic regression models of different groups of 2010 voters
 2010 Labour 2010 Conservative Liberal Democrat
EU approval –0.508*** –0.650*** –0.698




  (0.163) (0.110) (0.161)
Strength of ID with 2010 party (Base = No/different party ID)  
Not very strongly –0.083 –0.480* –0.880*
  (0.415) (0.213) (0.354)
Fairly strongly –0.461 –0.979*** –0.615*
  (0.336) (0.179) (0.285)
Very strongly –1.983*** –1.499*** –2.042**
 (0.517) (0.241) (0.773)
Education level (Base = No qualifications)   
GCSE D–G –0.224 –0.454 –0.181
  (0.541) (0.383) (0.700)
GCSE A*–C –0.162 –0.453 –0.747
  (0.390) (0.255) (0.495)
A level –0.132 –0.321 –0.765
  (0.471) (0.270) (0.536)
Undergraduate –0.546 –0.675* –1.025*
  (0.463) (0.273) (0.492)
Postgrad –14.501 –0.067 –0.850
  (707.056) (0.369) (0.626)
Other qualification –0.517 –0.640* –0.583
  (0.488) (0.272) (0.515)
Age 0.006 –0.014* 0.011
  (0.012) (0.007) (0.010)
Female –0.467 –0.291 –0.136
  (0.262) (0.148) (0.236)
Constant –0.249 1.750** 1.715*
  (0.945) (0.543) (0.826)
N origin voters 1,056 1,588 1,178
N UKIP switchers 81 270 130
Pseudo R2 0.1381 0.1155 0.0923
* p<0.05 ** p<0.01 *** p<0.001
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Table A5.6 OLS regression predicting approval of EU 
membership (five category dependent variable) used  
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Table A6.1 Graded response IRT model of economic left–right values
 Measured in wave:
 1–5 6 7–9 10–12 13
Government should redistribute income from the better off to those who are less well off
Discrimination 1.954*** 2.139*** 2.018*** 1.961*** 2.074***
 (0.0166) (0.0198) (0.0171) (0.0183) (0.0194)
Difficulty (base = Strongly disagree)
≥Disagree –2.141*** –1.860*** –2.138*** –2.042*** –1.868***
 (0.0173) (0.0162) (0.0173) (0.0181) (0.0165)












≥ Agree –0.166*** –0.0595*** –0.149*** –0.0735*** –0.0414***
 (0.00754) (0.00811) (0.00755) (0.00812) (0.00818)
= Strongly agree 1.020*** 1.099*** 1.131*** 1.254*** 1.216***
 (0.0102) (0.0113) (0.0106) (0.0123) (0.0120)
Big business takes advantage of ordinary people
Discrimination 2.147*** 2.647*** 2.278*** 2.163*** 2.438***
 (0.0189) (0.0254) (0.0200) (0.0212) (0.0235)
Difficulty (base = Strongly disagree)     
≥ Disagree –2.863*** –2.613*** –3.013*** –3.046*** –2.719***
 (0.0268) (0.0256) (0.0303) (0.0341) (0.0278)












≥ Agree –0.972*** –0.820*** –0.902*** –0.968*** –0.770***
 (0.00903) (0.00862) (0.00866) (0.00978) (0.00874)
= Strongly agree 0.548*** 0.499*** 0.663*** 0.635*** 0.687***
 (0.00813) (0.00817) (0.00836) (0.00909) (0.00893)
Ordinary working people do not get their fair share of the nation’s wealth
Discrimination 2.528*** 3.033*** 2.709*** 2.516*** 2.811***
 (0.0214) (0.0285) (0.0231) (0.0236) (0.0263)
Difficulty (base = Strongly disagree)
≥ Disagree –2.515*** –2.375*** –2.657*** –2.668*** –2.405***
 (0.0207) (0.0209) (0.0231) (0.0261) (0.0217)












≥ Agree –0.742*** –0.571*** –0.718*** –0.703*** –0.539***
 (0.00760) (0.00750) (0.00745) (0.00809) (0.00759)
= Strongly agree 0.595*** 0.610*** 0.668*** 0.753*** 0.764***
 (0.00767) (0.00797) (0.00775) (0.00881) (0.00861)
Continued
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 Measured in wave:
 1–5 6 7–9 10–12 13
There is one law for the rich and one for the poor
Discrimination 2.513*** 3.089*** 2.743*** 2.525*** 2.672***
 (0.0213) (0.0292) (0.0237) (0.0240) (0.0251)
Difficulty (base = Strongly disagree)
≥ Disagree –2.334*** –2.083*** –2.444*** –2.504*** –2.260***
 (0.0181) (0.0166) (0.0196) (0.0230) (0.0195)












≥ Agree –0.704*** –0.624*** –0.764*** –0.809*** –0.618***
 (0.00750) (0.00750) (0.00752) (0.00838) (0.00789)
= Strongly agree 0.502*** 0.410*** 0.452*** 0.477*** 0.586***
 (0.00747) (0.00746) (0.00722) (0.00799) (0.00826)
Management will always try to get the better of employees if it gets the chance
Discrimination 1.560*** 1.892*** 1.714*** 1.637*** 1.792***
 (0.0146) (0.0187) (0.0157) (0.0168) (0.0180)
Difficulty (base = Strongly disagree)
≥ Disagree –3.212*** –2.865*** –3.287*** –3.303*** –2.987***
 (0.0333) (0.0310) (0.0351) (0.0390) (0.0334)












≥ Agree –0.688*** –0.624*** –0.708*** –0.770*** –0.619***
 (0.00960) (0.00952) (0.00929) (0.0105) (0.00973)
= Strongly agree 0.916*** 0.848*** 0.957*** 0.979*** 0.990***
 (0.0111) (0.0109) (0.0109) (0.0122) (0.0118)
* p<0.05 ** p<0.01 *** p<0.001
Note: The direction of the predicted score is then reversed to give a scale that runs from left to right.
Table A6.1 Continued
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Table A6.2 Graded response IRT model of liberal–authoritarian values
 Measured in wave:
 1–5 6 7–9 10–12 13
Young people today don’t have enough respect for traditional British values
Discrimination 2.216*** 2.302*** 2.365*** 2.481*** 2.443***
 (0.0188) (0.0215) (0.0199) (0.0226) (0.0225)
Difficulty (base = Strongly disagree)
≥ Disagree –2.409*** –2.268*** –2.269*** –2.116*** –2.019***
 (0.0188) (0.0195) (0.0176) (0.0174) (0.0169)












≥ Agree –0.523*** –0.390*** –0.397*** –0.377*** –0.289***
 (0.00776) (0.00830) (0.00746) (0.00769) (0.00789)
= Strongly agree 0.726*** 0.804*** 0.839*** 0.798*** 0.837***
 (0.00825) (0.00931) (0.00838) (0.00856) (0.00898)
For some crimes, the death penalty is the most appropriate sentence
Discrimination 2.249*** 2.387*** 2.342*** 2.317*** 2.432***
 (0.0200) (0.0233) (0.0207) (0.0222) (0.0237)
Difficulty (base = Strongly disagree)     
≥ Disagree –0.933*** –0.771*** –0.816*** –0.839*** –0.794***
 (0.00924) (0.00949) (0.00885) (0.00959) (0.00957)












≥ Agree –0.0518*** 0.101*** 0.106*** 0.0809*** 0.0701***
 (0.00704) (0.00767) (0.00699) (0.00742) (0.00755)
= Strongly agree 0.769*** 0.903*** 0.919*** 0.912*** 0.846***
 (0.00843) (0.00968) (0.00883) (0.00942) (0.00918)
Schools should teach children to obey authority
Discrimination 1.981*** 2.045*** 2.060*** 2.209*** 2.212***
 (0.0172) (0.0196) (0.0177) (0.0204) (0.0207)
Difficulty (base = Strongly disagree)
≥ Disagree –2.669*** –2.517*** –2.434*** –2.319*** –2.322***
 (0.0223) (0.0231) (0.0200) (0.0201) (0.0206)












≥ Agree –0.774*** –0.628*** –0.530*** –0.515*** –0.494***
 (0.00884) (0.00934) (0.00817) (0.00834) (0.00863)
= Strongly agree 0.795*** 0.900*** 0.974*** 0.918*** 0.932***
 (0.00893) (0.0103) (0.00947) (0.00948) (0.00977)
Censorship of films and magazines is necessary to uphold moral standards
Discrimination 1.120*** 1.159*** 1.153*** 1.251*** 1.259***
 (0.0120) (0.0138) (0.0123) (0.0140) (0.0143)
Difficulty (base = Strongly disagree)
≥ Disagree –2.363*** –2.203*** –2.234*** –2.055*** –2.061***
 (0.0252) (0.0264) (0.0242) (0.0233) (0.0239)
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 Measured in wave:
 1–5 6 7–9 10–12 13
≥ Agree 0.000659 0.140*** 0.180*** 0.163*** 0.192***
 (0.0105) (0.0119) (0.0107) (0.0107) (0.0111)
= Strongly agree 1.967*** 2.074*** 2.203*** 2.043*** 2.026***
 (0.0218) (0.0255) (0.0239) (0.0230) (0.0232)
People who break the law should be given stiffer sentences
Discrimination 2.351*** 2.520*** 2.555*** 2.565*** 2.554***
 (0.0201) (0.0236) (0.0216) (0.0236) (0.0239)
Difficulty (base = Strongly disagree)
≥ Disagree –2.742*** –2.567*** –2.541*** –2.484*** –2.532***
 (0.0227) (0.0227) (0.0204) (0.0217) (0.0230)












≥ Agree –0.639*** –0.471*** –0.420*** –0.433*** –0.403***
 (0.00789) (0.00818) (0.00730) (0.00774) (0.00802)
= Strongly agree 0.635*** 0.726*** 0.792*** 0.773*** 0.774***
 (0.00775) (0.00864) (0.00795) (0.00833) (0.00856)
* p<0.05 ** p<0.01 *** p<0.001
Table A6.2 Continued
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Table A6.3 Multinomial logistic regression model of 2015 vote
Conservatives (base  
category = Labour)
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5
2010 Retrospective 
economic evaluation
–0.268*** –0.237 –0.234*** –0.227*** –0.223
(0.0629) (0.139) (0.0642) (0.0652) (0.146)
2015 Retrospective 
economic evaluation
0.669*** 0.179 0.479*** 0.570*** 0.108
(0.0765) (0.212) (0.0800) (0.0789) (0.218)
Labour economic 
competence
  –1.001***     –0.851***
  (0.175)     (0.185)
Conservative economic 
competence
  0.712***     0.580**
  (0.192)     (0.201)
Attitude towards austerity     0.929***   0.695**
      (0.100)   (0.237)
Labour responsible for 
Global Financial Crisis
      0.0306 –0.600
      (0.146) (0.332)
Labour responsible for 
level of national debt
      1.155*** 0.616
      (0.157) (0.365)
Age 0.0315*** 0.0313** 0.0336*** 0.0324*** 0.0323**
  (0.00557) (0.0116) (0.00569) (0.00566) (0.0119)
Female –0.263 –0.245 –0.135 –0.153 –0.173
  (0.134) (0.294) (0.138) (0.137) (0.302)
Education level (Base = no qualifications)      
Below GCSE 0.588 0.434 0.517 0.621 0.491
  (0.346) (0.782) (0.350) (0.352) (0.793)
GCSE 0.348 –0.134 0.333 0.339 –0.0322
  (0.255) (0.576) (0.259) (0.261) (0.581)
A Level 0.530* –0.110 0.545* 0.487 –0.0184
  (0.270) (0.606) (0.275) (0.277) (0.617)
Undergraduate 0.370 –0.506 0.326 0.271 –0.478
  (0.256) (0.576) (0.261) (0.262) (0.586)
Postgraduate 0.411 –0.548 0.313 0.244 –0.623
  (0.342) (0.780) (0.350) (0.346) (0.787)
Other –0.219 –1.225 –0.246 –0.252 –1.067
  (0.431) (0.883) (0.438) (0.436) (0.905)
Income percentile 0.00723* 0.0126* 0.00662* 0.00694* 0.0132*
  (0.00286) (0.00630) (0.00292) (0.00291) (0.00645)
Missing income 
data dummy
–0.197 0.215 –0.206 –0.167 0.165
(0.229) (0.499) (0.234) (0.230) (0.503)
Economic left–right  
values
1.461*** 1.328*** 1.163*** 1.420*** 1.164***
(0.0974) (0.215) (0.103) (0.0990) (0.223)
Liberal–authoritarian 
values
0.902*** 0.799*** 0.864*** 0.869*** 0.796***
(0.0963) (0.210) (0.0985) (0.0977) (0.213)
Immigration attitudes 0.257** 0.184 0.248** 0.208* 0.249
  (0.0940) (0.215) (0.0955) (0.0960) (0.220)
2015 not very strong 
Conservative Party id
0.794*** 0.179 0.751*** 0.722*** 0.0952
(0.171) (0.366) (0.174) (0.172) (0.372)
2015 fairly strong 
Conservative Party id
1.002*** 0.506 0.914*** 0.930*** 0.418
(0.167) (0.376) (0.170) (0.169) (0.383)
2015 very strong 
Conservative Party id
1.513*** 2.228* 1.406*** 1.463*** 2.176*
(0.293) (1.094) (0.298) (0.294) (1.104)
Continued
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2015 not very strong 
Labour Party id
–1.366*** –0.518 –1.309*** –1.204*** –0.333
(0.227) (0.499) (0.231) (0.233) (0.510)
2015 fairly strong Labour  
Party id
–2.645*** –0.764 –2.504*** –2.450*** –0.729
(0.255) (0.515) (0.258) (0.260) (0.525)
2015 very strong Labour  
Party id
–4.145*** –2.626* –3.932*** –3.874*** –2.447
(0.675) (1.245) (0.695) (0.685) (1.338)
2010 not very strong 
Conservative Party id
0.392* –0.240 0.393* 0.355* –0.186
(0.160) (0.356) (0.162) (0.161) (0.362)
2010 fairly strong 
Conservative Party id
0.830*** 0.795* 0.853*** 0.779*** 0.792*
(0.184) (0.394) (0.187) (0.185) (0.402)
2010 very strong 
Conservative Party id
0.562* 0.997 0.612* 0.501 1.065
(0.274) (0.657) (0.279) (0.274) (0.684)
2010 not very strong 
Labour Party id
0.129 –0.0588 0.242 0.172 –0.0780
(0.217) (0.461) (0.221) (0.222) (0.464)
2010 fairly strong Labour  
Party id
–0.0610 –0.555 0.0229 0.0474 –0.633
(0.253) (0.529) (0.257) (0.259) (0.537)
2010 very strong Labour  
Party id
–0.520 –0.553 –0.529 –0.428 –0.727
(0.515) (1.033) (0.531) (0.519) (1.057)
Constant –3.567*** –1.542 –3.350*** –4.122*** –1.761
  (0.540) (1.232) (0.552) (0.560) (1.314)
N 4228 992 4218 4228 992
Liberal Democrats (base 
category = Labour)
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5
2010 Retrospective 
economic evaluation
–0.190** –0.0375 –0.176* –0.184** –0.0288
(0.0686) (0.158) (0.0689) (0.0703) (0.162)
2015 Retrospective 
economic evaluation
0.378*** 0.540* 0.297*** 0.327*** 0.507*
(0.0843) (0.241) (0.0880) (0.0864) (0.244)
Labour economic 
competence
  –0.641**     –0.637**
  (0.201)     (0.208)
Conservative economic 
competence
  –0.131     –0.127
  (0.202)     (0.216)
Attitude towards austerity     0.399***   –0.220
      (0.110)   (0.276)
Labour responsible for 
Global Financial Crisis
      –0.153 –0.422
      (0.164) (0.378)
Labour responsible for  
level of national debt
      0.673*** 0.580
      (0.160) (0.393)
Age 0.0155* 0.0126 0.0168** 0.0161** 0.0132
  (0.00605) (0.0130) (0.00612) (0.00610) (0.0132)
Female –0.261 0.144 –0.244 –0.190 0.0791
  (0.150) (0.350) (0.152) (0.152) (0.358)
Education level (Base = no qualifications)      
Below GCSE 0.394 0.523 0.386 0.405 0.646
  (0.435) (1.210) (0.437) (0.436) (1.215)
GCSE 0.420 1.150 0.421 0.382 1.256
  (0.323) (0.884) (0.325) (0.326) (0.888)
A Level 0.219 0.658 0.226 0.207 0.757
  (0.339) (0.908) (0.341) (0.341) (0.914)
Table A6.3 Continued
Conservatives (base  
category = Labour)
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5
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Undergraduate 0.223 0.0935 0.218 0.137 0.134
  (0.317) (0.884) (0.320) (0.320) (0.891)
Postgraduate –0.0307 –0.586 –0.0485 –0.169 –0.745
  (0.388) (1.053) (0.391) (0.391) (1.068)
Other –0.0526 –1.707 –0.0469 –0.0859 –1.741
  (0.517) (1.443) (0.519) (0.516) (1.450)
Income percentile 0.00424 0.00310 0.00390 0.00438 0.00370
  (0.00310) (0.00704) (0.00312) (0.00313) (0.00715)
Missing income data 
dummy
–0.261 0.384 –0.281 –0.278 0.384















–0.0417 –0.228 –0.103 –0.0647 –0.278
(0.101) (0.230) (0.102) (0.101) (0.235)
Immigration attitudes 0.121 0.186 0.124 0.0999 0.181
  (0.110) (0.265) (0.110) (0.111) (0.270)
2015 not very strong 
Liberal Democrat  
Party id
1.348*** 1.341** 1.357*** 1.337*** 1.464**
(0.212) (0.504) (0.213) (0.213) (0.516)
2015 fairly strong Liberal 
Democrat Party id
1.897*** 1.604** 1.872*** 1.883*** 1.584**
(0.264) (0.550) (0.266) (0.265) (0.554)
2015 very strong Liberal 
Democrat Party id
3.621*** 1.958 3.653*** 3.644*** 1.636
(0.718) (1.345) (0.736) (0.722) (1.384)
2015 not very strong 
Liberal Democrat  
Party id
–0.787** –1.092 –0.760** –0.680** –1.003
(0.250) (0.565) (0.251) (0.253) (0.573)
2015 fairly strong Labour  
Party id
–1.579*** –1.855** –1.511*** –1.477*** –1.770**
(0.256) (0.614) (0.256) (0.258) (0.622)
2015 very strong Labour  
Party id
–3.062*** –16.42 –2.938*** –2.924*** –15.76
(0.577) (895.4) (0.579) (0.580) (645.0)
2010 not very strong 
Liberal Democrat  
Party id
0.605** 0.762 0.591** 0.637** 0.667
(0.200) (0.481) (0.201) (0.202) (0.490)
2010 fairly strong Liberal 
Democrat Party id
0.270 0.627 0.264 0.283 0.568
(0.264) (0.581) (0.265) (0.265) (0.590)
2010 very strong Liberal 
Democrat Party id
0.752 1.050 0.743 0.730 0.914
(0.495) (1.121) (0.496) (0.494) (1.095)
2010 not very strong 
Labour Party id
–0.152 0.515 –0.128 –0.118 0.343
(0.262) (0.562) (0.263) (0.264) (0.565)
2010 fairly strong  
Labour Party id
–0.0137 0.637 –0.0116 0.0172 0.546
(0.277) (0.623) (0.278) (0.280) (0.631)
2010 very strong  
Labour Party id
–0.115 0.0657 –0.0933 –0.0583 0.0224
(0.453) (1.204) (0.455) (0.456) (1.209)
Constant –2.415*** –1.721 –2.278*** –2.630*** –1.840
  (0.592) (1.474) (0.597) (0.607) (1.536)
N 4228 992 4218 4228 992
UKIP (base  
category = Labour)
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5
2010 Retrospective 
economic evaluation
–0.359*** –0.310* –0.334*** –0.326*** –0.331*
(0.0650) (0.149) (0.0659) (0.0671) (0.154)
Continued
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2015 Retrospective 
economic evaluation
0.212** 0.110 0.0527 0.142 0.0377
(0.0716) (0.209) (0.0758) (0.0738) (0.214)
Labour economic 
competence
  –0.947***     –0.868***
  (0.181)     (0.193)
Conservative economic 
competence
  0.0678     –0.0485
  (0.185)     (0.193)
Attitude towards austerity     0.767***   0.388
      (0.0979)   (0.236)
Labour responsible for  
Global Financial Crisis
      0.0866 –0.811*
      (0.148) (0.347)
Labour responsible for 
level of national debt
      0.775*** 0.565
      (0.152) (0.373)
Age 0.0265*** 0.0418** 0.0274*** 0.0276*** 0.0420**
  (0.00591) (0.0132) (0.00599) (0.00597) (0.0134)
Female –0.594*** –0.547 –0.526*** –0.514*** –0.583
  (0.137) (0.311) (0.140) (0.139) (0.319)
Education level (Base = no qualifications)      
Below GCSE 0.258 0.923 0.217 0.293 1.090
  (0.320) (0.793) (0.324) (0.323) (0.805)
GCSE 0.373 0.481 0.351 0.369 0.601
  (0.233) (0.581) (0.237) (0.237) (0.585)
A Level 0.261 0.109 0.298 0.241 0.243
  (0.257) (0.639) (0.261) (0.262) (0.647)
Undergraduate –0.171 –0.185 –0.209 –0.243 –0.115
  (0.245) (0.602) (0.251) (0.250) (0.609)
Postgraduate 0.173 0.00454 0.103 0.0251 0.0137
  (0.355) (0.855) (0.362) (0.358) (0.865)
Other –0.0621 –0.483 –0.0750 –0.103 –0.293
  (0.425) (0.959) (0.430) (0.429) (0.979)
Income percentile 0.00186 0.0109 0.00127 0.00154 0.0116
  (0.00294) (0.00652) (0.00300) (0.00298) (0.00664)
Missing income data 
dummy
–0.0635 0.0459 –0.0731 –0.0462 –0.00686
(0.232) (0.549) (0.236) (0.232) (0.546)
Economic left–right values 0.723*** 0.730*** 0.468*** 0.690*** 0.652**
  (0.0921) (0.216) (0.0990) (0.0938) (0.228)
Liberal–authoritarian 
values
0.907*** 0.633** 0.864*** 0.882*** 0.627**
(0.0942) (0.213) (0.0962) (0.0951) (0.215)
Immigration attitudes 0.626*** 0.803*** 0.621*** 0.581*** 0.851***
  (0.0925) (0.213) (0.0939) (0.0939) (0.219)
2015 not very strong 
UKIP party id
0.658* 0.985 0.669* 0.702* 1.015
(0.283) (0.573) (0.283) (0.283) (0.581)
2015 fairly strong UKIP  
party id
1.987*** 2.306*** 2.003*** 1.994*** 2.379***
(0.225) (0.463) (0.225) (0.225) (0.471)
2015 very strong UKIP  
party id
2.823*** 2.899*** 2.921*** 2.864*** 2.889***
(0.315) (0.622) (0.319) (0.317) (0.644)
2015 not very strong 
Labour Party id
–1.597*** –0.372 –1.558*** –1.414*** –0.275
(0.238) (0.511) (0.242) (0.242) (0.524)
2015 fairly strong Labour  
Party id
–1.825*** –0.710 –1.698*** –1.668*** –0.669
(0.213) (0.519) (0.216) (0.217) (0.526)
Table A6.3 Continued
UKIP (base  
category = Labour)
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5
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2015 very strong Labour  
Party id
–2.834*** –1.876 –2.718*** –2.623*** –1.736
(0.408) (0.968) (0.419) (0.408) (0.971)
2010 not very strong 
UKIP party id
0.414 0.0692 0.411 0.416 0.0663
(0.263) (0.628) (0.265) (0.263) (0.629)
2010 fairly strong UKIP  
party id
0.409 –0.0859 0.369 0.394 –0.0900
(0.303) (0.522) (0.305) (0.305) (0.537)
2010 very strong UKIP  
party id
2.477*** 0.619 2.441*** 2.396*** 0.616
(0.652) (1.205) (0.664) (0.657) (1.202)
2010 not very strong 
Labour Party id
–0.110 –0.110 –0.0312 –0.0754 –0.180
(0.212) (0.486) (0.216) (0.215) (0.484)
2010 fairly strong Labour  
Party id
–0.198 0.274 –0.142 –0.113 0.0957
(0.232) (0.499) (0.235) (0.236) (0.500)
2010 very strong Labour  
Party id
–1.211** –1.089 –1.144* –1.098* –1.258
(0.460) (1.094) (0.466) (0.457) (1.065)
Constant –1.176* –0.600 –0.901 –1.607** –0.327
  (0.531) (1.293) (0.542) (0.549) (1.344)
N 4228 992 4218 4228 992
Green Party (base 
category = Labour)
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5
2010 Retrospective 
economic evaluation
–0.107 –0.262 –0.104 –0.0768 –0.199
(0.0883) (0.216) (0.0884) (0.0906) (0.224)
2015 Retrospective 
economic evaluation
–0.0123 –0.0917 –0.0427 –0.0431 –0.0886
(0.102) (0.311) (0.106) (0.103) (0.318)
Labour economic 
competence
  –0.417     –0.434
  (0.261)     (0.272)
Conservative economic 
competence
  –0.0865     –0.0581
  (0.282)     (0.307)
Attitude towards austerity     0.165   –0.00949
    (0.137)   (0.367)
Labour responsible for 
Global Financial Crisis
      0.225 0.560
      (0.203) (0.477)
Labour responsible for 
level of national debt
      0.369 –0.207
      (0.202) (0.541)
Age 0.00179 0.00910 0.00203 0.00262 0.0106
  (0.00760) (0.0187) (0.00764) (0.00763) (0.0188)
Female 0.136 0.0234 0.143 0.166 –0.0519
  (0.193) (0.455) (0.193) (0.194) (0.472)
Education level (Base = no qualifications)      
Below GCSE –1.090 –14.32 –1.124 –1.080 –13.73
  (0.810) (1024.1) (0.810) (0.810) (722.9)
GCSE 0.152 –0.189 0.134 0.144 –0.269
  (0.419) (0.883) (0.419) (0.421) (0.897)
A Level 0.0938 –1.142 0.0756 0.0624 –1.320
  (0.430) (0.939) (0.430) (0.433) (0.970)
Undergraduate 0.0911 –1.278 0.0760 0.0414 –1.270
  (0.408) (0.901) (0.408) (0.411) (0.902)
Postgraduate 0.688 –1.383 0.656 0.596 –1.296
  (0.463) (1.097) (0.464) (0.466) (1.086)
Other –0.960 –0.632 –0.926 –1.012 –0.543
  (0.908) (1.458) (0.903) (0.910) (1.452)
Continued
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Income percentile 0.000135 –0.000611 5.64e–08 –0.000168 –0.00129
  (0.00378) (0.00866) (0.00378) (0.00378) (0.00871)
Missing income data 
dummy
–0.609 –0.658 –0.633 –0.637 –0.576
(0.373) (1.019) (0.373) (0.375) (1.012)
Economic left–right values –0.166 –0.487 –0.217 –0.176 –0.468
  (0.122) (0.295) (0.132) (0.123) (0.319)
Liberal–authoritarian 
values
–0.125 –0.578* –0.146 –0.133 –0.576*
(0.116) (0.279) (0.119) (0.117) (0.287)
Immigration attitudes –0.239 –0.425 –0.244 –0.277 –0.468
  (0.143) (0.360) (0.143) (0.144) (0.368)
2015 not very strong 
Green Party id
1.743*** 2.342** 1.737*** 1.738*** 2.282*
(0.374) (0.888) (0.373) (0.374) (0.898)
2015 fairly strong Green  
Party id
2.190*** 1.911* 2.175*** 2.210*** 2.126**
(0.340) (0.793) (0.341) (0.340) (0.807)
2015 very strong Green  
Party id
4.303*** 5.340*** 4.253*** 4.353*** 5.817***
(0.855) (1.475) (0.852) (0.858) (1.539)
2015 not very strong 
Labour Party id
–0.560* –0.904 –0.557 –0.472 –0.945
(0.286) (0.775) (0.286) (0.290) (0.802)
2015 fairly strong Labour  
Party id
–1.635*** –0.721 –1.608*** –1.558*** –0.682
(0.304) (0.669) (0.304) (0.305) (0.684)
2015 very strong Labour  
Party id
–2.779*** –2.162 –2.747*** –2.668*** –2.150
(0.600) (1.276) (0.601) (0.602) (1.261)
2010 not very strong  
Green Party id
–0.0178 0.505 0.0244 –0.0118 0.651
(0.438) (1.023) (0.438) (0.439) (1.017)
2010 fairly strong Green  
Party id
–0.256 0.203 –0.259 –0.276 0.123
(0.517) (1.061) (0.517) (0.515) (1.047)
2010 very strong Green  
Party id
1.792 0 1.803 1.817 0
(1.503) (.) (1.484) (1.540) (.)
2010 not very strong 
Labour Party id
–0.361 –0.205 –0.347 –0.327 –0.166
(0.293) (0.648) (0.294) (0.295) (0.658)
2010 fairly strong Labour  
Party id
–0.705* –1.348 –0.693* –0.647 –1.303
(0.329) (0.767) (0.328) (0.330) (0.791)
2010 very strong Labour  
Party id
–0.993 –1.094 –0.980 –0.938 –1.082
(0.573) (1.255) (0.572) (0.577) (1.257)
Constant –1.194 0.673 –1.093 –1.492* 0.299
  (0.718) (1.740) (0.719) (0.739) (1.889)
N 4228 992 4218 4228 992
* p<0.05 ** p<0.01 *** p<0.001
Table A6.3 Continued
Green Party (base 
category = Labour)
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5
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Table A6.4 Graded response IRT Model of austerity attitudes
Necessity of deficit reduction  
Discrimination –0.888***
 (0.0107)
Difficulty (base = It is completely unnecessary)  
≥ It is not necessary but it would be desirable 3.119***
 (0.0367)
≥ It is important but not absolutely necessary 0.991***
 (0.0156)
= It is completely necessary –1.774***
 (0.0212)
How to reduce deficit  
Discrimination –1.201***
 (0.0117)
Difficulty (base = Only by increasing taxes)  
≥ Mainly by increasing taxes, but also by cutting spending 1.633***
 (0.0166)
≥ An equal balance of spending cuts and tax increases 0.460***
 (0.00993)
≥ Mainly by cutting spending, but with some tax increases –1.435***
 (0.0139)
= Only by cutting spending –2.592***
 (0.0237)
Cuts too far: public spending  
Discrimination 4.710***
 (0.0584)
Difficulty (base = Not gone nearly far enough)  
≥ Not gone far enough –2.177***
 (0.0134)
≥ About right –1.339***
 (0.00758)
≥ Gone too far –0.388***
 (0.00536)
= Gone much too far 0.617***
 (0.00585)
Cuts too far: NHS  
Discrimination 2.739***
 (0.0231)
Difficulty (base = Not gone nearly far enough)  
≥ Not gone far enough –2.747***
 (0.0212)
≥ About right –1.944***
 (0.0121)
≥ Gone too far –0.949***
 (0.00713)
= Gone much too far 0.220***
 (0.00594)
Continued
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Table A6.5 Multinomial Logistic regression model of 2017 vote

































Age 0.0271*** 0.0343*** 0.0218 0.00968
 (0.00738) (0.00801) (0.0153) (0.0144)
Female –0.106 –0.297 –0.257 –0.0956
 (0.171) (0.196) (0.316) (0.346)
Education level (Base = no qualifications)   
Below GCSE 0.358 0.839 –0.358 –15.39
 (0.428) (0.583) (0.759) (1363.3)
GCSE –0.0727 0.258 0.0348 –0.752
 (0.309) (0.455) (0.456) (0.619)
A Level 0.0559 0.522 –0.680 –0.919
 (0.333) (0.454) (0.566) (0.665)
Undergraduate –0.285 0.132 –0.384 –0.678
 (0.317) (0.436) (0.513) (0.585)
Postgraduate –0.0345 0.699 –1.268 –0.595
 (0.432) (0.496) (1.159) (0.765)
Other –0.372 0.151 0.304 –1.056
 (0.726) (0.884) (1.022) (1.530)
Income percentile 0.00221 0.00899* 0.0108 0.00142
 (0.00353) (0.00377) (0.00654) (0.00687)
Economic left–right values 0.959*** 0.520*** 0.328 0.339
 (0.120) (0.128) (0.197) (0.222)
Liberal–authoritarian values 0.274* 0.0458 0.0760 –0.267
 (0.118) (0.125) (0.213) (0.221)
Cuts too far: Local services  
Discrimination 3.368***
 (0.0305)
Difficulty (base = Not gone nearly far enough)  
≥ Not gone far enough –2.660***
 (0.0200)
≥ About right –1.822***
 (0.0107)
≥ Gone too far –0.422***
 (0.00579)
= Gone much too far 0.780***
 (0.00668)
* p<0.05 ** p<0.01 *** p<0.001
Note: The direction of the predicted score is then reversed to give a scale that 
runs from anti-austerity to pro-austerity.
Table A6.4 Continued
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Immigration attitudes 0.208 –0.104 0.511* –0.104
 (0.119) (0.143) (0.223) (0.257)
EU attitudes 1.073*** –0.286* 1.437*** 0.236
 (0.132) (0.141) (0.274) (0.251)




















































































































































































Constant –3.539*** –3.529*** –5.213*** –1.645
 (0.697) (0.809) (1.348) (1.307)
N 2255
* p<0.05 ** p<0.01 *** p<0.001
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Table A7.2 Multinomial logistic model of 2015 vote choice of 2010 Liberal Democrat 
voters
Base = Liberal Democrats Conservatives Labour UKIP Green Party
Like Outcome Party 0.983*** 0.661*** 0.734*** 0.720***
 (0.0910) (0.0592) (0.0703) (0.0860)
Like Liberal Democrats –0.565*** –0.597*** –0.340** –0.566***
 (0.109) (0.0894) (0.117) (0.117)
Like Clegg –0.109 –0.0763 –0.225* –0.0981
 (0.0892) (0.0732) (0.0968) (0.101)
Change in economy 0.267 –0.230 –0.0213 –0.142
 (0.217) (0.164) (0.241) (0.207)
Liberal Democrats 
































– likelihood of 
Conservatives winning 
constituency











– likelihood of Labour 
winning constituency
Constant –2.953** 0.00332 –1.994* –2.398**
 (0.910) (0.649) (0.969) (0.917)
N 875
* p<0.05 ** p<0.01 *** p<0.001
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Table A7.3 Linear regression model of change in feelings 
towards the Liberal Democrats between elections
 2015 2017






Liberal–authoritarian values 0.436*** –0.189***
 (0.0311) (0.0364)
Economic left–right values –0.363*** –0.458***
 (0.0336) (0.0394)
2010 Liberal Democrat Party identity strength
(base: no/other party id) 
 
Not very strong 0.933*** 0.739***
 (0.116) (0.133)
Fairly strong 1.548*** 1.152***
 (0.147) (0.162)





* p<0.05 ** p<0.01 *** p<0.001
Table A7.4 Multinomial logistic model of 2017 vote choice
Base = Liberal Democrats Conservatives Labour UKIP Green Party
Like Outcome Party 0.739*** 0.566*** 0.641*** 0.509***
 (0.0234) (0.0210) (0.0409) (0.0436)
Like Liberal Democrats –0.590*** –0.520*** –0.509*** –0.593***
 (0.0387) (0.0360) (0.0637) (0.0627)
Like Farron –0.138*** –0.0179 –0.128* 0.0185
 (0.0355) (0.0319) (0.0587) (0.0597)
Likelihood of Liberal 
Democrats winning 
constituency
–0.0786*** –0.0599*** –0.0577* –0.0598*
– likelihood of 
Conservatives winning 
constituency
(0.0168) (0.0141) (0.0276) (0.0269)
Likelihood of Liberal 
Democrats winning 
constituency
–0.156*** –0.218*** –0.160*** –0.161***
– likelihood of Labour 
winning constituency
(0.0171) (0.0154) (0.0286) (0.0282)
Constant 0.147 0.614** –2.076*** –1.903***
 (0.223) (0.194) (0.402) (0.380)
N 6302
* p<0.05 ** p<0.01 *** p<0.001
OUP CORRECTED PROOF – FINAL, 19/11/19, SPi
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X variables represent a vector of control variables (party ID, leader likes, Britishness, 
Scottishness, approval of Scottish government, devolution preferences, satisfaction with 
UK  democracy). Additional controls are also used (without recursive effects from other 
 variables) but not shown on the diagram: 2011 Holyrood SNP vote, 2010 Labour vote, age, 
political knowledge, and subjective class.
T1 = Feb/march (BESIP wave 1)
T2 = May 2014 (BESIP wave 2)
T3 = pre–referendum (SRS pre–referendum)
T4 = referendum (BESIP wave 3)
T5 = pre–election (BESIP wave 4)





























Figure A8.1 Simplified Illustration of the Cross–Lagged Model of Attitudes, 
Referendum Vote, And Party ID/Vote Intention used to Estimate The Impact of the 
Scottish Independence Refeferendum vote on General Election Vote Choice
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Table A8.1 Two parameter IRT model of Scottish devolution 
preferences (constant loading and varying preferences across waves)













































† Only asked in Scottish Referendum Study pre–referendum wave
* p<0.05 ** p<0.01 *** p<0.001
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Table A8.2 Cross-lagged model of attitudes, referendum vote, and party ID/vote intention 
used to estimate the impact of the Scottish independence referendum vote on general 
election vote choice






(measured in previous wave) t2 t3 t4
SNP Vote intention  –1.082 –1.078*
  (0.719) (0.646)
Party ID Labour 0.379 0.00447 0.00194
 (0.443) (0.399) (0.407)
Party ID SNP –0.498 0.858 0.570
 (0.805) (1.078) (1.581)
Like Salmond 0.225*** 0.144*** 0.136
 (0.0608) (0.0558) (0.0896)
Like Sturgeon   0.181**
   (0.0873)
Like Miliband –0.168** –0.136** –0.106
 (0.0662) (0.0608) (0.0838)
Britishness –0.0396 –0.154* 0.111
 (0.0896) (0.0836) (0.120)
Scottishness 0.00155 0.136* 0.0824
 (0.0822) (0.0770) (0.111)
Approve of Scottish Government 0.483 0.853*** 0.0419
 (0.317) (0.307) (0.406)
Devolution Preferences 0.690*** 0.208 0.834***
 (0.204) (0.191) (0.282)
Satisfaction with UK democracy –0.115 –0.245 –0.456**
 (0.171) (0.170) (0.208)
2011 Holyrood SNP vote 0.358 –0.117 –0.554
 (0.383) (0.398) (0.510)
2010 Labour vote 0.320 –0.316 –0.242
 (0.310) (0.298) (0.390)
Economy better off independence 0.376 1.582*** –1.536***
 (0.335) (0.364) (0.389)
Personally worse off independence –0.512 –0.784*** 0.216
 (0.319) (0.289) (0.614)
Referendum Yes vote (intention) 3.822*** 2.718*** 3.531***
 (0.323) (0.358) (0.451)
Age –0.0112 –0.0125 –0.0255*
 (0.0100) (0.00951) (0.0134)
Political knowledge –0.0148 –0.147 –0.0708
 (0.165) (0.159) (0.224)
Working class (subjective) 0.118 –0.200 –0.0957
 (0.279) (0.267) (0.357)
Constant –2.162** –0.133 –0.514
 (0.851) (0.841) (1.121)
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Table A8.3 Logistic regression model of SNP vote (intention) before and 
after the Scottish independence referendum among 2010 Labour voters 







Approval of Scottish Government 0.358 0.778**
 (0.439) (0.346)






Like Miliband –0.327*** –0.195***
 (0.0861) (0.0704)
Devolution preferences –0.397 0.481*
 (0.281) (0.258)
Satisfaction with UK democracy 0.0729 0.299
 (0.238) (0.189)
Referendum Yes vote (intention) 0.954** 1.652***
 (0.466) (0.356)
Labour party identity strength (base = non–identifier)  
Not very strong –0.548 0.345
 (0.575) (0.507)
Fairly strong –0.789 –0.146
 (0.518) (0.443)
Very strong –0.640 –1.216*
 (0.787) (0.621)
SNP party identity strength (base = non–identifier)  
Not very strong 1.095 0.769
 (0.710) (0.844)
Fairly strong 1.573** 2.920***
 (0.633) (0.943)
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Table A8.6 Multinomial logistic model of 2015 and 
2017 vote choice in Scotland
Base category = SNP 2015 2017
Conservative   




EU attitude 0.245* 1.300***
 (0.0993) (0.111)
Immigration attitude –0.0288 0.236*
 (0.107) (0.116)




Labour   




EU attitude –0.268*** 0.117
 (0.0776) (0.0892)
Immigration attitude –0.0448 0.106
 (0.0799) (0.0904)




Liberal Democrat   




EU attitude –0.0333 0.169
 (0.104) (0.130)
Immigration attitude –0.192 –0.175
 (0.111) (0.137)




UKIP   




EU attitude 1.437*** 1.552**
 (0.207) (0.527)
Immigration attitude 0.490** 1.169*
 (0.190) (0.497)
Continued
OUP CORRECTED PROOF – FINAL, 19/11/19, SPi
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Green Party   




EU attitude –0.294 0.292
 (0.173) (0.408)
Immigration attitude –0.0258 –0.446
 (0.170) (0.406)





* p<0.05 ** p<0.01 *** p<0.001
Table A8.6 Continued
Base category = SNP 2015 2017
OUP CORRECTED PROOF – FINAL, 19/11/19, SPi
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Table A9.1 Conditional logit model with alternative specific coefficients of 2017 vote 
choice




2015 Voted Conservative –1.464*** –0.847*** –2.769*** –1.818***
 (0.179) (0.199) (0.587) (0.420)
2015 Voted Outcome party 1.188*** 2.005*** 0.893** 1.433***
 (0.135) (0.179) (0.328) (0.259)




















EU distance: Conservatives 0.178*** 0.202*** 0.297*** 0.178***
 (0.0334) (0.0375) (0.0530) (0.0529)
EU distance: Outcome party –0.113*** –0.203*** –0.0202 –0.145**









































Constant 0.408 –0.199 –3.037*** –1.595***
 (0.215) (0.254) (0.489) (0.406)
N 3648
* p<0.05 ** p<0.01 *** p<0.001
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Identity scale questions
Party identity
Generally speaking, do you think of yourself as Labour, Conservative, Liberal Democrat, 
or what?
Conservative, Labour, Liberal Democrat, Scottish National Party (SNP) [Scotland only], Plaid 
Cymru [Wales only], United Kingdom Independence Party (UKIP), Green Party, Other party, 
No – None
Earlier you said that you tend to identify as [party]. Thinking about this party, how much 
do you agree with these statements?
When I speak about this party, I usually say ‘we’ instead of ‘they’. I am interested in what 
other people think about this party. When people criticize this party, it feels like a personal 
insult. I have a lot in common with other supporters of this party. If this party does badly 
in opinion polls, my day is ruined.* When I meet someone who supports this party, I feel 
connected with this person. When I speak about this party, I refer to them as ‘my party’.* 
When people praise this party, it makes me feel good.
Strongly disagree – Disagree – Agree – Strongly agree
* No equivalent referendum identity question asked and so these items are excluded from 
the scales used to compare referendum identity strength.
EU referendum identity
Thinking about the EU referendum, do you think of yourself as closer to either the ‘Leave’ 
or ‘Remain’ side? If yes, which one?
The remain side – The leave side – Neither
You said that you feel closer to the [EU referendum side]. Thinking about this side, how 
much do you agree with these statements?
When I speak about the [EU referendum side], I usually say ‘we’ instead of ‘they’. I am 
interested in what other people think about the [EU referendum side]. When people 
criticize the [EU referendum side], it feels like a personal insult. I have a lot in common 
with other supporters of the [EU referendum side]. When I meet someone who supports 
the [EU referendum side], I feel connected with this person. When people praise the 
OUP CORRECTED PROOF – FINAL, 19/11/19, SPi
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[EU referendum side], it makes me feel good. If the [EU referendum side] side does 
badly in opinion polls, my day is ruined*
Strongly disagree – Disagree – Agree – Strongly agree
*Waves 7–9 only and so excluded from the scales used to compare referendum identity 
strength.
Scottish independence referendum identity
Thinking about the Scottish independence debate, do you think of yourself as closer to 
either the ‘Yes’ (pro-independence) or ‘No’ (anti-independence) side? If yes, which one?
The Yes side – The No side – Neither
You said that you feel closer to the [Scottish referendum side]. Thinking about this side, 
how much do you agree with these statements?
When I speak about the [Scottish referendum side], I usually say ‘we’ instead of ‘they’. I am 
interested in what other people think about the [Scottish referendum side]. When  people 
criticize the [Scottish referendum side], it feels like a personal insult. I have a lot in com-
mon with other supporters of the [Scottish referendum side]. When I meet someone who 
supports the [Scottish referendum side], I feel connected with this person. When  people 
praise the [Scottish referendum side], it makes me feel good.
Strongly disagree – Disagree – Agree – Strongly agree
Table A10.1 Linear regression model of feelings towards the Labour and  
Conservative parties as a function of party and referendum identity strength
 Like Labour Like Conservatives
Conservative–Labour party identity strength –1.026*** 1.111***
 (0.0137) (0.0144)
Leave–Remain referendum identity strength –0.208*** 0.312***
 (0.0105) (0.0111)





* p<0.05 ** p<0.01 *** p<0.001
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